SA. BODYGUARD TRAINING ACADEMY.

VIP/CLOSE PROTECTION

SAQA US ID 11510

VIP/CLOSE PROTECTION

TRAINING MANUAL

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SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY

REGISTERED UNIT STANDARD:

SAQA UNIT STANDARD TITLE - Provide Close Protection to Designated Persons

SAQA US ID - 11510

NQF LEVEL-Level 5

PURPOSE OF THIS UNIT STANDARD

The purpose of this unit standard is to enable relevant personnel who are tasked with the protection of designated person(s) (principal), to provide protection to such person(s)(principa) against harmful threats whilst in transit, on foot or at a venue.

Benefit for society of this unit standard is that the person who completes this, will contribute to safety in society.

Person credited with this unit will be able to :

- Ascertain the principals brief and risk profile
- Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal.
- Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement.
- Terminate and review the protection operation.

LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE AND RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING

The following knowledge, skills, attitude and/or equivalent :

- A knowledge, comprehension and application of language and mathematical skills at NQF level 04.
- Competently drive a vehicle according to the K53 standards.
- Understand the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use of relevant firearms.
- Handle relevant firearm safely.
- Operate, use and maintain relevant firearm.
- Shoot relevant firearm competently.
- Use of firearms in tactical duty related situations.

UNIT STANDARD RANGE

The unit standard applies to the protection of designated persons against harmful threats, whether physical or electronic, direct and indirect.

HOW TO WORK THROUGH THIS STUDY UNIT

Welcome to your VIP Protection study unit. Before we begin, we'll introduce you to the icons we'll use in the unit.

Icons used in this study unit

Familiarise yourself with the icons below. They will act as learning signposts as you work through the study unit.

Icon	Description
	You must be able to complete the following learning outcomes after you have worked through the study unit. You will see that the study unit has outcomes, and each lesson also has outcomes. Make sure that you can show competence in each outcome. Competence means that you must be able to demonstrate that you can meet the outcome with skill and knowledge.
	This is an important definition that you have to remember.
	This is an important statement. Make sure that you understand it before you continue with the rest of the lesson.
	These questions help you establish whether you have understood the theory that we covered in the lesson. Each lesson has a set of self-assessment questions.
	These are the answers to the self-assessment questions. Please do not look at the answers before you have tried to answer the questions yourself.

The best way to study

To ensure that you get the full benefit of this distance learning study unit, we recommend that you do the following:

Work through each chapter carefully and diligently. Always bear in mind the outcomes that you have to achieve in that chapter.

Ensure that you answer all the self-assessment questions at the end of a chapter. Compare your answers with those provided.

If you come across any words that you do not understand, look up their meaning in a dictionary before you continue.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO CLOSE PROTECTION

Learning outcomes for Chapter 1

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

define a *principal* in your own words;

describe the aim of close protection; and

explain the need for close protection.

In this chapter we will introduce you to the profession of close protection. We'll assume that you'll be working in the private sector, and will give you essential background to close protection in this sector. However, we'll start by looking at:

a brief history of successful assassinations, and of how Dr Verwoerd's assassination led to the development of the South African Police Service close protection units;

the need for close protection; and

the aim of close protection.

In the next chapter we'll define terminology you'll need as a close protection operative (CPO). However, we cannot discuss any aspect of close protection without referring to the *principal*, so we'll define this term right at the start.



In the close protection profession, a *principal* is an individual or a group that requires personal protection. The principal may be a *VIP* – a 'very important person'. That is why this course is called VIP Protection – we'll assume that you'll be protecting VIPs such as the heads of giant international companies.

Principals may also be celebrities, sportspeople, families of business people, politicians, religious or cultural leaders, or private individuals under threat.

The primary function of CPO's is to protect their principal, or VIP. In the course we'll discuss how the various CPO positions can carry out this function by working effectively together as a team. (The public call *all* CPOs bodyguards, but bodyguards are only part of the team.) By way of introduction, we'll look briefly at assassinations and the history of the SAPS close protection unit.

A brief history of successful assassinations

All plants and animals protect themselves. The sea snail changes colour according to the colour of its surroundings, for instance, and the swallow darts in flight. Human beings have always been able to use a variety of ways to protect themselves. As we have created ever more sophisticated weaponry, so we have developed corresponding technology to protect against attack.

However, protection by dedicated persons – bodyguards or CPOs – remains one of the most effective ways of guarding individuals who are at risk of attack.

Among the individuals considered to be at particular risk of attack are those whose high office in the state exposes them to the threat of assassination. One of the best-known assassinations in history was that of the Roman emperor Julius Caesar, on 15 March 44 BC – just over 2 000 years ago. While the 20th century officially saw the end of the world's empires, the American president holds even more power than the emperors of old. Such heads of state are at particular risk of assassination.

We speak of *assassination* rather than *murder* when the victim is a prominent person, especially one working in the interests of a state, and the killing has been planned. (There is no legal difference between murder and assassination.)

The state will usually protect its president (or other head of state) with the help of its administrative organs, such as the police force.

However, CPOs from the private sector will always be in demand, to safeguard high-profile people whose death or kidnapping would benefit certain interest groups, or provide kidnappers with quick and easy revenue.

Table 1 below summarises some well-known assassinations.

TABLE 1: WELL-KNOWN ASSASSINATIONS

Date	Name of target, place	Apparent motive	Method or mode
44 BC	Julius Caesar, Rome	Political conspiracy	Knives
8 September 1901	President J McKinley, Buffalo, USA	Personal (psychopath)	Revolver in handkerchief, 1 shot
June 1914	Archduke Franz Ferdinand (heir to the Austrian throne), on a ceremonial visit to Sarajevo	Political (Serbian separatism)	Revolver, 2 rounds – target and wife killed (hand-grenade killed 2 protectors)
9 October 1934	King Alexander of Yugoslavia, on a visit to Marseille, France	Revolutionary	Automatic pistol, 2 rounds – target and wife killed
22 November 1963	President JF Kennedy, Dallas, Texas, USA	Personal (mentally disturbed person)	Sniper, 3 rifle shots, during presidential cavalcade
July 1976	E Biggs (UK ambassador to Ireland), Dublin, Ireland	Political	5 000 pounds of explosives detonated remotely on country road
4 November 1995	Y Rabin Tel Aviv, Israel	Political	Automatic pistol with hollow-point bullets
6 September 1966	Hendrik Verwoerd, Cape Town	Personal (psychopath)	Knife, in parliament
10 April 1993	Chris Hani, Boksburg	Political	Automatic pistol, outside his house

The real story behind some of these assassinations is still a matter of conjecture. In case studies and examples in this course we will present only the official, or generally accepted explanation of such events.

TABLE 2: WELL-KNOWN ASSASSINATIONS			
Date	**Name of target, place**	**Apparent motive**	**Method or mode**
4 April 1968	Dr Martin L King (Religious Fig	Personal Psychopath	Sniper-1 shot across str
20 Dec 1973	Minister C Blanco,Madrid,Spain	Territory or separa-tism/2 ETA terrorists	64 kg remote contr bomb under car.Minister and occu-pants killed.
24 June 1922	Minister Rathenau,German Min of Foreign Affairs	National aspirations. 2 opposition rebels	S/machinegun & hand-granade in in movement Minister killed
5 June 1968	Sen R Kennedy (Pres nominee) Los Angeles	Ideological/mental attacker	Revolver-8rounds. Senator killed
17 Sep 1980	Pres A Somoza, Nicaragua fled to Asunction,Paraguay	Political/National aspirations/FSLN rebels from Nicragua	S/machinegun & rocets. President hit 25 times, chauffeur also killed
6 Oct 1981	Pres A Sadat, Cairo Egypt	Religious/4 Muslim Fundamentalists	S/machineguns/ handgranades. Pres killed ,Vice Pres & Min of Defence wounded
5 Sept 1977	Dr Hans Schleyer Industrialist Cologne W Germany	Idiological RAF ter-rorrists	Smachine-guns,shotguns,pistol-80 rounds DR,chauffeur,3 CPO`s killed
16 March 1978	Pres Aldo Moro, Rome Italy	Political/Idiological Red Brigade terrorist	S/machine,pistols-90 rounds.pres kidnapped both chauf –4CPO`s killed
15 Nov 1983	Capt. George Tsantes (USA) CIA Rep Athens, Greece	Political /2, 17 No-vember terrorists on on motor cycles	9mm Pistols-killed in car on way to work Chauffeur also killed

TABLE 3: WELL-KNOWN ASSASSINATIONS			
Date	**Name of target, place**	**Apparent motive**	**Method or mode**
3 June 1982	Amb S Argov .(Israel) London England	Political/Idiological 1PLO terrorist supported by 2 other PLO terrorists	S/M Amb killed, **Terrorist killed by CPO**
30 March 1979	Min Neave London England	Political/Separatism or territory IRA terrorists	Bomb in engine of Min car
29 May 1977	Lord Mountbatten(UK) on holiday in London	Political/territory or separatism/IRA terrorists	Bomb planted in locker of motorboat. Detonated remotely. killed
17 Nov 1986	Dr George Besse. (industrialist) Paris, France	Political/Red Brigade terrorists (Women)	Pistols-shot twice 9mm parabellum-head chest-killed
15 Feb 1984	Genl RHunt (USA) Nato reppresentitive Rome Italy	Political Red Brigade	AK47-1 Round killed
7 Nov 1984	P/Min Indira Ghandi,Delhi,India	Territory or separatism/2Sheikh Rebels	S/Machine/revolver,30/6 rounds. Killed in prescence of CPO`s,Rebels killed by CPO`s
9 Sep 1986	Prof. Karl H Beckhurtz (Scientist) Munich W Germany	Political/Ideologist RAF terrorist	Bomb against tree next to road. Detonated remotely. Prof &chauffeur killed CPO`s in escort car injured
5 May 1986	Vice Adm Canessa,Lima Peru	Personal/shining path trrorists	S/Mahine/hand grenade when car stopped at robot
2921 Nov 1983	Genl G Lacaci Madrid Spain	Territory or Sepratism/3ETA terrorists	9mm Pistols /killed on the wayfrom church.13 rounds,5 in head Wife&CPO wounded

TABLE 4: WELL-KNOWN ASSASSINATIONS			
Date	**Name of target, place**	**Apparent motive**	**Method or mode**
27 Aug 1982	Amb.A Altikat,Ottowa,Canada	Territory or separatism /2 Armanian terrorists	9mm Pistols-2 rounds-killed in car at robot.
15 Nov 1983	Capt. George Tsantes (USA) CIA Rep Athens, Greece	Political /2, 17 November terrorists on on motorcycles	9mm Pistols-killed in car on way to work Chauffeur also killed
21 Nov 1983	Opposition leader Benigo Aquino Manilla Philippine Islands	Political/Army personal conspired to kill him	When he stepped of the plane- shot in the back of his head. Attacker was then shot by army
NOTES			

LIST OF ASSASSINATIONS / ATTEMTED ASSASSI-NATIONS CONTINUE

NAME: Pres. R. REAGAN, Washington DC (USA)
DATE: 30 March 1981
MOTIVE: Personal / mental
MODE: 6 rounds – 22 Devastator revolver, 4 hits. The President 1 protector, 1 secretary & 1 policeman

NAME: Pres. G. FORD, Sacramento, California
DATE: 5 September 1975
MOTIVE: Personal / religious / fanatic / mental – 1 female attacker
MODE: Fence line situation. When Pres. tried to greet her – pulled a 9mm pistol – stoppage arrested.

NAME: Pres. G. FORD, San Francisco, California
DATE: 22 September 1975
MOTIVE: Personal / member of Simbonic Liberation Army – 1 female attacker
MODE: Fence line situation. 1 shot fired with a .38 special revolver from across the street when the Pres. came out of a hotel. 13 metres – missed and hit a taxi driver

NAME: Pres. A. PINOCHET, El Molocoton, Chile
DATE: 7 September 1986
MOTIVE: Nationalistic aspirations / political / 18 Manuel Rodrigues Front terrorists
MODE: Presidential motorcade ambushed when he returned from his week end home. Rockets, machine guns. Pres escaped but slightly injured. 5 protectors dead, 11 injured.

NAME: Prime Minister M THATCHER, Blackpool, England
DATE: 12 October 1984
MOTIVE: Territory or separatism / IRA terrorists
MODE: Planted time bomb in a hotel room above her suite. Bomb exploded – rubble missed her by a mere minute

NAME: Pope JOHN PAUL II, Rome, Italy
DATE: 13 May 1981
MOTIVE: Political / 1 Grey Wolf terrorist from Turkey – supported by 2 other
MODE: 9mm pistol 5 rounds – Pope hit twice – 3 American tourists wounded

NAME: Queen ELIZABETH II (UK) Dunedin, New Zealand
DATE: 10 August 1981
MOTIVE: Personal / terrorist ideology / mental/ 17 year old school boy
MODE: .22 Rifle. Attacker used university building for a sniping position. Low calibre bullet fell short. Protector though it was a vehicle back firing

NAME: Dr. E ZIMMERMAN, Munich, W Germany
DATE: 1 February 1985
MOTIVE: Political / Ideological / 3 RAF terrorists (incl 1 woman)
MODE: Executed in his own house after terrorists gained entrance under false pretences. .38 or .357 revolver 1 dum dum bullet

NAME: Dr. R P AUDRUN (Industrialist) Paris, France
DATE: 25 January 1985
MOTIVE: Political / Ideological / 1 Action Directe terrorist
MODE: 9mm pistol- 8 rounds as he reversed his car into driveway – killed

NAME: Amb. R SYKES, The Hague, Netherlands
DATE: 4 April 1979
MOTIVE: Political / Territory or separatism (refer to EWART-BIGGS)

NAME: Princess ANNE & Capt MARK PHILLIPS, London, England
DATE: 20 March 1974
MOTIVE: Personal / Mental lone attacker
MODE: 2 Revolvers – 7 rounds. Protector hit 3 times. Chauffeur, 1 policemen & 1 journalist wounded

NAME: Min. C HERNU, Toulouse, France
DATE: 10 April 1983
MOTIVE: Personal / Lional REHAL was grieved by his brother's death in Chad during clashes with Libya
MODE: Entered military base where Minister was to receive bodies of soldiers that died in battle. Attacker stole car and tried to kill minister. Protector shot attacker through legs

NAME: Opposition Leader BANDRA-NAICKER,Sri Lanka
DATE: 17 December 1988
MOTIVE: Anarchism, opposition rebels involved
MODE: 2 bombs exploded when she arrived at a meeting. Protector made an escape with her.

NAME: Prime Minister ANEROOD JUGNAUTH, Port Louis, Mauritius
DATE: 5 November 1988
MOTIVE: Religious / 1 Muslim fanatic opposed to Hindu faction to which the Minister belongs.
MODE: 1 Revolver shot – Minister wounded in arm during a political rally

NAME: Amb. C BURKE ELBRICK (USA) Brazil
DATE: 4 September 1969
MOTIVE: Political ? ALN terrorist
MODE: Killed chauffeur and kidnapped Amb. For release of fellow terrorists in gaol

NAME: Gov. GEORGE WALLACE
DATE: 15 May 1972
MOTIVE: Personal / Mental / 1 attacker
MODE: Fence line situation Gov came to greet

NAME: Min. MOMFERATOS, Athens, Greece
DATE: 21 February 1983
MOTIVE: Political / 6 17 November terrorists
MODE: 9mm pistols – Blocked VIP car. Killed when hit by 8 rounds. Driver survived 4 bullets

NAME: Lord JUSTICE GIBSON (N-Ireland) between borders of Rep of Ireland and Northern Ireland
DATE: 25 April 1966
MOTIVE: Political / territory or separatism / IRA terrorists
MODE: Off-road car bomb detonated remotely when he and wife came home from holiday

NAME: Count F BERNADOTTE, (Sweden) Jerusalem
DATE: 17 September 1948
MOTIVE: Political / Territory or separatism / 2 Arab rebels dressed in Israeli uniform
MODE: S/machineguns / Blocked road with army jeep, killed Count and French army Colonel

NAME: JURGEN PONTO (Banker)
DATE: 30 July 1977
MOTIVE: Political / 3 RAF Terrorists
MODE: 9mm pistols – 6 rounds – killed the banker

STATISTICS ON ASSASSINATIONS

THESE STATISTICS WILL ASSIST YOU IN TERMS OF IDENTIFING THE MOST COMMEN METH-ODS USED BY ASSASSINS,AS WELL AS THE WEAPONRY THY USE, AND MOTIVES ETC.

MOTIVES

POLITICAL/ TERRORISM/ IDEOLOGICAL	42
PERSONAL/ MENTAL/ PSYHCOPATH	15

METHOD OR MODE

KNIVES	2	REVOLVER/ PISTOLS	24
SNIPER RIFLES	4	SUB-MACHINE GUNS	13
SHOTGUN	1	EXPLOSIVES/REMOTE	4
HANDGRANADES	3	CAR BOMBS	4
ROCKETS	2		

PLACE OF ASSASSIN/ ATTEMPT

VEHICLE RELATED	33	VENUE RELATED	18
AT ROBOT	3	FENCELINE	3

NO OF CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES KILLED (ONLY IN MENTIONED CASES) 23

NO OF DRIVERS KILLED **11**

NO OF CPO`S INJURED (WOUNDED) **18**

ASSASSINS KILLED BY PROTECTORS **4**

NO OF PROTECTORS WHO COULD ESCAPE WITH THEIR PRINCEPAL **1**

THESE STATISTICS ARE COMPILED FROM 57 ASSASSINS OR/AND ATTEMPTS.

ASSASSINATION THEORY

1. **Subject select**
2. **Surveillance**
   A. Home
   B. Work
   C. Route
   D .Recreation

Intelligence gathering

\

1. Home staff
2. Work staff
3. Route (eg. Garages, café's, etc)
4. Recreation (club members, etc)
5. Weak link identification
6. Disgruntled staff
7. Children –Family Members
8. Bad neighbours
9. Leaking confidential information

Planning

- Home
- Business
- Route
- Escape Routes
- Escape Tactics
- Escape Vehicles
- Safe houses
- Weapons selection
- Weapons dead drop
- Weapons dump
- Change of clothing
- Alibi's

Execution

- Recce (advance group)
- Signal group (comms)
- Support group
- Assault unit
- Assassination
- Transport
- Escape
- Weapons dump
- Escape
- Clothing
- Escape route
- Safe house
- Weapons dump
- Dispense
- Alibi's

CONTRA MEASURES

1. Know your client's

A. Status
B. The Threat
C. Vulnerability

2. Know your enemy

Opposition
Political
Business
Personal

3. Level of threat

Information (sensitive)
Financial gain
Personal gain
Political gain

4.. Category of Threat (Assassin)

Organized terrorist group
Syndicated crime group
Radical extremists
Freelance mercenaries (financial gain)
Mentally disturbed
Aggrieved employees
Religious fanatics (martyrs)

5. Profiles of assassins

Usually loners
Drifters
Psychologically unstable
Sense of greatness
Radicals (martyrs)

As you can see from the table above, an analysis of assassinations in the last 100 years reveals a variety of:

motives;

methods of attack (the method used is known as the *modus operandi*); and

vulnerable situations in which an attack can occur.

In this course we'll explore each of these three aspects of assassinations.

Origin of the SAPS's National Protection Service

The assassination of Prime Minister HF Verwoerd by Dimitri Tsafendas, on
6 September 1966, has arguably been the most significant event in South African close protection history.

It led to the creation of the Physical Security Services Unit, a unit independent from the Special Guard Unit, to protect the parliamentary complex. (The Special Guard Unit, created in 1965, had concentrated mainly on the static protection of ministers' residences.) Later the State President's Unit was established to take care of all aspects of the president's protection.

Close protection in its current form was first introduced as a function of the old South African Police VIP Protection Unit, founded in 1987. This unit's main function was the protection of ministers and deputy ministers while in transit. This function has since developed into the modern close protection function.

After the 1994 general election, this unit underwent transformation and was renamed the National Protection Service (NPS). The State President, state dignitaries, members of the defence force and so on are exclusively protected by SAPS's VIP protection services. The private sector close protection industry, which we'll discuss shortly, provides *no* protection to the public sector.

In the chapter on case studies, we'll discuss another historic assassination of a South African leader, that of Chris Hani. In April 1993 Mr Hani, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and respected ANC leader, was assassinated in his driveway as he returned home from buying a newspaper.
Mr Hani had given his bodyguards the day off.

The need for close protection

To take an extreme case, it is generally accepted that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg thrones, precipitated World War I, a war that devastated Europe. In this case it is therefore easy to argue that the loss of the principal's life lead to:

the loss of millions of other lives;

heavy financial losses;

long-term political instability; and

wide-ranging power struggles and civil wars.

Protecting a principal's life can therefore be a critical function of the close protection operative! However, the aim of close protection is broader than this.

The aim of close protection

The aim of close protection is to proactively and reactively protect VIPs against:

direct personal risks, such as murder, kidnapping and assault; and

indirect personal risks, such as threats, intimidation and *crimen injuria*.

Background to close protection agencies in the private sector

SA.Bodyguard Association is a controlling body in the private sector and regulates its members by means of Registration. SABA will provide your practical training and a SABA certificate in close protection. Under the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001, you must be registered with SABA *and* the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This regulation is vital, as the market for close protection in South Africa continues to grow.

We refer to the business entities that offer close protection services in the private sector as *agencies*. (The agencies are often close corporations, rather than companies.) The agencies contract out their close protection services, and CPOs, to *clients* who require them, on either a short-term or a long-term basis.

Sometimes the operations required are intensive, for instance when the clients are organising a one-week international sporting event or series of concerts, or bringing the head of a multinational company such as Coca-Cola to South Africa for three days. Protection may be required on a long-term basis when the principal resides in South Africa, for instance a high-profile businessperson or celebrity based in the country.

Agencies may service the tourism industry, cricket, rugby, football and golfing events organisers, modelling agencies, the film industry, celebrities, high-profile business people (such as Chief Executive Officers or CEOs), and so on. CPOs' working environment will vary from one operation to the next, and they will always be meeting new people. Giant international corporations on visits to their affiliates in South Africa provide a substantial part of the close protection business in the country.

Let's imagine that you are a CPO whose agency has been contracted to protect the head of Coca-Cola – a VIP – on a visit to Coca-Cola in South Africa. The visit will be part business and part leisure, and Coca-Cola's head (a man) will be bringing his wife and child with him. You may be one of the CPOs assigned to protect the VIP himself. You must protect him 24/7, accompanying him from hotel to offices to dinner, and so on, in case someone tries to kidnap or kill him. If so, the risk factor will switch instantly from low to high. You will be carrying out real *VIP* protection, in other words guarding the VIP himself. Other CPOs, usually a man and a woman, will be assigned to protect the VIP's family wherever they go, as they are soft targets for kidnappers. They will be giving close protection that does not strictly qualify as *VIP* protection.

If you have the right personality and an aptitude for skills such as close-quarter combat, medical,or communication skills, you could have a long and rewarding career as a CPO. We'll take a closer look at what it takes to be a CPO in a later chapter.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 1

1. How many bodyguards were present the day Chris Hani was killed, and why?

2. What is the aim of VIP protection?

3. What is a *principal* in the close protection profession?



Self-assessment answers 1

1. Chris Hani gave his bodyguards the day off, so no bodyguards were present when he was killed.

2. The aim of close protection is to proactively and reactively protect VIPs against:

   direct personal risks, such as murder, kidnapping and assault; and

   indirect personal risks, such as threats, intimidation and *crimen injuria*.

3. In the close protection profession, a *principal* is an individual or a group that requires personal protection. The principal may also be called a *VIP* – a 'very important person'. Principals may be politicians, military officials, civil servants, business people, religious leaders, cultural leaders or private individuals who need protection.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all your learning outcomes, move on to Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we'll introduce you to the various members of the close protection team, and explain some of the terms they'll use when out on an operation.

CHAPTER 2: TERMINOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF A CLOSE PROTECTION TEAM

Learning outcomes for Chapter 2

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

identify the typical positions within the close protection team;

explain the function of each position in the close protection team; and

understand and explain the basic terminology that CPOs use.

The close protection team

Before we describe the various members of the close protection team, we'll define *CPOs* and the *close protection team* in more detail.

The close protection team is assigned to carry out an operation with the aim of *protecting the principal*. The close protection team comprises various CPOs, who are all responsible for the protection of the principal. Different members of the team will accompany the principal to various venues, secure the venues, and supply weapons and equipment.

CPOs are members of the close protection team, who are all trained in close protection skills. CPOs may be tasked with a variety of duties.

For example, a CPO may be a driver, part of the advance team, or part of the personal escort section (PES) team,or back-up team. The *bodyguard* is a member of the PES team.

While CPO positions may vary according to the number of CPOs available for an operation, the close protection team will usually include the following positions:

the personal escort section (PES) team;

the bodyguard (BG), the team leader (TL),the points man (P), left flank, (LF), right flank (RF), and tail or rear.

the advance team (we'll cover some of knowledge you'll need in this team);

the drivers (we'll cover some of the knowledge you'll need as a driver);

the mobile support team or back-up team (we'll cover some of the knowledge you'll need in this team); and

the operational commander (OC).

Apart from the principal, the close protection team may need to liaise with support staff, the police, managers of various venues, dignitaries and so on.
The close protection team is similar to a rugby or football team in that every member can make a name for himself or herself in his or her given position in the team while making an equally valuable contribution to the team's goals.

We'll look at each of these positions in the CPO team more detail. Firstly, however, we'll outline the position of close protection detail commander.

Close protection detail commander



The *close protection detail commander* is responsible for:

guides close protection training;

co-ordinating protection operations;

managing personnel provision; and

liaising with senior management and principals.

We'll define 'detail' a little later in the chapter. Note that the close protection detail commander is in charge of *everyone* who may be involved in protection operations, not just CPOs. Usually, management at the agency's offices will take care of the administrative side of operations, together with the advance team.

Personal escort section (PES) team



The close protection operatives that accompany the principal during all movements, from point A to B and back to A, are called the *personal escort section (PES) team*. It is their task to cover and evacuate the principal in the event of an attack or other emergency. Usually the principal may not move without them. The team may comprise 2 to 18 members, but usually has from 5 to 9 members.

As well as the skills we'll cover, PES team members need practical skills, such as unarmed combat skills, which you'll learn in your practical training. They must be prepared to die for the principal! All team members have equal skills and status. To be promoted beyond the team, members must complete an advanced course. The PES team includes the *bodyguard* and a *team leader*.

Bodyguard (sometimes called the 'main bodyguard')



The *bodyguard*, or 'main' bodyguard, usually the biggest member of the PES team, never leaves the principal's side during an operation. He or she drives together with the principal, and along with the team leader directs the efforts of the team, radioing the leader with updates of the principal's movements and to ask for clearance.

Close protection team leader (TL)



The *team leader (TL)* is responsible for leading a close protection or PES team, and supervising the team's tasks and activities during a protective operation (using two-way radios). For instance, the TL gives the bodyguard clearance to proceed from a car or building. Team members may take turns at being TL (except for the bodyguard, who always stays with the principal). The TL must establish a sound working relationship with principals, so as to assess their needs and to inform them of protection measures.

In some operations the team leader may also act as *operational commander*, which we'll define a little later.

The number of members in the PES team will vary widely and depend on the risk factor and the client's finances. For example, in a low-risk situation, just one bodyguard, say to protect a businessperson, could be sufficient. If the VIP received a direct physical threat, this would constitute a medium- to high-risk threat, and the team should include at least between two and six CPOs. If the VIP was a very high-profile person who had received a recent death threat, the team should comprise between seven and twelve members.

As a general rule, you will always be safe with a seven-person team.

Advance team

The advance team comprises a member or members of the close protection team who go ahead of the PES team to secure a venue that the principal will visit. A useful team size is five members. The advance team is responsible for planning and implementing effective close protection measures at the venue, 'sweeping' or examining the building and keeping it 'sterile' or safe. As in the PES team, all team members have equal status.

For example, a hotel placement with a six-person advance team would proceed as follows. After the clearance process, also known as *sweeping*, one CPO would check the hotel room, one CPO the level above the principal room, one CPO the lift, passage and top of the stairway, one CPO the ground floor, lift and stairway, one CPO the lobby and reception desk, and one CPO would sweep the hotel entrance and parking area and then wait outside for the VIP.

During the planning phase of an operation, the advance team will visit all venues that the principal may visit, a day or a few hours in advance. They will plan and familiarise themselves with all routes that the principal's vehicle may take, including contingency routes. They will map out and study every detail of the operation *together with management and staff at the office*.

When they arrive at the venue, the advance team will secure the venue, making sure that no cars park at the main entrances to the venue, securing toilets and other rooms, and so on, and searching for bombs, snipers, bugging devices and escape routes. The advance team will receive and support the PES team when it arrives and keep the venue sterile until after it has left. We'll look at venue protection in a separate chapter.

Driver

A driver is a member of the close protection team who is responsible for the safe driving and upkeep of a principal or escort vehicle. A driver must be trained in advanced driving techniques and basic mechanics. We will discuss motorcades in a separate chapter. The driver should always remain with the vehicle, to ensure its safety and to respond at departure phase.

Mobile support team (back-up vehicle)

The mobile support team is a team of CPOs who are responsible for providing tactical support, such as weapons and equipment, to the close protection team in the event of an attack or other emergency. We'll discuss weapons later in this unit. In the private sector, mobile support is usually called the *back-up vehicle*.

Operational commander (OC)



The *operational commander (OC)* is given overall command of a specific protection operation, such as a banquet or rally. From the control or operational (ops) centre at a venue, the OC will
co-ordinate the functions of the close protection team and all the other security components at the venue. Sometimes the team leader will perform the OC's tasks.

Often OCs will be CPOs who are senior in age and experience to other CPOs, and whose physical skills have become a little less valuable to the team than their maturity and experience.

Terminology used by the close protection team

Now that you're familiar with the structure of the close protection team, we'll explain some of the terms with which team members must be familiar:

protective detail; PES team; point,right flanc,left flanc,tail, main bodyguard,team leader, all of them called CPO`s ,solo,

Principal,vehicle; lead vehicle,back-up vehicle, form a motorcade (assigned drivers), motorcade commander, escort vehicle;

safe haven; holding room; control centre;(ops room),low, medium,high,and extreme high risk,

security perimeter; sweep, evacuate, open and close formation, diamond, box, circle, open v, wedge, foot formations, leap frog,

Zig zag, pyramid, j-turn,y-turn, ramming,

Foot Formations-Drills-Positions and functions will be discussed in full in the chapter (Foot formations)

Protective detail



The *protective detail* means all security components responsible for protecting the principal, including the close protection team and visible security. The detail includes *all* members of the operation.

Principal vehicle

The *principal vehicle* is the vehicle in which the principal is transported. It is usually a luxury sedan car. The principal's vehicle will always drive in the middle of a motorcade, protected by escort vehicles in front of and behind it.

Escort vehicles

As their name implies, *escort vehicles* are the vehicles that escort the principal vehicle in a motorcade. There are usually two escort vehicles to protect the principal vehicle. The escort vehicle in front of the principal vehicle is called the lead car, and the vehicle behind the principal vehicle is the back-up vehicle.

The advance vehicle will not form part of the motorcade, as the advance team will drive well ahead of the principal vehicle to secure the venue.

Safe haven

The *safe haven* is a secured room in a house, office, hotel and so on, with reinforced walls and doors, that is used to conceal and protect the principal in the event of an attack or contingency. The safe haven must be equipped with a panic alarm, communication system, emergency rations and first aid kit.

Holding room

The *holding room* is a secure room at a venue to be visited by the principal. It is usually a private room set aside for the principal's convenience and privacy. The room should have a telephone and bathroom. It is sometimes used as a temporary safe haven.

Control centre



The *control centre* is the command and communication centre at a venue, from where the protection operation is directed. The OC, or sometimes the team leader, will be in charge of the control centre. The control centre may also be called the *ops room*.

Security perimeter

The *security perimeter* is a secured area under control of the close protection team or other security component.

The area must have been searched and the perimeter secured with barricades, access control, patrols, electronic equipment and so on. There may be more than one perimeter, for example an inner and an outer perimeter. Reference is often made to concentric rings of protection, which we will explain under the next sub-heading, 'Security post.'

Security post

The *security post* is an area of responsibility that forms part of the security network. It can be a mobile or a static post. There are three basic posts:

the access control point;

the observation post; and

the specific order or task.

Access control point

The *access control point (ACP)* is a point through which individuals have to pass in order to gain access to a restricted area. The purpose of the ACP is:

to provide access control to a restricted area;

to control the access of authorised personnel, persons, vehicles, parcels and so on; and

to prevent the access of unauthorised personnel, persons, parcels and so on.

Observation post

The *observation post* is a security function with the responsibility to observe a specific area and activities in that area. The purpose of an observation post is:

to observe a specific area;

to observe people, vehicles and goods in that area; and

to report all valid information to the control centre.

Specific order or task

The *specific order or task* refers to any other specific task regarding the protection of a principal, such as:

driving the principal vehicle;

driving an escort vehicle;

being part of control centre staff; or

being a bodyguard.

Motorcade

A *motorcade* is a planned and controlled movement of principal vehicle and escort vehicles with the purpose of protecting the principal while in transit.

Cordoning situation

A *cordoning situation* is a security function during which several police officers, soldiers, marshals or security staff line the sides of the route through which the principal will move, to provide maximum protection against crowds or attack.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 2

1. Define *close protection operative (CPO).*

2. Define *personal escort section (PES) team* and *bodyguard*.

3. What is the *protective detail*?



Self-assessment answers 2

1. CPOs are members of the close protection team who are trained in the skills of close protection. CPOs may be tasked with a variety of duties. For example, a CPO may be a driver, or part of the personal escort section or the advance team. When the close protection team is assigned to carry out an operation, the aim of each CPO in the team is to protect the principal.

2. The close protection operatives that accompany the principal during all movements, from point A to B and back to A, are called the personal escort section (PES) team. Their task is to cover and evacuate the principal in the event of an attack or other emergency. Usually the principal may not move on his or her own without the PES team.

   The bodyguard is the senior member of the personal escort section. He or she drives in the principal vehicle with the principal, and helps to direct the efforts of the personal escort section. The bodyguard never leaves the principal's side during an operation.

3. The protective detail means all security components responsible for protecting the principal, which will include the close protection team and visible security. The detail includes *all* members of the operation.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the terminology and structure of a close protection team, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Profile and code of conduct of a close protection operative'. In that chapter you'll learn about the attributes and skills that a CPO needs, and about the code of conduct the CPO should adhere to.

CHAPTER 3: PROFILE AND CODE OF CONDUCT OF A CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVE



Learning outcomes for Chapter 3

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

describe the ideal profile of a CPO; and

describe and understand how to apply the code of conduct of a CPO.

Close protection requires close interaction between the principal and CPOs. CPOs should therefore be socially skilled, and act so as to enhance the public image of the principal and the protection profession. They should be discreet, and refrain from flashing their weapons in public or pushing people around.

In order for CPOs to be regarded as professionals, the following is required:

public recognition that the occupation is a profession;

specialised knowledge and skills on the part of the CPOs;

international peer-evaluation and recognition of these skills;

the maintenance of task-specific standards;

personal dedication to the profession's ideals, ethics and code of conduct, so that they form the basis of all the CPOs' decisions and actions; and

thorough preparation of CPOs for a specific protection programme.

As we've stated, the close protection profession is controlled and regulated by SABA, which also provides CPO training. To become a successful CPO, you should have certain personal, physical and social attributes and skills, which we'll list below. CPOs should also adhere to the profession's code of conduct, which we'll paraphrase later in this chapter.

Profile of a CPO

To become a CPO, you should have a matriculation-level qualification. All other training will be provided, through this INTEC course, and through SABA's hands-on training. However, it is also very important that you have most of the attributes we'll describe in this section.

Personal attributes required

A CPO should:

be intelligent and confident;

have a positive attitude and be committed to the profession of protection;

have a well-balanced personality, with no serious psychological problems;

have a natural inclination to explore matters further, rather than accepting them at face value;

be self-disciplined and responsible;

be able to stay alert during long working hours; and

remain calm in stressful situations.

Physical attributes required

A CPO should:

be physically fit, without any disabilities;

be neat and professional in appearance;

be of a similar build and height to the principal (especially PES members);

maintain a healthy lifestyle; and

be physically capable of working long hours under adverse conditions and coping with frequent unplanned absences from home.

Social attributes required

The CPO should:

have a broad general knowledge;

be socially skilled and adaptable, well spoken, a good communicator;

be familiar with protocol and etiquette (discussed in this study unit);

maintain a sober lifestyle, both on and off duty;

be punctual and courteous; and

be diplomatic and trustworthy.

Skills required

The CPO should have all the skills that we'll discuss in this study unit. SABA provides all the practical training required. Fully trained CPOs should:

be familiar with the legal issues regarding the protection profession (we'll discuss legal aspects of self-defence in the 'Self-defence' chapter);

be able to co-ordinate and plan protection operations;

be trained in most of the following close protection disciplines:

- identification of explosives (discussed in this unit);
- protection theory and practices (discussed in this unit);
- advanced driving techniques (required by drivers);
- unarmed combat (beyond the scope of this study unit);
- surveillance and counter-intelligence (discussed in this unit);

have a well-balanced personality, with no serious psychological problems;

have a natural inclination to explore matters further, rather than accepting them at face value;

be self-disciplined and responsible;

be able to stay alert during long working hours; and

remain calm in stressful situations.

Physical attributes required

A CPO should:

be physically fit, without any disabilities;

be neat and professional in appearance;

be of a similar build and height to the principal (especially PES members);

maintain a healthy lifestyle; and

be physically capable of working long hours under adverse conditions and coping with frequent unplanned absences from home.

Social attributes required

The CPO should:

have a broad general knowledge;

be socially skilled and adaptable, well spoken, a good communicator;

be familiar with protocol and etiquette (discussed in this study unit);

maintain a sober lifestyle, both on and off duty;

be punctual and courteous; and

be diplomatic and trustworthy.

Skills required

The CPO should have all the skills that we'll discuss in this study unit. SABA provides all the practical training required. Fully trained CPOs should:

be familiar with the legal issues regarding the protection profession (we'll discuss legal aspects of self-defence in the 'Self-defence' chapter);

be able to co-ordinate and plan protection operations;

be trained in most of the following close protection disciplines:

- identification of explosives (discussed in this unit);
- protection theory and practices (discussed in this unit);
- advanced driving techniques (required by drivers);
- unarmed combat (beyond the scope of this study unit);
- surveillance and counter-intelligence (discussed in this unit);

Dress and grooming

Dressing appropriately, normally in clean and neat clothing, will help a bodyguard to gain the necessary acceptance and remain inconspicuous in a given situation. (See the chapter on etiquette for details.)

Alcohol and drugs

The CPO should follow these rules regarding drugs and alcohol:

Drink *no* alcohol while on duty, and don't drink in excess when off duty.

Using drugs is a criminal offence, and may also jeopardise the safety of the principal, yourself and your team.

Check that any medication you use will not affect you negatively, for instance, impair your ability to reason or react quickly.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 3

1. List three personal attributes that you would look for in a potential CPO.
2. List three physical attributes required in a potential CPO.
3. List three social attributes required in a potential CPO.
4. List three skills that a potential CPO must acquire.
5. List six general principles that a CPO should adhere to, and that should be included in the code of conduct for CPOs.



Self-assessment answers 3

1. *Personal attributes of a CPO*

   A CPO should (give any three):

   be intelligent and confident;

   have a positive attitude and commitment to the profession of protection;

   have a well-balanced personality, with no serious psychological problems;

   have a natural inclination to explore matters further, rather than accepting them at face value;

5. *General principles that a CPO should adhere to*

The CPO should (give any six):

protect any principal that he or she is assigned to, impartially and without prejudice;

render effective and friendly service, regardless of political or religious beliefs, personal feelings, race, gender or ethnicity;

treat subordinates and senior personnel with respect;

make personal sacrifices to protect the principal;

set a good example in his or her personal life;

develop and practise self-control, and remain honest in thought, word and deed, both on and off duty;

prevent personal feelings, prejudice, antagonism or friendship from influencing his or her loyalty and judgement;

receive no unlawful reward or compensation;

report all incidents and activities to the control or operations room;

keep weapons concealed at all times;

ensure that his or her personal behaviour is exemplary, and that he or she never compromises his or her own integrity or the team's integrity;

actively promote the ideals, image and group spirit of the protection team;

use the least possible degree of force when persuasion, advice and warning has failed to protect the principal; and

show professional courtesy, as follows:

use good grammar and diction, and avoid streetwise expressions;

give service with a smile;

request rather than demand; and

practise diplomacy and tact.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Protocol and etiquette'. This topic is especially important to potential members of the personal escort section team.

CHAPTER 4: PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE



Learning outcomes for Chapter 4

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

describe the official protocol with which a CPO should be familiar; and

describe the etiquette with which a CPO should be familiar.

Introduction

The word *etiquette* refers to the accepted code of behaviour in a community. The official code governing the behaviour of state officials and diplomats, which has become almost universal, is called *protocol*. As a CPO, you should be aware of the etiquette governing behaviour in any given situation, and also adhere to the correct protocol if your principal receives invitations from dignitaries.

While it is often more rewarding to be natural and sincere in your interaction with others than to follow a code of behaviour, in your capacity as a CPO you *do* need to keep to basic etiquette. Following the accepted rules of behaviour will allow you to remain inconspicuous, and make it easier to look professional and build a good relationship with your principal. When your principal mixes with state officials or dignitaries, you should also learn the necessary protocol. Note that etiquette and protocol may vary from one country to another. We'll describe various rules of protocol first, then focus on etiquette.

Protocol



The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines *protocol* as follows:

diplomatic etiquette.

Your principal may well be a high-profile person who mixes with ministers, mayors and so on. As a professional who may accompany the principal, you should ensure that you know the official protocol – how to behave towards dignitaries, how to address them, how to introduce other people to them, what to do at formal dinners. For instance, you should know that guests arrive at an official reception according to the official order of precedence.

We'll discuss the following aspects of protocol, and refer to some other aspects under 'Etiquette' (if you are ever in any doubt, ask dignitaries' staff for advice!):

forms of address;

formal dinners and luncheons, receptions and cocktail parties; and

placement in vehicles and elsewhere.

Forms of address

Table 2 below shows the accepted forms of address in oral (spoken) introductions and other forms of oral address in South Africa.

TABLE 2: ACCEPTED FORMS OF ORAL ADDRESS

Position	Correct way to address this person
The State President	'Mr State President' or 'Madam State President'
Cabinet minister	'Mr Minister' or 'Madam Minister'
Ambassadors	'Mr, or Madam, Ambassador' or 'Your Excellency'
Minister's plenipotentiary	'Mr Minister' or 'Madam Minister'
Charge d'affaires	'Mr, or Madam, Charge d' affaires'
Chief Justice and other judges	'Judge'
Speaker of the House of Assembly	'Madam Speaker' or 'Mr Speaker'
Leader of the official opposition	'Sir' or 'Madam'
Head of the SADF	As appropriate, for example 'General' or 'Admiral'
Administrator of a province	'Mr Administrator' or 'Madam Administrator'
Commissioner-General	'Mr, or Madam, Commissioner-General'

Formal dinners and luncheons

Arrival of guests

It is impolite to the host to arrive late for dinner (supper) or luncheon (lunch). In addition, if there is to be a guest of honour – someone that the guests have been invited to meet – then other guests should try to arrive before this person.

On the other hand, if your principal *is* a guest of honour, then it is helpful if he or she (along with his or her spouse and bodyguard) arrives about 10 minutes *after* the appointed time. This will give the other guests time to arrive and make it easier for the hosts to introduce the guest of honour to them.

On arrival, guests should make straight for their hosts in order to greet them. Even if the room is crowded and the hosts are temporarily occupied, newly arrived guests should not stop to talk with other guests or accept refreshments on the way. For their part, the hosts should arrange for all guests to be presented to the guest of honour, and to each other, before the meal. If by some oversight guests have not been properly introduced, it is correct and polite for them to talk with other guests after introducing themselves.

A convention from more patriarchal days is that, when a head of state is to be entertained, the host must greet him at the entrance to the official residence. As this convention assumes that the head of state is male, the hostess need be present to greet him only if his wife accompanies him. It is also assumed that the hostess is merely the wife of the host, and not a dignitary in her own right. Remember, if the hostess is a high-ranking dignitary in her own right, or if the head of state is a woman, ask dignitaries' staff for advice about the protocol. Now we'll explain table settings, so you will recognise them at a formal dinner.

Table settings

Serving plates

When guests enter the dining room, there should be a service plate in each place. This plate will normally remain until the meat course is served, when it will be replaced by the meat plate. However, *silver* service plates often remain until the end of the meal. There must always be a plate in front of the guests, who should never have to look at the bare tablecloth or table mats. As each plate is removed from the table, it must immediately be replaced by another plate, for the next course.

Cutlery

Cutlery should be arranged so that guests start at the *outside* of the place-setting, and proceed inwards towards the plate as they select the appropriate utensils for each course.

Glasses

The water goblet should always be filled at the start of the meal. Glasses should be arranged so that the water goblet is nearest the right-hand top corner of the place-setting. The wine glasses should be arranged in the order in which they are to be used.

Removal of condiment containers and so on

Condiments include salt and pepper. After the meat course, and before the dessert is served, all condiments, remains of bread sticks or rolls, and so on must be removed from the table.

Smoking

During a formal meal, it is impolite to smoke until the hosts have given some indication that this is in order. The absence of ashtrays on the table may be taken as an indication that you should not smoke until the hosts have asked that cigarettes be offered to guests. At very formal official dinners, you should never smoke before the formal toast to the head of state.

Drinks

Sherry is served before the meal or with the soup. Dry white wine accompanies fish and poultry. Champagne may be served throughout the meal. Full-bodied red wine is served with roasts. Red wine is served with meat, game and cheese. Semi-sweet white wine accompanies dessert. Liqueurs are served with coffee.

To enable guests to fully appreciate the various wines, the correct glass should be provided for each wine. Coloured wine glasses should never be used.

Commencing and finishing a course

At the beginning of the meal, and as each course is served, the hostess should take up the appropriate cutlery and begin to eat. This will indicate to the guests that they may begin the course. Similarly, the hostess should ensure that all the guests have finished eating before she indicates the end of the course by laying down her cutlery.

When wine is served, the host or hostess should take a sip without delay. This indicates to the guests that they may begin to drink.

Departure

The guests of honour should be the first to leave the function. It used to be the responsibility of the senior woman (the wife of the highest-ranking accompanied man) to make a move to leave, even if an unaccompanied man of higher rank was present. Check which rule is in force before the event.

In the case of a luncheon party, departure is usually shortly after coffee. In the case of a dinner it is usually about ¾ hour after coffee. At some dinners, however, the guests of honour may observe that music or other entertainment is being provided, and stay longer.

When they decide to leave, the guests of honour should say goodnight to each of the other guests and then take leave of their host and hostess, who will accompany them as far as the door. The other guests will then be free to take their leave after an appropriate interval.

You will learn the exact protocol through experience, but as a professional you should ensure you know exactly what to do *before* any operation begins.

Receptions and cocktail parties

Arrival and departure

In the case of formal dinners, it is essential that guests arrive and take their designated places *before* the time indicated on the invitation, and depart only after the completion of the ceremonies and the retirement of the host.

Your time of arrival at and departure from receptions or cocktail parties can be more flexible. However, if the invitation card specifies '6 pm to 8 pm', for example, you should try to arrive by 6.20 pm at the latest – otherwise at a large party staff may have difficulty in locating the hosts if they have gone to mingle with guests. You should not leave later than 8 pm, unless the hosts are persistent in their request that guests stay a little longer. It is quite permissible to leave after spending only an hour at the party, excusing yourself on the grounds of another engagement.

If the invitation stipulates the time of the party as merely '6.30 pm', for example, guests should not interpret this as an invitation to stay as long as they wish. They should leave after a reasonable interval on the assumption that no cocktail party can be expected to last more than two hours.

If your principal is a guest of honour at the reception, you should both arrive shortly *before* the appointed time, so that it is easier for the hosts to introduce the other guests to him or her as they arrive. (This protocol is different from that for formal dinners.)

Even at the most crowded party, at which the hosts may already have left the receiving post, guests should seek out and greet both host and hostess before conversing with other guests or accepting refreshments. When they depart, they should take leave of both host and hostess.

Placement in vehicles and elsewhere

If your principal were a high-ranking person travelling with others of varying ranks, then following rules regarding placement would apply:

It is an internationally accepted rule that the right-hand side of the rear seat of a car is the place of honour. However, in South Africa, the *left-hand side* of the rear seat of the car is the place of honour.

The senior-ranking person enters cars, aeroplanes and boats *last*. However, he or she leaves them first.

The senior-ranking person enters a room first and leaves first.

A junior-ranking person walks and sits on the left of the senior.

Etiquette



The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines *etiquette* as follows:

conventional rules of personal behaviour in polite society.

To reword this definition slightly, etiquette is a set of (usually unwritten) conventions about acceptable behaviour in a certain society or social group. These conventions differ from one society to another, and change over time.

Etiquette is often based on 'good manners', or simple consideration for the needs of others. We'll discuss the following aspects of European etiquette:

introductions;

invitations to formal and informal receptions;

visiting restaurants with a formal party, and table manners;

dress (attire) and appearance in general;

body language;

telephone usage; and

letters.

Introductions

The purpose of an introduction is to allow one person to get to know another. It is therefore helpful to give some background about each person when you introduce two people to each other, so that a conversation will flow naturally. For example, 'Ms Dlamini, may I introduce Mr Nick Humphries, the new head of the Marketing Division. Ms Dlamini is the CEO of ABC Products.'

It is unfair to introduce someone to a large group of people, as it is almost impossible for someone new to remember everyone's names. However, you can train yourself to remember names, by concentrating on and repeating each name out loud as you are introduced.

Protocol regarding introductions

Generally accepted conventions regarding official introductions include the following:

Introduce men to women, irrespective of marital status. It is still appropriate to introduce a young, comparatively junior-ranking woman to a high-ranking male such as the CEO of a company.

Introduce single people to married people of the same sex who are of similar or lower rank.

Introduce younger people to older people of their own sex and marital status.

Men should always rise when being introduced, and when a woman enters the room. It is also polite for someone to stand up when introduced to a notable older person of the same sex, whatever the marital status of the two parties.

Women should *not* stand up when men are introduced. They should stand if they are introduced to a high-ranking dignitary such as a cabinet minister or an ambassador. Ladies should extend their hands first. Handshakes should be firm but not too vigorous.

When introducing two people, first say the name of the person you wish to honour, followed by the words 'may I present'. Then say the name of the lower-ranking person, adding a few words regarding the identities of each party.

For example:

'Mr Ambassador, may I present Mr Smith, who is an under-secretary in the Department of Commerce.'

'Madam Prime Minister, may I present Mrs Green, who is the wife of the American Vice-Consul in Cape Town.'

Invitations to formal and informal receptions

You should be able to recognise and reply to invitations to either formal or informal receptions.

Invitations to formal receptions

For a formal reception, printed cards are sent out at least one month before the occasion. The date and the time will be written out in words. The year will not be mentioned. The words 'Black Tie' – which indicate a formal event – will be clearly shown on the card, usually at the bottom. An address or telephone number to which guests can send their replies will also be supplied.

Answer a formal invitation in writing, in the third person. Repeat the date and time in words, without mentioning the year.

For example, 'Mr Smith thanks Mrs Bloggs for her kind invitation for Friday 26 May, from 6 pm to 8 pm, and has much pleasure in accepting.'

Alternatively, 'Mr Smith … regrets that he is unable to accept as he has a prior engagement.'

Invitations to informal receptions

For the informal reception, any writing paper may be used as an invitation. The invitation may be typed or hand written. The wording will depend on how well the host knows you. A map may be included for guests who have not been to the venue before. The invitation should clearly show:

the type of party;

the date and time;

the place; and

the required dress code.

Answer in a similar style to that of the invitation, using the same informal wording, and repeating the date and time.

Visiting restaurants with a formal party

If you visit a restaurant with a formal party, remember the following etiquette.

A booking should always be made so as to avoid possible embarrassment.

If the waiter shows the way to the table, the guests should follow him or her.
If the waiter merely points out the table, the host or hostess should go first. The waiter will generally pull out chairs for the women, but men should do so if the waiter does not.

If the party is fairly small, guests should order through the host (or the hostess if there is no host), who alone gives the orders. If the party is large, this may be impossible.

The bill should be settled by one person, and any discussion as to how to split the bill should take place afterwards. Give a tip only if the service was good, 10% is sufficient. If a service charge has already been added, no tip need be given unless the service was outstanding.

You should be familiar with the following French terms, used in restaurants:

à la carte	-	each item on the menu is priced separately;
table d'hôte	-	the final charge is inclusive of all dishes served;
hors d'oeuvres	-	starters;
entrée	-	a dish served between the hors d'oeuvres and the main course; and
plat du jour	-	speciality of the day.

Table manners

To many people, eating is a type of ritual, which may take quite a strict form. Table manners are partly a convention, varying from one society to another, but partly just good manners. Show consideration for others at the table. Don't eat until their plates are full, and ask them politely to pass the bread or salt. If you aren't sure that your table manners are appropriate, research the subject in the library and ask someone to teach you the formalities.

The following is a guideline to European table manners or etiquette:

Use the cutlery furthest from your plate first, and work inwards as each new course is served. Soup is served first, so the soup spoon should be furthest away from your plate, on your right-hand side. Other cutlery is laid in pairs, for instance fish knife (on the right) and fork (on the left), and normal knife (on the right) and fork (on the left). Your bread knife and dessert spoon and fork should be placed at the top of your plate.

Staff may remove cutlery if you skip a course, and other cutlery may be added for new courses.

The napkin (serviette) might contain a warm roll, so open it carefully before placing it on your lap – after your hostess has opened her napkin. The napkin is there to catch spills and for dabbing (not wiping) your lips. At the end of the meal, *crumple* the napkin slightly and put on your side plate. If you know your host well, it is acceptable to fold the napkin.

Break your bread before buttering it. Put sufficient butter on your side plate first, using the butter knife. Then take butter from your side plate, using your butter knife, to butter your bread. Put your bread knife on your side plate after you have used it.

Don't take the best portions from bowls or plates that are being passed round the table. Take small mouthfuls or conversation may be difficult or messy. Do not talk with your mouth full or eat with your mouth open. Do not drink while there is food in your mouth, or you may choke. If you really find something inedible, you may quietly remove it from your mouth with your fork and place it at the edge of your main plate.

If you use a knife with your fork, so that your fork is in your left hand, use the fork with the prongs facing *downwards*.

The position of your knife and fork on your plate will indicate whether you are finished a course or not. Between mouthfuls, place your knife and fork on the plate with the prongs of the fork over the blade of the knife, which should face to the left. At the end of a course, place your knife and fork next to each other, shafts towards you, knife blade facing to the left. This indicates to the waiter that he or she can take away your plate.

After the meal, don't stack plates on the table, as they should be removed singly.

Stir tea or coffee quietly. Don't dunk biscuits.

Never smoke before a toast or before the end of the main course. If there is no toast, await your hostess's permission to smoke. You can take this permission as granted if she lights up at the table.

Practise using cutlery in the correct way. Now we'll give you some helpful advice about dressing for formal and informal occasions.

Dress (attire) and appearance in general

Men's dress for formal or informal functions

The dress to be worn at formal or official functions is usually indicated on the invitation. Men seldom have problems with their attire, as the options are usually limited to the following:

black tie - dinner suit with black bow tie (usually required for formal dinners);

morning coat;

lounge suit - a dark lounge suite would be more appropriate after sunset; and

casual - for example, sports jacket; usually for informal luncheons.

Men's dress in general

Clean, neat clothing, appropriate for the occasion, immediately gain acceptance and reduce a CPO's conspicuousness. Good personal hygiene and a neat overall appearance are mandatory.

Male protectors should dress in accordance with their principal's attire. For instance, they should dress appropriately for a game of golf, a normal working day or a dinner party. A conservative business suit is an essential part of the male bodyguard's wardrobe. Men should wear a good firm belt for their weapon and radio gear. Jackets or coats must be open at all times to allow the male CPO easy access to his weapon.

Sunglasses are useful to protect the eyes from glare, and for cover when observing people's actions and movements. They can also protect the eyes from thrown objects.

Bodyguards must always present a professional image.

Women's dress for formal or informal functions

Because women's fashions change constantly, it is not so easy to describe what female CPOs should wear. However, the following are some generally accepted conventions:

For 'black tie' occasions, women usually wear a dinner gown, with or without sleeves. The gown may be long or short, depending on the fashion at the time or the wording of the invitation. Jewellery and accessories should be appropriate for the occasion.

For 'morning coat' occasions, woman may wear a suit or formal afternoon dress.

When the dress for men is specified as 'lounge suit', women's dress will depend on the function. For formal luncheons, official functions, or for meeting VIPs at the airport, the female CPO may wear a suit or tailored dress. For a reception or cocktail party she may wear a dinner dress (long or short) or a cocktail dress – depending on the hostess's indication in the invitation.

Women's dress in general

Female CPOs should follow these general guidelines regarding dress:

Female protectors should wear low-heeled shoes and conservative, practical suits, with jackets that cover all protective equipment.

They can dress according to fashion, but must wear outfits that are suitable for their type of work, and in keeping with the attire of the VIP.

Make-up and jewellery should be conservative.

Jackets with large pockets may help to compensate for the lack of a handbag.

Saris may only be worn by Indian women. The blouse worn with it must cover the shoulder as well as the waist.

The female CPO should wear flattering but understated make-up and a smart but practical hairstyle.

Female protectors should always dress smartly and professionally.

Appearance in general

Your clothing and general appearance make an important contribution to the crucial first impression you make on strangers. This is especially true in modern society, where we encounter so many strangers every day that we tend to judge people by their looks. Generally, neatness, cleanliness and a degree of fashion-consciousness indicate that you are organised and have a positive self-image. People tend to ascribe positive characteristics to well-dressed people, such as intelligence and reliability. As a CPO it is very important that you make a good impression – people will assume that CPOs who cannot take care of their own appearance will be unlikely to be able to take care of a VIP.

By dressing well, you show:

respect for the occasion;

respect for the other people who are present; and

self-respect.

When you step away from your bathroom mirror in the morning, you should forget about your appearance and concentrate totally on your work and other people. This is only possible if you know you look good and are dressed in practical, appropriate clothing.

Some final rules for dressing for work as a CPO:

Items of clothing must match, and you must wear them properly.

You must follow a proper personal hygiene routine.

You should aim to blend in with the environment in which you'll be working that day.

Body language (non-verbal communication)

Your body language, or non-verbal communication, makes more of an impression on people than what you say to them. Research body language in the library. Study your own body language and try to interpret non-verbal signs in other people. While the common interpretations of some body language signs may not always be correct, they are widely accepted – so people will probably interpret your body language accordingly!

For instance, while you may cross your arms to keep out the cold, crossed arms and legs are generally taken to indicate resistance. If you believe that people are really showing resistance, offer them a cup of tea so that they will uncross their arms. Similarly, open palms are taken to show goodwill.

Remember these important aspects of non-verbal communication:

Punctuality. You must always be on time. This shows that you are organised and respectful of other people's time. It is also vital to the smooth running of the protection operation.

Self-confidence. Show people that you are confident through non-verbal signs such as your straight posture, warm and direct eye contact, and friendly tone of voice. Take care not to appear arrogant.

Telephone usage

Use the telephone professionally. Speak clearly, keep to the point, and whenever possible put a smile in your voice. With friendliness and patience you will gain people's willing co-operation and increase your job satisfaction.

Making a call

When you make a phone call, greet the person who answers the phone, and say who you are and who you would like to speak to. For example, 'Good morning, Sam Smith speaking – may I speak to Ms Venter, please?' If it is an inconvenient time for the recipient of the call, arrange to speak at a time convenient to both of you.

Don't monopolise the telephones at work. Keep your calls short. If you need to make a series of calls, block out a time that is convenient for everyone concerned. Many South Africans now have cell phones for emergencies, but be aware that they may be expecting a call on a line at work, or that people may call a work number in an emergency. If your call is cut off, the onus is on you, as the caller, to phone back.

Receiving a call

Greet the caller in a friendly but business-like way, and identify yourself. If there is too much noise in the office to hear the caller properly, alert your colleagues. If the caller does not identify himself or herself, ask politely, 'Who am I talking to?' If the call is for somebody else, tell

For example, 'Hello, this is Joe Bloggs of XYZ Bodyguards.'
'Hello, Mr Smith, how can I help you?'
'Certainly, Mr Smith, please hold while I transfer your call to Ms Venter.'
'Ms Venter (or her first name), can I put a Mr Sam Smith through to you? He's calling about your meeting tomorrow. He has some new information for you.'
If Ms Venter is unavailable, then tell Mr Smith, 'Sorry, Mr Smith, Ms Venter is in a meeting. Can I ask her to call you back? Let me take your details … . Thank you, I'll give Ms Venter the message. Goodbye, Mr Smith.'

General telephone manners

Never keep a caller waiting for someone indefinitely. Remember that you, as the recipient of the call, represent your company. Impress the caller with the company's professionalism and personal touch.

If you need to listen to a caller speaking at length, assure him or her that you are still listening by saying, 'I see,' 'Exactly' and so on at intervals. Give a telephone conversation your full attention. Don't try to communicate with people in the office at the same time.

Take care not to waste other people's time when you make a call. Jot down the points you need to cover before you make the call. If you ask your secretary to make a call, ensure that you are there to answer it immediately.

Try not to make a business call to someone's home telephone number, and never do so after hours.

If somebody has made an appointment to see you, do not take telephone calls while you are meeting with that person.

When you receive a telephone message, phone back as soon as possible.

Letters

Letters remains the most affordable method of communication, and they allow you to put your case forward carefully and in detail. Be diplomatic in the way you phrase what you need to say. Ensure that you say nothing in a letter that can be used against you later, perhaps in court. If you send a letter or other written correspondence by e-mail, you can usually be less formal. However, still take care not to state anything controversial or inaccurate. It may be worth your while to take a course in business communication.

Keep copies of your e-mails. Check that details such as your initials, surname and address are correct in any letters that you send by post. Keep a copy of any correspondence you post.

Summary

In this chapter, we've given you some of the rules of etiquette and protocol that you will need to follow as a CPO, especially if you become a bodyguard.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.

Self-assessment questions 4

1. Define the following:

   (a) protocol;

   etiquette;

   à la carte;

   table d'hôte;

   hors d'oeuvres; and

   entrée.

2. How much should you tip for good service at a restaurant?

3. A senior-ranking person enters a room _____ and leaves _____.

4. (a) Which type of wine is served before the meal or with soup?

   (b) Which type of wine accompanies fish and poultry?

   (c) _____ may be served throughout the meal.

   (d) Full-bodied red wine is served with _____ .

5. Give three general guidelines for dressing for work as a female CPO.

6. Give three general rules of telephone etiquette.

Self-assessment answers 4

1. (a) *Protocol* is diplomatic etiquette.

   (b) *Etiquette* refers to the conventional rules of personal behaviour in polite society.

   (c) Each item on the menu is priced separately.

   (d) The charge is inclusive of all dishes served.

   (e) Hors d'oeuvres are starters.

   (f) The entrée is a dish between the hors d'oeuvres and the main course.

2. You should tip 10% for good service. If service is poor, you need not tip.

3. A senior-ranking person enters a room *first* and leaves *first.*

4. (a) Sherry is served before the meal or with soup.

   (b) Dry white wine accompanies fish and poultry.

   (c) Champagne may be served throughout the meal.

   (d) Full-bodied red wine is served with roast.

5. General guidelines for dressing for work as a female CPO (any three):

   Female protectors should wear low-heeled shoes and conservative, practical suits, with jackets that cover all protective equipment.

   Dress according to fashion, but wear outfits that are suitable for the type of work, and in keeping with the attire of the VIP.

   Make-up and jewellery should be conservative.

   Jackets with large pockets may help to compensate for the lack of a handbag.

   Saris may only be worn by Indian women. The blouse worn with it must cover the shoulder as well as the waist.

   The female CPO should wear flattering but understated make-up and a smart but practical hairstyle.

   Female protectors should always dress smartly and professionally.

6. General rules of telephone etiquette (any three):

   Never keep a caller waiting for someone indefinitely. Remember that you, as the recipient of the call, represent your company. Impress the caller with the company's efficiency and personal touch.

   If you need to listen to a caller speaking at length, assure him or her that you are still listening by saying, 'I see,' 'Exactly' and so on at intervals. Give a telephone conversation your full attention. Don't try to communicate with people in the office at the same time.

   Take care not to waste other people's time when you make a call. Jot down the points you need to cover before you make the call. If you ask your secretary to make a call, ensure that you are there to answer it immediately.

   Try not to make a business call to someone's home telephone number, and never do so after hours.

   If somebody has made an appointment to see you, do not take telephone calls while you are meeting with that person.

   If you receive a telephone message, phone back as soon as possible.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Venue protection'. This topic applies especially to members of the advance team.

CHAPTER 5: VENUE PROTECTION



Learning outcomes for Chapter 5

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

conduct a thorough search of a building;

describe the measures necessary to secure a venue; and

identify the most suitable positions in which to place protection personnel at a venue.

Introduction

In this chapter we will explain the principles and practices that the close protection team should apply in order to secure a venue. Protecting a VIP at various venues is part of the protection team's (and especially the advance team's) daily programme. Venue protection must always be carefully planned and executed to ensure it is effective. We'll discuss it under these headings:

general guidelines for securing a venue;

searching a building;

placement of personnel and protection of venues; and

types of protection formations.

Firstly, note that *venues* may include:

official residences;

hotels;

the principal's office;

restaurants; and

venues for public meetings and dinners.

The assassinations of HF Verwoerd in parliament in Cape Town (stabbed) and Robert Kennedy in the USA (shot) show the importance of venue protection. Apart from shooting or stabbing, the *contingencies* below could occur at venues:

sniper or armed penetration attacks;

bomb threats or attacks;

a fire;

chemical or gas attacks; and

volatility of participants at political meetings, or an over-enthusiastic response from supporters.

General guidelines for securing a venue

The close protection team should follow these guidelines for securing a venue:

Carry out proper operational planning and advance work.

Contact and liaise with all parties involved.

Sweep and secure the area.

Dominate the high ground (install snipers).

Ensure proper access control.

Screen and observe all personnel who will come into close contact with the principal.

Provide overt (open, or official) and covert (undercover) personnel.

Be prepared for any emergency.

Ensure that emergency service and support units are on hand, or on standby.

Ensure that all protection personnel can be clearly identified.

Ensure that every protector is familiar with the area, his or her duties, and emergency procedures.

Ensure communication with all CPOs.

Set up a safe haven.

Set up and secure escape routes.

We can divide venue protection into outer perimeter protection (protection outside and at the entrance to the venue) and inner perimeter protection (within the venue itself).

Outer perimeter protection

To ensure outer perimeter protection, the close protection team should do the following:

Control the area:

- Search the area (search cars for car bombs).
- Implement access control.
- Set up observation posts with snipers to dominate the high ground.
- Set up cordons and barricades.

Use overt and covert personnel.

Arrange right of admission procedures for entry to the venue.

Secure all escape routes from the venue.

Control the media:

- Place covert personnel at strategic points.
- Clear all reporters, and check their press identification (ID) cards.
- Search all media equipment.

Inner perimeter protection

To ensure inner perimeter protection, the close protection team should do the following:

Search the area thoroughly.

Take control of the inner perimeter and place personnel to keep the area secured.

Escort the principal with the fewest possible CPOs within the venue, so as not to restrict the free movement of the principal or other guests.

Secure and control all escape routes from the venue.

Secure all areas that the principal might move to by placing covert personnel there.

Set up and secure a safe haven or holding room within the venue.

Searching a building

The overall security of a protection operation depends largely on how well the advance team searches the venue during the operational advance phase. The team must allow enough time for a thorough, unrushed search, with consent from the owner of the premises or a designated representative.

The advance team must know what they are searching for. They must be able to locate and recognise anything that may pose a threat to the principal, for example explosives or electronic devices. Once the advance team has searched an area, the area must be secured.

Basic rules for searching venues

The three basic rules for searching the venue are as follows:

Search from the outside to the inside.

Search from the bottom to the top.

Investigate all possible hiding places and articles.

Equipment required

The advance team should take the following basic equipment to the venue:

a torch (penlight or a larger type of torch);

a multi-purpose knife (Swiss army knife);

a stethoscope;

a probe;

a magnifying glass;

a telescopic mirror;

a portable X-ray machine;

screwdrivers (of various sizes); and

a metal detector.

The division of labour for searching

As a general guideline, the division of labour for searching a venue should be as follows:

25% of the team - outside the building (see 'External searching' below);

another 25% of the team - in public places (see discussion below); and

the remaining 50% of the team - room-to-room searching (see below).

External searching

Searching must occur within a radius of at least 25 m from the building, or to the natural boundary of the venue. Team members assigned to external searching should search the following areas outside the building, preferably in the order in which they are listed:

the ground level of the venue, looking for places where the ground has been disturbed or penetrated, and the following features:

- heaps of leaves or rubbish, in case anything is hidden inside them;
- dustbins and flowerpots, in case anything is hidden inside them;
- fences;
- drainpipes and storm-water furrows; and
- any parked vehicles, which must be identified to determine whether they pose a possible threat;

ground to roof level:

- windowsills;
- air-conditioners;
- lights; and

the roof.

Guards must be deployed to ensure that no unauthorised *persons* or *objects* enter the secured area after searching has been completed. The guards should stay at their posts until completion of the protection operation.

Searching public places

Team members assigned to search public places should search the following:

the lobby;

flower pots;

lights;

the reception counter and other counters;

chairs and tables;

fire-extinguishers;

lifts;

hoists and electrical equipment;

public toilets;

water and toilet systems;

air vents;

cupboards; and

places that are visited only infrequently, for example storage rooms.

Room-to-room searching

Start at the ground level. Search the cellar first, then search your way to the top floor, so that there is always a protected area behind you.

Conduct an initial visual search of each room, looking for anything out of the ordinary. Stop at various points around the room, and listen closely. This will allow you to hear any unusual sounds, such as ticking sounds from a clock timer. It will also give you a chance to familiarise yourself with the normal background noises in the room.

Searching levels

The team should search rooms from the first to the fourth searching level, as follows:

first searching level – floor to hip level:

carpet, chairs, table, cupboards, sockets and so on – if possible, check walls with a stethoscope or X-ray machine;

second searching level – hip to eye level:

cupboards, lights, air-conditioner, light switches, bookcases and so on;

third searching level – eye level to the ceiling:

air conditioners, loud-speakers, fans, hanging lights and so on;

fourth searching level – ceiling:

inspect everything leading up to the ceiling (including wiring and the ceiling itself).

The room-to-room searching team should be divided into two sections to search a room. (Each section may consist of only one team member if numbers are limited.) The two sections will start at opposite sides of the room and work inwards towards each other, meeting in the middle of the room. It is a good idea to have an extra person present during the search to record the procedure, as the team gives him or her a running commentary. The recorder can then point out anything that the team has overlooked.

The room-to-room searching team should remember the following:

Check all electrical equipment, and test the lights, television and air-conditioning.

Check any bedding, telephones and chairs, flush the toilet and check all cupboards.

When leaving a room, the team must be absolutely sure that the area is safe. After the team has searched a room, guards must be placed in the corridor outside. The team should mark the door to indicate that the room has been searched, or it may be necessary to search the same room all over again. If the team does find anything suspicious, they should summon the explosive experts.

Once the team has found something suspicious and called in the experts, they should proceed as follows:

The team must continue searching after the explosives experts have removed the suspicious object or declared it safe.

Dogs from the explosives unit should be used only as an aid. The physical search of the venue is of utmost importance.

Now we'll discuss placing personnel at venues, choosing venues to facilitate protection, and protecting the principal's offices.

Placement of personnel and protection of venues

It is important that venues be selected and personnel be placed so as to maximise protection, especially at the following venues:

restaurants;

cinemas, auditoriums and theatres;

hotels; and

the principal's offices (we'll discuss security at the principal's offices in detail).

Restaurants

Here are some guidelines for placing protection personnel at restaurants:

If visits to restaurants may be arranged at short notice, the team should have contingency plans in place.

Arrange a quick advance search at the venue.

Place the minimum number of personnel that can still ensure effective protection.

Screen and observe all personnel that will come into direct contact with the principal.

Deal with unplanned or unannounced visits so that they interfere with the normal activities of the restaurant as little as possible. Avoid drawing any unnecessary attention to the principal or the team.

Choose seating positions that will minimise exposure. For example, avoid seating near windows or toilets, the kitchen, service doors, and areas with a constant flow of people such as those close to the bar or the entrance.

Make use of covert personnel to enhance security. They should cover areas such as the bar and the kitchen, and keep an eye on waiters.

PLACEMENT OF CPO's IN RESTAURANTS

THESE ARE GUIDELINSE ONLY,AS ALL SITUATIONS WILL VARY.

CHOICE OF RESTAURANTS:

- Restaurants in malls might not be a good choice , as it require lengthy walks to reach the venue.
- A restaurant with a car park entrance would be a better choice than a restaurant located on a busy street

RESERVATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES:

- Reservations should be made in advance
- To prevent embarrassment
- Booking should not be made on Principals name, unless he/she is familiar with the restaurant by visiting it often.
- The restaurant might be fully booked
- Additional tables may be required for team
- Principal might have a preferred table etc.

ADVANCED ARRANFEMENTS WITH STAFF:

* GET THE.NAMES OF THE STAFF WITH WHO THE PRINCEPAL AND PROTECTION TEAM WILL HAVE DIRECT CONTACT.
- THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE RESTURANT.
- SELECTED A TABLE FOR THE PRINCEPAL—AWAY FROM FOOT TRAFFIC.
- SELECTED A TABLE FOR THE CPO'S
- ARRANGE FOR BILL IN ADVANCE .IE WITH THE ORDERING OF THE COFFEE, TO ENABLE THE VEHICLES TIME ENOUGH TO BE BROUGHT ROUND TO THE PICK UP POINT AND PREPARE FOR DEPARTURE.
- ARRANGE WITH THE WAITER / WAITRESS FOR THE BODYGUARDS TO EAT IMMEDIATELY.
- DETERMINE PROPER ATTIRE FOR PROTECTION TEAM TO BLEND IN.

TIPS

- ALWAYS TIP THE PERSONS THAT HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PRINCEPAL AND CPO'S IN ORDER TO GET THE BEST SERVICE.

TABLE SELECTION


- CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING IN SELECTING TABLES IN A RESTURANT
- TABLE SHOULD BE AWAY FROM WINDOWS EXSPECIALY IF THE TABLE IS FACING THE STREET.
- IN A SITUATION WHERE THE ONLY AVALIBLE TABLE IS CLOSE/ INFRONT OF A WINDOW A BODYGUARD SHOULD BE PLACED AT THE OUTSIDE OF THE WINDOW.
- IF THE RESTURANT HAS A PATTIO A BODYGUARD SHOULD BE PLACED AT A TABLE ON THE OUTSIDE AS WELL.
- DO NOT SELECT A TABLE IN THE PATHWAY TO THE BAR OR LOO (TOILET)

DEPARTURE PHASE

* IE. THE PRINCEPAL INFORM THE MAIN BODYGUARD THAT HE IS READY TO DEPART AFTER COFFEE

THE MAIN BODYGUARD WILL INFORM THE TEAM LEADER WHO WILL GIVE A FIVE MINUTE WARNING TO THE REST OF THE TEAM INCLUDING THE DRIVER SO THAT THE VEHICLE COULD BE SUMMONED AND THE TEAM COULD BE READY TO LEAVE.

- THIS RESTAURANT PLAN ILLUSTRATES THE PLACING OF THE BG's AND THE SELECTION OF THE PRINCIPAL TABLE.
- SELECT A TABLE AWAY FROM ENTRANCE AND FOOT TRAFIC (PATHWAY TO BAR AND TOILETS)
- THE BG's OCCUPY TABLES THAT CAN CONTROL ACCSESS TO THE PRINCIPAL TABLE.
- THE LAST BG IS PLACED AT A TABLE ON THE PATIO IN FRONT OF THE WINDOW,ALSO NOTE THE DOOR ON TO THE PATIO WICH OFFERS QUICK EVACUATION IF NEEDED.



Cinemas, auditoriums and theatres

These are the basic rules for protection at cinemas, auditoriums and theatres:

Apply all general guidelines.

Place undercover operatives. Attract the least possible attention during operational protection, to create a relaxed atmosphere for the principal, and to avoid causing embarrassment or a public disturbance.

Dominate the high ground and strategic areas such as the projection room, control room, main switch and so on.

Use a diamond formation – see the section on formations that follows. The extent of traffic will determine whether you use an open or a closed formation.

Hotels

Choice of hotel

In order to select the most suitable room or suite at a hotel, the team leader should consult with hotel staff regarding the protection team's requirements

It is important that the principal stay only at hotels that have an excellent reputation, in upmarket areas with adequate access routes. The hotel should preferably *not* be part of a shopping complex, as this increases its vulnerability to attack. It should have a secured parking area and a high level of security.

Choice of room

The room should be as high up as possible in the building, but *not* on the top floor. This will help protection staff to secure the room. The team leader should choose a room in a corner or at the end of a corridor, but *not* near a lift or a staircase, as this will limit the activity of people in the area.

Room service

The protection team must control room service, cleaners and guests.

Alternative accommodation

Alternative accommodation must be identified beforehand, in case the hotel has to be evacuated.

Security at the principal's offices

As we've mentioned, we'll assume that your principal will be someone active in society, in other words someone who will work regularly from his or her own office or suite of offices. The protection team needs to consider the following aspects of security at the principal's offices:

positioning;

access control; and

emergencies and the safe room.

Positioning

If possible, the principal's offices should *not* be situated on the ground floor, but rather in the *centre* of the building. This will force an intruder to pass through other offices, increasing the possibility of his or her being observed. An open area surrounding the principal's offices will also improve security. The offices should be inaccessible from public areas. Windows facing public or open areas should be tinted, fitted with reinforced glass or covered by curtains, so that the interior is invisible from outside the building.

The offices themselves and the personnel attached to the offices should provide maximum protection for the principal.

Access control

The team must maintain strict control over the access of people and packages entering the building and the offices of the principal.

Access control should begin at the entrance to the building, where security guards must always be on duty. All visitors, employees of service companies and deliveries must be inspected – security guards should verify everyone's identification and check that they are not carrying any material that may pose a threat to the principal. Everyone who enters the building lawfully must be issued with an identification card and escorted to their destination. No outsiders must be allowed to wander around the building by themselves.

Restricted access to the principal's inner office must be very strictly enforced. There should be an outside office or reception area, which everyone seeking access to the principal must pass through, with a receptionist, guard or secretary on duty.

This outside office should be equipped with an alarm switch (an emergency button), which is connected to the central alarm system. In an emergency, the person on duty can immediately alert security. The team should consider the option of enabling the principal to open the office door electronically from his or her own office or reception area.

Where possible, the team should install a metal detector at the main entrance to the building. Portable metal detectors should be available. Lifts must be programmed so that they can be controlled from the ground floor or from inside the lift. Every floor should be patrolled or checked by closed-circuit cameras.

The team must set strict lock and key control measures. They must ensure that the principal's office cannot be opened with a master key. Locks must be changed regularly. Arrival points, times, and routes used inside the building should be altered every day. (They may take the stairs for a change, for instance.)

The team must be particularly strict in enforcing access control after hours. The area surrounding the principal's office should be patrolled by security guards 24 hours a day. Names and titles on doors and parking places should be replaced by numbers. Parking places must be periodically switched.

All general rooms, such as store-rooms and toilets, must be locked. Areas used by the general public must be searched regularly, for example, public toilets

Emergencies and the safe room

All members of the protection team, other personnel and the principal must be familiar with emergency drills. Everyone must know what to do and where to go if they have to evacuate the building due to fire or a bomb threat, for instance.

A 'safe room' must be at the principal's disposal, where the protection team can secure him or her during an emergency situation. This room should be equipped with communication equipment, weapons, food, first aid supplies and so on. Now look at the protection formations shown on the next few pages. We'll explain how you can use these formations later in the unit.

CHAPTER 6: FOOT PROTECTION

Learning outcomes for Chapter 6

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

describe the rules regarding transit protection and motorcades;

discuss motorcade formations;

describe vehicle searches; and

understand and use the correct terminology with respect to motorcades.

Introduction

Your close protection team will have to transport your principal from one venue to another, usually by car. This is a particularly risky phase of the protection operation, and it is a great responsibility to plan and implement it.

The risk factor is high during transit because a vehicle is:

easily identifiable;

exposed;

vulnerable to attack;

an easy place to attack several CPOs at once; and

vulnerable to collision.

In this chapter, we'll discuss transit protection under the following headings:

basic guidelines for motorcade protection;

debussing and enbussing;

formal motorcade formations (used only in the public sector);

terminology;

equipment in vehicles; and

tactical motorcade movements.

FOOT PROTECTION

Foot formations is one the skills that should be 2nd nature to the bodyguard, as this provide body cover to the Principal. A foot formation is also what the public see mostly and his protection team can harm the image of the VIP
By embarrassing him instead of them enhancing his image.

To understand a formation there are some basic rules to be implemented to be successful

- **To place yourself between the threat and the principal.**
- **Deny access within the team parameter**
- **Constant scanning (360 degrees) divided by the team members**
- **To inform the team of identified threat**
- **Know the exit points and the emergency equipment location**
- **Immediate option selection by deciding when to execute which option in terms of evasion of threat.**
- **(Acceleration, Takedown, Diversion, Evacuation)**
- **Acknowledge instructions of team leader**
- **Slow down attacker to give principal time to be moved to a safe place**

A TIP WHEN WORKING IN FORMATIONS 

There is a product specially designed for bodyguards named LEGION SPECS which enable a bodyguard to be one step
Ahead of a potential attacker by just moving your eyes to the corners of the frame, looking into a mirror observing all the activities behind you with out turning your head .The advantage of this product is to observe 360 degrees surrounded without attacker realising he is under surveillance.
This product is used by members of SA BODYGUARD ASSOCIATION country wide, with a 100% success rate.

ALLERTNESS
Always be on the look out for the following signs

- **People wearing long coats**
- **People wearing jackets on a warm day**
- **Persons with parcels**
- **Pay attention to eyes and hands especially when hands are concealed.**
- **Unnatural movements and positions.**
- **Stalkers**

All formations will be explained

THE SOLO BODYGUARD

We describe the operation of a solo bodyguard (working individually), but it is not recommended. It is SA Bodyguard Association's policy not to work solo, because of the risks involved, which will be explained.

- **i.e. As a solo bodyguard cannot be driver and give cover at as solo at the same time in transit.**
- **A solo B/G with a driver is a better option but still not advisable, however the majority of B/G in the private sector operate as solo`s.**
- **A solo bodyguard does not have cover and an attacker cannot be slowed down in a situation where the bodyguard must cover and evacuate.**
- **As a solo bodyguard there is no one to clear the way in all instances. No proper planning is possible. Can not stick to plan.**
- **BG will lack ability to provide defence in depth and body cover.(He will be limited in the actual execution of reacting to a threat)**
- **By approaching a door the BG will have to move past the Principal to scan before Principal exit , which leaves**
  The principal uncovered, even maybe dead.

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As previously mentioned, a bodyguard should always position himself between a threat and a principal and scan the crowd. If a bodyguard is left handed, he should walk to the left rear of the principal to ensure that his left hand is free to draw his weapon, and his right hand, which is closer to the principal, is free to cover and direct the principal in a specific direction without looking at the principal. And visa versa.

In a possible threat situation be decisive in selecting a option that is relevant to the threat , in terms of body cover (shield) between the threat and the principal and when approaching doors, to exit or enter, the bodyguard must accelerate in order to open the door and scan for potential threats before principal exit or enters.


If the bodyguard is not the driver, he should always first verify the identity of the driver, before the Principal enters the vehicle. With a debus, the bodyguard should exit the front passenger door before the principal, and shield the
Principal's door until it is safe to debus.

OPTIONS TO CONSIDER IN FOOTORMATIONS (Regarding possible threat situations)

The team leader should take a split second decision and at the same time instruct the team members to execute one of the following options. **EXAMPLES**

- **ACCELERATION** - To avoid collision with oncoming or crossing persons or objects within team parameter.
- **DIVERSION** - As above but also used when a suspicious object is observed in surrounded area where team must pass through or placed directly in their way.
- **TAKE DOWN** - Where evacuation is not an option, for example no object or vehicle to give fire over, or building to escape to, and also where direction of gunshot is not identified.
- **EVACUATION** - When vehicle ,building or place of safety is close enough to escape to .(These are only **guidelines** and can vary depending on the situation.


BG



NORMAL POSITION

BG IDENTIFY THREAT






BG MOVES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND THREAT




THREAT


TWO MAN TEAM

With a two man team they should constantly rotate (leap frog) eg. One will be point and one tail they might even become left and right flanks when moving in a situation with people on each side of them, each BG should cover 180 degrees.






CROWD




MOVING IN CONFINED AREAS




THREE MAN TEAM

CLOSED V FORMATION
ALSO KNOWN AS TRIANGLE
OR WEDGE



OPEN V FORMATION
ALSO KNOWN AS INVERSE TRIANGLE



With a 3 man team reasonable cover can be offered to the Principal. It is now possible to do the placements of the team members More securely.
Eg. Main BG should not leave his principal, the team leader should then be placed as the 2nd BG and the 3rd BG simultaneously be the driver

Standard procedure after meeting should then be as follows:


The main BG will give a 15 minute warning to the team leader who will instruct the driver to get the vehicle ready
This procedure will repeat itself to a 10 minute warning and finally a 5 minute warning to exit until the debus procedure is completed.

A three man team are considered by most professionals to be the minimum necessary CPO's to perform an acceptable level of protection.


A FOUR MAN TEAM

A Diamond or Box formation could work well in a 4 man team.

A 4 man diamond formation




A 4 MAN DIAMOND FORMATION CAN EASILY TRANSFORM INTO A BOX FORMATION




IN THE BOX FORMATION THE TEAM LEADER SHOULD MOVE TO ONE OF THE REAR POSITIONS TO OBTAIN A GOOD VIEW OF THE TEAM IN FRONT AND IT'S SURROUNDINGS.






THIS FORMATION IS GOOD FOR THE IMMAGE OF THE PRINCEPAL AND NORMALLY USED IN A SAFTY ZONE ,WHEN PRINCIPAL IS WELCOMED BY AN-OTHER PARTY.

OPEN FORMATION (BOX)




AN OPEN FORMATION WOULD BE USED IN A NO — RISK SITUATION

CLOSE FORMATION (BOX)




A CLOSE FORMATION SHOULD BE USED IN ANY POSIBLE RISK SITUATION TO EVACUATE IBE NEEDED.

DIAMOND FORMATION POSITIONS



FUNCTION OF TEAM MEMBERS




TO GIVE **BODY COVER** TO PRINCEPAL 360 DEGREES.

TAIL– SHOULD COVER REAR OF PRINCIPAL AND ALSO SCAN 180 DEGREES TO THE REAR HE WILL THEN AUTOMATICALY COVER 45 DEGREES OF LEFT AND RIGHT FLANKS ENSURING A DOUBLE SCANNING PROCESS IN OPEN AREAS AS POINTED OUT ABOVE WITH ARROWS.


LEFT FLANK-SHOULD COVER LEFT OF PRINCIPAL ALSO CROSS SCANNING WITH TAIL AND POINT 45 DEGREES.

RIGHT FLANK– SHOULD COVER RIGHT HAND SIDE OF PRINCIPAL ALSO SCANNING 180 DEGREES ON RIGHT, CROSSING 45 DEGREES WITH TAIL AND POINT.




POINT-SHOULD COVER 180 DEGREES INFRONT OF PRINCIPAL AND CROSS 45 DEGREES WITH LEFT FLANK AND RIGHT FLANK, TO CREATE A DOUBLE SCANNING PROCESS

TRANSFORMING FROM A DIAMOND FORMATION INTO AN OPEN "V" FORMATION



DOORS




WHEN APPROACHING A DOOR ,THE LEAD BG ON THE SIDE ON WHICH THE DOOR IS HINGED WILL OPEN THE DOOR, ALLOWING THE OTHER LEAD BG TO ENTER AND CLEAR ON HIS SIDE,

THE MAIN BG WILL THEN HOLD THE DOOR FOR THE PRINCIPAL TO MOVE PAST HIM .


THE 2 REAR BG's SHOULD GIVE BODY COVER TO THE PRINCIPAL AND MAIN BG.

BOX FORMATION




THE MAIN BODYGUARD WILL MOVE TO THE DIRECTION WHERE POSSIBLE THREAT CAN BE LAUNCHED FROM—IN THIS CASE, THE RIGHT HAND SIDE.

7 MAN **CIRCLE FORMATION**



FENCE LINE FORMATION MOVEMENT




ALL BG 's ARE FACING THE CROUD

Principal is moving down a fence line and in the process he/she greets the spectators.

- The no 1 BG walks in advance of the principal observing ahead for threats
- The no 2 BG will move just ahead of the principal watching the next person the principal will greet.
- The no 3 BG follows the principal observing the crowd, and when a person holding the hand of the principal too long during a handshake, no 3 will free the hand of the principal in order to move on.
- The no 4 BG will in his position have a broad view of the crowd
- The Team leader is placed right behind the principal, ready to pivot him/her away from threat and give body cover

An Alternative receiving line formation




MOVING BETWEEN 2 BUILDINGS :CORRIDOR, PASSAGE, ETC.

*AS TEAM WALK BETWEEN THE 2 BUILDINGS, ONE OF THE REAR BG WILL STAY BEHIND AND POSITION HIMSELF AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE 2 BUILDINGS AS THE TEAM PASS THE CORNER

*THE M/BG WILL POSITION HIMSELF ON THE SIDE WHERE THERE MIGHT BE A GREATER THREAT EG.WINDOWS, DOORS, ETC.


* ONE OF THE LEAD BG'S WILL ACCELERATE TO CLEAR THE EXIT OR BLIND CORNERS FOR TEAM TO FOLLOW

THE ONE REAR BG SHOULD STAY PUT TILL SIGNAL IS RECEIVED FROM THE LEAD BG, WHEN ALL IS CLEAR THEY WILL PROCEED..




LEAD BG SHOULD CLEAR AND GIVE THE CLEAR SIGNAL FOR TEAM TO PROCEED

ESCALATORS — MALLS — OFFICE BUILDINGS — AIRPORTS ETC



- THE BG CLOSEST TO BOTTOM WILL CHECK THE LANDING
- THE 2ND BG SHOULD COVER AND SCAN ESCALATOR GOING UP
- THE MBG RIGHT NEXT TO THE VIP SHOULD COVER 180 DEGREES
- THE BG BEHIND THE VIP SHOULD COVER THE REAR AND THE SIDE OF THE ESCALATOR
- THE BG AT THE TOP SHOULD COVER THE TOP OF THE ESCALATOR LANDING AND THE ESCALATOR MOVING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION PAST HIM.



STAIRCASES


STANDARD PROCEDURE SHOULD BE TO FIRST SECURE ONE LEVEL BELOW AND AT THE SAME TIME ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE PRINCIPAL

DURING ASCEND AND DESCEND THE FORMATION SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN TO PREVENT TRIPPING.

- NO 1 COVERS THE REAR AND THE ENTRANCE
- NO 2,3 AND MBG REMAINS WITH THE PRINCIPAL ALLOWING ENOUGH SPACE BETWEEN THEM.
- NO 4 HAS MOVED AHEAD TO SECURE THE NEXT LANDING.

LIFTS

FORMATIONS IN LIFTS WILL BE EXPLAINED BELOW



IN A SITUATION WHERE A LIFTS IS USED , A BG WILL BE SENT TO THE DESTINATION FLOOR TO CLEAR.
THE REMAINING TEAM WILL STAY PUT UNTIL THEY RECEIVE AN ALL CLEAR SIGNAL FROM ABOVE MENTIONED BG .
NO 1 AND 2 WILL EXIT THE LIFT FIRST TO GIVE COVER BUT WILL MOVE OUT FAR ENOUGH TO MAKE
SPACE FOR THE REMAINING FORMATION TO EXIT THE LIFT

THE FORMATION WILL THEN FORM AROUND PRINCIPAL AND START MOVING


All formations can be used in an open or a closed position. In a low-risk situation, you would use an open formation. In a high-risk formation, you would use a closed formation. Never move further than an arm's length away from the next CPO and the principal, unless the situation permits you to. If you need to close and cover for evacuation, you should need to take only one step to your principal.

EXAMPLE

Formations in practice: negotiating blind corners and stairways

Consider the following example to see how formations can be used in practice.

NEGOTIATING BLIND CORNERS



Look at the diagram on the left, showing how a five-person box formation changes to negotiate a blind corner. Note that whoever is at the front of the formation is known as 'point', and that the number 4 position is the main bodyguard, who will never leave the principal's side. All the other members of the team will rotate around the bodyguard as explained below.

Number 1 (who begins as 'point') accelerates to take up the position marked in the diagram, to clear the way ahead.

Number 5 takes up the position vacated by number 1, and numbers 2 and 3 each move up a position. The formation will rotate past point, with each CPO taking turns to 'leap-frog' ahead, in other words to accelerate ahead of the team, as they move.


Remember that number 4 (the main bodyguard) won't rotate, but will stick close to the principal.

Leap-frog method (clock system or continuous rotation method)


When all the CPOs leap-frog (unlike in the stairway example that follows, where only two CPOs leap-frog), the result is as in the diagram below – also called the clock or continuous rotation method. We can explain the diagram as follows:

Note how the team maintains the arcs, and how the arcs overlap in the shape of a clock-face, as the CPOs move in a clockwise direction. All CPOs rotate except for main bodyguard, who in this case is B.

The clock system will help you to face in the direction of the threat in an ambush.



TACTICS ON STAIRWAYS	*Look at the diagram on the left. Numbers 1 and 2 will take turns to be 'point' on the stairs, in a leap-frogging action.* The method used on stairways is very similar to that used to negotiate blind corner. The only difference is that only numbers 1 and 2 'leap frog.' Number 1 accelerates up the stairs and clears the next landing in advance. Number 2 then does the same on the next landing. Numbers 1 and 2 continue this 'leap-frogging' until the formation reaches the top of the stairs. The basic leap-frog method is described in more detail below.



Open and closed positions

As we've mentioned, all formations can be used in an open or a closed position.

VIP protection is normally low- or medium-risk, but could instantly become high risk if there were a direct threat to the VIP. In this event, CPOs would immediately transform into a closed position. Remember:

in a low-risk situation – VIPs face no immediate threat, CPOs walk in open formations but can immediately transform into the closed formation if need be;


in a medium-risk situation – there is a possible threat, so CPOs should take no chances and use a closed formation; and

in a high-risk situation – there is an immediate threat, so CPOs should walk in closed formation only.

The function of a formation is to form a human shield around a person who needs protection, with a visual capacity of 360°. All closed formations look similar, but in their open position they all differ in appearance. Which formation you use is largely a matter of preference. They all serve the same purpose – to protect. The success of a formation depends on the number of CPOs used. In a normal, 'no-risk' situation, numbers will be unimportant. Only when you are attacked and move to the closed position will you know whether your chosen formation is being effective.

An open position

Your team would use an open position in normal circumstances, when they are escorting the principal in a no-risk situation. Each CPO will be an arm's length away from the next CPO, as in the diagram that follows.




A closed position

Your team will use a closed position when the situation is dangerous, and they must cover and evacuate the principal to safety, or break through a crowd.

On command of the team leader, who will shout 'close', all CPOs will form a closed circle around the principal, with their arms interlinking at the inside of the elbow where the arm bends. Again, the main bodyguard acts independently. He or she will grab the VIP, with one hand on the VIP's belt and the other hand on the collar of the VIP's jacket behind his or her neck.

At the shout of 'left', team members will all begin to run, starting with the left foot. They will run for cover at a place that will have been arranged during the planning process.



A golden position

Your team will use a golden position when in the direct line of fire. Refer to the diagram above. At the first sound of gunfire, the main bodyguard takes down his or her VIP.

In the take-down procedure, the main bodyguard will cover the VIP by lying on top of the VIP, with his or her right leg between the VIP's legs, in a leopard crawl position. The bodyguard will hook one of his or her feet around the VIP's ankle, and then move off in a leopard crawl, all the while supporting and covering the VIP.

At the same time the other CPOs will make a 180° turn and kneel around the VIP without changing their relative positions, so that they can determine the direction of fire and return cover fire. Until they determine the direction of fire, point (the CPO in front) will clear the way to the vehicle, and the team leader will assist the main bodyguard to bring the VIP to safety. The other CPOs will provide cover until the evacuation is complete. This system may vary according to the number of CPOs in the formation.

Summary

In this chapter we've considered the basics of venue protection. Make sure that you understand how to search buildings, select and protect venues.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 5

1. Name three rules for searching venues.
2. Name the four levels of searching.
3. Name four types of protective formations.
4. In which situations would you use a closed formation?
5. Give four general guidelines for securing venues.



Self-assessment answers 5

1. The three basic rules for searching the venue are as follows:

   Search from the outside to the inside.
   Search from the bottom to the top.
   Investigate all possible hiding places and articles.

2. The four levels of searching are as follows:

   first searching level – floor to hip level;
   second searching level – hip to eye level;
   third searching level – eye level to the ceiling; and
   fourth searching level – ceiling.

3. Formations include the diamond, the circle, the box and the 'V' or wedge.
4. If the situation was dangerous, you would use a closed formation.
5. General guidelines for securing venues include the following (any four):

   Carry out proper operational planning and advance work.
   Contact and liaise with all parties involved.
   Sweep and secure the area.
   Dominate the high ground (instal snipers).
   Ensure proper access control.
   Screen and observe all personnel who will come into close contact with the principal.
   Provide overt (open, or official) and covert (undercover) personnel.

Be prepared for any emergency.

Ensure that emergency service and support units are on hand, or on standby.

Ensure that all protection personnel can be clearly identified.

Ensure that every protector is familiar with the area, his or her duties, and emergency procedures.

Ensure communication with all CPOs.

Set up a safe haven.

Set up and secure escape routes.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter –'Transit protection and motorcades'.

CHAPTER 7: TRANSIT PROTECTION AND MOTORCADES

Learning outcomes for Chapter 7

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

describe the rules regarding transit protection and motorcades;

discuss motorcade formations;

describe vehicle searches; and

understand and use the correct terminology with respect to motorcades.

Introduction

Your close protection team will have to transport your principal from one venue to another, usually by car. This is a particularly risky phase of the protection operation, and it is a great responsibility to plan and implement it.

The risk factor is high during transit because a vehicle is:

easily identifiable;

exposed;

vulnerable to attack;

an easy place to attack several CPOs at once; and

vulnerable to collision.

In this chapter, we'll discuss transit protection under the following headings:

basic guidelines for motorcade protection;

debussing and enbussing;

formal motorcade formations (used only in the public sector);

terminology;

equipment in vehicles; and

tactical motorcade movements.

Basic guidelines for motorcade protection

The following are some basic guidelines for motorcade protection:

Only protectors who have been trained in advanced driving techniques may be principal vehicle drivers or escort vehicle drivers.

When vehicles are not in use, they must be locked and parked under guard.

Equipment and weaponry that will be transported in the vehicle must be inspected before and after the motorcade movement, in order to ensure that it is in a good working condition. Before use, always inspect vehicles for any suspicious objects, listening devices or mechanical defects.

Also check the oil, water and tyre pressure! The vehicle's road-holding ability, and therefore the principal's safety, is dependent on the correct tyre pressure. Note the manufacturer's recommendations for high-speed full load. The fuel tank must always be filled after use. On long trips, fill it up when the level drops to less than half a tank. There must always be enough fuel in the tank to cope with an emergency situation if one arises.

Doors and windows must be shut and locked during motorcade movements. This can prevent someone from throwing a dangerous object into the vehicle or stop someone from opening a door from the outside.

All passengers, including the principal, *must* wear their safety belts while in the vehicle. Check that safety belts can be undone quickly if there is an emergency. A traffic accident can occur even when a car is stationary.

Debussing and enbussing

Your team must follow these rules regarding debussing (disembarking) and enbussing (embarking) with the principal:

When vehicles (in a motorcade) stop, all engines must be kept running. For safety reasons, all CPOs should stay where they are until the team leader (the motorcade commander) orders them to debus.


Only then should the CPOs debus and take up their positions.

The main bodyguard (number 1) will then open the door for the principal.

Once the principal is out, the team will move as shown in solid lines in the diagram below, with the leader or commander, number 5 (point).

Accelerating to clear, the team will escort the principal into the building.

During enbussing, the team will follow a similar procedure.



Formal motorcade formation

We'll describe the recommended formal motorcade formation, although you will never use it in this form in the private sector. A team may adapt this formation to suit different circumstances.

the advance vehicle – travels well ahead but follows the same route as the motorcade;

the reconnaissance vehicle – drives just ahead of the motorcade;

the pilot vehicle (police or traffic) – co-ordinates traffic escorts;

the lead escort vehicle with the CPO's motorcade commander – he or she plans the route, alternative routes and procedure, and gives a running commentary to direct the motorcade;

the principal back-up vehicle;


the principal vehicle;

the follow-up escort vehicle;


the command support vehicle – contains the temporary operations (ops) or command centre at the venue, and transports the mobile support team; and

the tail vehicle – lends visibility to the motorcade, to ensure traffic safety.

In the private sector, your team will use only three vehicles per VIP, and one vehicle as an advance vehicle. Your lead vehicle could also be a motorcycle. Your motorcade will therefore be much simpler, as shown in the diagram below:



If you need to stop, do so as follows:



You should stop behind the vehicle in front of you – not further behind than where an imaginary line from the rear right-hand tyre of the vehicle in front meets the horizontal line of the nose of your vehicle. In the event of an emergency, you can then move either to the left or to the right to pass the vehicle in front of you. You will have no time to reverse and then move forward.

Terminology

We'll explain the following terms:

advance vehicle;

reconnaissance vehicle;

lead and follow-up escort vehicles;

principal back-up vehicle;

vehicle search;

principal vehicle;

tail vehicle; and

motorcade commander.

Advance vehicle

As we explained earlier, the advance vehicle is used by the advance team to travel to the venue.

Function

The function of the advance vehicle is to:

transport advance team members;

transport the advance team's equipment to the venue; and

provide a temporary operations centre at the venue.

Attributes

The vehicle must have good passenger and equipment-carrying capacity.

Reconnaissance vehicle

The reconnaissance vehicle is used to reconnoitre (survey) the route before the motorcade uses the route.

Function

The function of the reconnaissance vehicle is to:

reconnoitre the route to identify hazards;
convey up-to-date information regarding the route and conditions to the main motorcade; and
investigate suspected hazards.

Attributes

The attributes are the same as those of the lead and follow-up escort vehicles or motorbikes.

Pilot vehicle

The pilot vehicle is a marked police or traffic police vehicle that travels at the head of the motorcade.

Functions

The functions of the pilot vehicle are to:

ensure that the motorcade travels unhindered through traffic; and
co-ordinate traffic escorts.

Attributes

The pilot vehicle must be a high-performance, properly marked and equipped police or traffic police vehicle.

Lead and follow-up escort vehicles

Lead and follow-up escort vehicles are escort vehicles that drive in front and behind the principal vehicle.

Functions

The functions of the lead and follow-up vehicles are as follows:

They provide physical protection to the principal vehicle.
They transport CPOs, weapons, and communication and other equipment.
They may be used as substitute principal vehicles in an emergency or for the sake of deception.

Attributes

Lead and follow-up escort vehicles should meet the following requirements:

Vehicles should be compatible with the principal vehicle in all respects, but to increase their combat capability they may be less luxurious.

They must have a large external configuration.

They must have a spacious internal configuration.

They must have adequate safety features to protect occupants.

They must have performance that is compatible with or superior to that of principal vehicle.

They must have rear-wheel drive.

They must be automatic.

They must have a 'run flat' system in the tyres.

In high-risk areas, armoured vehicles are recommended for this purpose.

Vehicle search

Systematic search essential

Your team should divide vehicles into five search areas:

outside of the car – especially doors, bonnet, boot door, petrol flap for wires, and behind bumpers;

underneath the vehicle – wheel caps, under wheel arches, underneath the vehicle and around the petrol tank;

inside the vehicle – beneath mats or carpets, in, underneath and behind seats, armrests and door trims, roof, side pillars, sun visors, dashboard, heater or air vent, pipes and glove compartment;

engine compartment – air filter, under battery tray, behind radiator, grill, head-lights, inside heater or air trunk, any suspicious wiring from battery coil, condenser, starter and fuse box; and

boot complete inside – boot floor or under carpet, all compartments, above rear wheels and spare wheel.

Principal back-up vehicle

The principal back-up vehicle can be used as the principal vehicle if the principal vehicle breaks down, or is damaged or incapacitated.

Functions

The functions of the principal back-up vehicle are as follows:

to act as a replacement principal vehicle if necessary;

to provide additional support and cover during an attack;

to act as an escape vehicle at the venue; and

to act as a decoy.

Attributes

The attributes of the principal back-up vehicle are the same as those of the principal vehicle.

Principal vehicle

The principal vehicle is the vehicle that the principal is transported in.

Functions

The functions of the principal vehicle are as follows:

It is used to transport the principal and his or family.

It provides physical protection to the occupants.

Attributes

The principal vehicle has the following attributes:

It must be armoured to the desired level of ballistic capability.

It must have exceptional performance, road-holding and safety features.

It must have a 'run flat' tyre system.

It must be an automatic drive vehicle.

It must be a rear- or four-wheel-drive vehicle.

Its appearance must fit the status of the principal.

Command support vehicle (back-up)

The command support or back-up vehicle drives behind the follow-up escort vehicle in a motorcade.

Functions

The functions of the back-up vehicle are as follows:

It transports the command element of the protection team.

It must be fitted with communication equipment.

It may be used as a temporary operational centre at the venue.

In certain circumstances, such as on rural roads, on hunting trips or at mass rallies, it may be used as a lead or follow-up escort vehicle, or even as the principal vehicle.

It transports the mobile support group.

Attributes

The command support vehicle must have the following features:

- high ground clearance;

4 × 4 drive;

performance compatible with the principal vehicle;

large external configuration;

spacious internal configuration;

safety features to protect the occupants; and

a 'run flat' tyre system.

Tail vehicle

The tail vehicle is a marked police or traffic police vehicle that travels at the rear of the motorcade.

Functions

The tail vehicle lends visibility to the motorcade, for the sake of traffic safety.

Attributes

The tail vehicle should have the same attributes as the pilot vehicle.

Motorcade commander

The motorcade commander directs the tactical functioning of the motorcade. The commander will normally have been responsible for planning the routes, alternative routes and procedures. The commander normally rides in the lead escort vehicle.

Equipment in vehicles

Weaponry

Vehicles in a motorcade should carry the following weapons:

an R1 or R5 rifle, with fully loaded double magazines and fully loaded additional double magazines;

a 12-bore shotgun, with folding stock or piston grip loaded with SSG or LG rounds and 20 additional rounds; and

a 9 mm P sub-machine piston, with fully loaded magazines and fully loaded additional double magazine.



Magazines must be unloaded after use to ensure that springs are not weakened, which would cause stoppages. Weapons must be cleaned and test-fired to ensure that they are in good working condition.

Pyrotechnical

Vehicles in a motorcade should carry the following pyrotechnical equipment:

smoke grenades, green and red, which can be used to provide cover or signal to a helicopter;

stun grenades, an offensive weapon that may be used against a barricaded attacker or hostile crowd;

a 300 m rocket flare;

teargas grenades, or a spray canister or gas marker; and

instalight.

Other equipment

Vehicles in a motorcade should also carry the following equipment:

first aid kit;

fire-extinguisher;

magnetic blue light (not applicable – for national level motorcades only);

multi-channel two-way radio;

siren and public address system;

spotlights and flashlights;

body armour;

maps;

water;

emergency parts (fan belts, fuses and tools); and

night vision equipment.

Tactical motorcade movements

We can divide tactical motorcade movements into the following phases:

pre-departure phase;

departure phase;

transit phase;

arrival phase; and

post-arrival phase.

Pre-departure phase

The team should take the following into account in the pre-departure phase:

Vehicles and equipment should be checked as mentioned.

The motorcade should be in place only shortly before departure. To ensure that the motorcade will be ready in time, there should be efficient communication between the PES team and the motorcade.

When possible, departure should take place from a secured area, for example from a parking garage, to lessen the exposure of the motorcade.

When a crowd is present or the principal departs in an exposed area, a secured area should be formed around the vehicles, by means of a cordon or other suitable measures, for example patrol dogs.

The team should make use of additional security posts, such as observation posts and sniper posts.

The engines of the vehicle in the motorcade must be warmed up, drivers must be in the vehicles and the engines must be running.

The doors of all the vehicles must be closed. The door of the principal vehicle should be opened by the point person or any other protector in the PES team when the principal approaches the vehicle.

Departure phase

The team should take the following into account in the departure phase:

The period when the principal leaves the building and approaches the vehicle is a high-risk phase. (Examples are the attack on US President Reagan in 1981, President Ford in 1975, and Israeli Premier Rabin in 1995).

The protectors must focus their attention on the surrounding area and people and not on the principal (this is one of the things that went wrong in the attack on President Reagan in 1981).

When the protection PES team with the principal reaches the vehicles, the protector in front opens the door for the principal. This will probably be the principal.

As soon as the principal is seated in the vehicle, the protectors must get into their vehicles so that the motorcade can depart without any delay. The motorcade is a soft target at this stage.

The doors of the principal vehicle must be locked as soon as the passengers are seated.



All drivers should await the following instructions from the motorcade commander (the MC):

Lights on.

Doors locked.

Buckle up.

Roll (depart).

Transit phase

The team should take the following into account in the transit phase:

During this phase, there must be *good communication* between the vehicles, the arrival and departure point, and the control centre.

The motorcade commander must give a running commentary to direct the motorcade.

The motorcade must try to keep to the speed limit and traffic rules as far as possible, to prevent any risk of collision and unnecessary embarrassment for the principal. The use of blue lights or sirens should be limited.

In the case of a stretch limousine, the team can make ask the traffic department to assist them.

People on traffic escort duty or point duty must make sure that the motorcade runs smoothly.

The driver should drive with discretion to keep the motorcade moving as much as possible. *A stationary motorcade is an easy target.* (For example, the motorcade is especially vulnerable at traffic lights and stop streets.)

The drivers should maintain a safe following distance at all times. No other vehicles may be allowed in the motorcade. For the sake of safety, vehicles trying to enter the motorcade must be prevented from doing so.

Protectors must always be prepared. They must be on the lookout for any hazards or vehicles that might be a threat to the motorcade, and they must be able to counter-attack immediately.

Possible hazards

Hazards may include the following:

overhead bridges and subways;

construction works and detours;

intersections and junctions;

stationary or slow-moving vehicles;

vehicles overtaking the motorcade;

motorcycles moving and stopping next to the motorcade (for example, George Tsantes, Athens, November 1983; Buback, West Germany, 1977);

roadblocks;

explosive devices in refuse or other containers (for example, Judge Gibson, North Ireland, 1978);

an accident scene;

pedestrians, especially in places where you don't normally find them (for example, on the freeway); and

choke points.

There should be:

no unnecessary smoking, eating or talking while moving in the motorcade; and

no drinking, as this reduces reaction time and concentration.

Arrival phase

The team should take the following into account in the arrival phase:

If the destination is known, an advance team must be used to secure the point of arrival.

Communication between the motorcade and the advance team is of the utmost importance, so information can be relayed, arrangements made or changed, and the arrival co-ordinated.

When approaching the point of arrival, the protectors must get ready to deploy (for example, loosen safety belts, check radios and weapons, unlock doors.) They must do this without relaxing their observation or alertness.

The motorcade must stop in such a way that the exposure of the principal is limited.

As soon as the motorcade stops, the protectors must deploy. The deployment must be done without creating an impression of disorder.

Drivers must stay where they are, engines running and vehicles in gear.

The doors of the principal vehicle must stay locked at first.

When the protectors are in place, the motorcade commander will give a signal to the bodyguard.

The bodyguard will get out of the principal vehicle, making sure that the PES is correctly deployed and the situation is under control.

The bodyguard will then open the door for the principal. The team will form a protective formation around the principal as he or she leaves the vehicle.

During the arrival, the protectors must concentrate on their surroundings and the crowd. They must not make the possibly fatal mistake of looking at the principal (for example, the attempted assassination of Reagan).

If the motorcade arrival takes place in the street, the team should ask the traffic department for assistance.

The bodyguard should have informed the principal of the procedure to be followed on arrival at the destination.

Post-arrival phase

The team should take the following into account in the post-arrival phase:

When the principal is safely in the building, the motorcade will move to a secure holding area.


Drivers will stay with the vehicles and maintain communication with the PES team and control centre.

Vehicles and equipment must be inspected.


The motorcade must be ready for departure at all times. Drivers must be temporarily relieved of their duties if they want to leave the vehicles.

MOTORCADES

PYRAMID FORMATION



ZIG ZAG VEHICLE FORMATION




A MOTORCADE IMMEDIATELY PLACE THE PRINCIPAL IN A MOST VULNERABLE POSITION. MOST ATTACKS ARE LAUNCHED IN TRANSIT

- AS THE PRINCIPAL AND BODYGUARDS ARE CAPTURED IN A CONFINED SPACE
- A FAST GET AWAY FOR ATTACKERS
- AN IDEAL POSITION FOR AMBUSH (STATIC OR MOBILE)

THE SAME MAKE, MODEL AND COLOUR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO CONFUSE THE ATTACKERS

BREAKDOWNS

BACK—UP VEHICLE BREAKS DOWN



LEAD/V PRINCIPAL/V BACK– UP/V

P/V BECOME LEAD/V




IF THE BACK - UP VEHICLE BREAKS DOWN THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE WILL BECOME THE LEAD VEHICLE AND THE LEAD WILL BECOME THE BACK - UP VEHICLE


IN A NO THREAT SITUATION THE M/C MIGHT STOP AND THE CPO's IN THE BROKENDOWN VEHICLE CAN JUMP IN WITH THE NEW APPOINTED B/UP/V, THE DRIVER OF BROKENDOWN VEHICLE WILL STAY WITH

LEAD VEHICLE BREAKS-


L/V P/V B-UP/V



THE M/C WILL NOT CHANGE POSITIONS




PRINCIPAL VEHICLE BREAKSDOWN



THIS SITUATION WILL ALSO CHANGE THE MOTORCADE POSITIONS, AS THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE BREAKS DOWN THE BACK– UP VEHICLE BECOMES THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE AND THE LEAD VEHICLE MOVES IN BEHIND THE BACK- UP VEHICLE.

IN THE EVENT OF A MINOR BREAKDOWN LIKE A FLAT TIRE, THE BROKENDOWN VEHICLE WILL CATCH UP WITH THE MOTORCADE AFTER THE BODYGUARDS HAVE CHANGED THR TYRE.



PROTECTION LEVELS & ARMOUR ON VEHICLES

LEVEL 1 — IS DESIGHNED FOR SMALLER HANDGUN ROUNDS BUT DOES NOT MEET DESIRED REQUIRE MENTS FOR MOTORCADES.

LEVEL 2 — SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS THE LOWEST LEVEL OF PROTECTION SINCE IT WOULD BE SINCE IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR MEDUIM POWERED SMALL ARMS FROM 9MM TO 357 MAGNUM RANGE ie. 124 GRAIN 9MM FMJ AT 1120' /SEC.

LEVEL 3 — WILL STOP MST POWERFULL SMALL ARMS IN THE 44 RANGEINCLUDING 12 GUAGE SOLID SLUGS AND .30 CARBINE 110GRAIN BALL AT 1900'/SEC

LEVEL 4 - DEFEATS MOST HIGH POWERED RIFLES IN THE .223 TO 7.62 NATO RANGE INCLUDING 30 TO 60 GRAIN SP AT 2410'/SEC

LEVEL 5 - DESIGHNED TO STOP .50 APM2 708 GRAIN AT 2400'/SEC

THE BASIC TYPES OF MATERIAL USED FOR ARMOURING VEHICLES

- HARD STEEL— NORMALLY USED FOR DOORS AND ROOFS
- TOUGHER STEEL WHICH IS MORE BRITTLE IS MORE DESIRABLE IN FLOORS TO PROVIDE GREATER
  BLAST RESISTANCE.
- ALLOYS WHICH ARE USED USUALLY COMPRISE OF STEEL WITH ALLUMINIUM LAMINATING
- KEVLAR IS A COMPOSITE MATERIAL—IT IS IMPORTANT WHEN KEVLART IS USED THAT IT IS WATERPROFFED WITH RESIN TO ENSURE THE MOIST EVENTUALLY DOES NOT LOWER THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION
- FIBREGLASS (REINFORCED) SPESIFICALLY TO PROTECT AGAINST BLAST ABOVE MENTIONED ARE
  USED FOR FLOORS, DOORS, ROOFS
- FOR WINDOWS, SPECTRA SHIELD AND A COMBINATION OF GLASS AND TRANSPERENT POLYCARBONATE LAMINATES FOR WINDSHELDS. THIS FILM WILL BE PLACED ON THE INSIDE TO PROTECT AGAINST SHATERING AND FRAGMENTS

TYRES

RUN-FLAT TYRES ARE A VIRTUAL NECESSITY, BUT PREFFEREBLY NOT THE FOAM TYPE AS IT CAN LIQUEFY WHICH WILL NO LONGER BE EFFECTIVE. BUT INSTEAD THE RUN-FLAT TYRE WITH THE INTERNAL SEALENT THAT QUICKLY CLOSES AND PUNCTURE ON THE TYRE

OTHER ESENTIAL SAFETY FEATURES TO CONSIDER

PROTECTING THE FUELTANK

- EXPLOSAFE IS A LIGHT WEIGHT FOIL LINNERLINING WHICH DIVERT THE HEAT SO RAPIDLY THAT THE FLAME IS EXTINGUISHED INSTANTLY

- ANOTHER OPTION COULD BE A REMOTE FIRE EXTINGUISHER DESIGNED FOR THE FUELTANK

- THE MOST COMMON METHOD APPLIED AS A SAFTY FACTOR IS A PANEL PREVENTING TANK TO BE RAPTURED

IN ADDITION THE FOLLOWING SAFETY FEATURERS SHOULD BE INSTALLED:

REMOTE CONTROLLED INGINITION START CONTROLLED FROM A DISTANCE INCASE A BOMB IS WIRED TO THE IGNITION SYSTEM. THE PROTECTIVE TEAM AND PRINCIPAL WONT BE

- A PAGER ALARM DESIGNED TO BE ACTIVATED INCASE THE UNGUARDED VECHILE HAS BEEN TAMPERED WITH. A SYSTEM CALLED TAIGER IS A GOOD OPTION. ESPECIALLY HELPFULL WHEN WORKING SOLO OR SMALL TEAM AND THERE IS NO OPTION BUT LEAVING VEHICLES UNATTENDED

- A NUT AND BOLT THROUGH THE EXHAUSTE PIPE WILL PREVENT TAMPERING
- FILM WINDOW TINT TO ASSIST IN NOT IDENTIFING PERSONS OR NUMBER OF PERSONS AND EXACT POSITIONS OF PERSONS IN VEHICLE AS WELL AS COUNTER SURVELLANCE PURPAISES

DRIVER TRAINING

THE QUALITIES A GOOD DRIVER SHOULD HAVE

- RESPONSIBLE AND NOT! BE RECKLESS
- BE DECISIVE AND CALM
- DO NOT HESITATE TO TAKE ACTION
- KNOW YOUR CAPABILITIES AND OF THE VEHICLE IE.
- TURNING RADIUS OF VEHICLE AND STEERING CONTROL, BRAKING AND ACCELERATION
- ALERTNES-RECOGNISE AND PREVENT DANGER SITUATIONS RATHER SIMPLY REACTING TO THEM
- ALWAYS'S BE AWARE OF ALTERNITIVE AND ESCAPS ROUTES
- A DRIVER SHOULD HAVE THE BASIC BGS TRAINING TO KNOW HOW A PROTECTIVE TEAM OPERATES
- KNOW ALL RELEVANT TECHNIQUES (WILL BE DEMONSTRATED LATER)
- DRIVER MUST ALWAYS SIGNAL HIS/HER INTENTIONS AND CO-ORDINATE WITH OTHER VEHICLES IN THE MOTORCADE
- A BALANCE BETWEEN SKILLS OF DEFENSIVE, OFFENSIVE AND EVASIVE DRIVING SHOULD BE MAINTAINED

A FEW BASIC RULES APPLY TO DEFENSIVE, OFFENSIVE AND EVASIVE DRIVING

- NEVER HIT ANYTHING HEAD ON**.**
- IF THERE IS NO OTHER ALTENATIVE BUT TO HIT SOMETHING HIT SOFT OBJECT IE. (BUSHES THAN LAMP POST) RATHER OR OBJECT MOVING IN SAME DIRECTION AS VIP VEHICLE RATHER THAN SOMETHING MOVING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION OR SOMEHTING STATIONARY
- IF EVASIVE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID DANGER, HEAD AWAY FROM ON COMING TRAFIC
- IT IS WISER TO LEAVE THE ROAD UNCONTROLLED THAN A UNCONTROLLED SKID

DEFENSIVE DRIVING

INVOLVES SKILLS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO AVOID ACCIDENTS—SAFE AND CONSIDERATE DRIVING.

EVASIVE DRIVING

HIGH PERFORMANCE AGGRESSIVE MANOEUVRES NECESSARY TO EVADE ABUSH.

OFFFENSIVE DRIVING

WITH OFFENSIVE DRIVING WHEN A CAR WANT TO RUN THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE OFF THE ROAD, IMMEDIATELY BRING THE VEHICLE TO THE CENTRE LINE OF THE ROAD TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR ATTACING CAR TO RUN PRINCIPAL VEHICLE OF THE ROAD

IF THE ATTACKER ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE P/VECH FROM THE ROAD THE P/DRIVER MAY COUNTER THIS BY FORCING THE ATTACKER OF THE ROAD BY SPINNING THE STEERING WHEEL THROUGH ABOUT NINETY DEGREES

RAMMING

USING THIS TECHNIQUE THE DRIVER SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT HIS THUMBS ARE NOT HOOKED ON THE WHEEL TO PREVENT, INJURY BY THE IMPACT

IF THE ROADBLOCK IS STATIONARY AND NO OPTION OF ESCAPING, THE RAMMING TECHNIQUE WILL BE USED TO CLEAR THE WAY


PROCEDURE IS AS FOLLOWS:

SLOW DOWN AND CHANGE INTO LOW GEAR, IDENTIFY THE OPTIMUM IMPACT POINT (WICH WILL NORMALLY THE LIGHTEST POINT OR PART ON THE VEHICLE TO PIVOT AWAY FROM IMPACT) ACCELERATE TO RAM




BOOTLEG—TURN

AN OPTION USED IN A AMBUSH SITUATION WHIILE APROCING AN OBSTRUCTION IN THE ROAD WHILE IN MOTION THE DRIVER TURNS THE WHEEL AND SHARPLY STAMPS ON THE EMERGENCY BRAKE WHICH WILL CAUSE THE BACK OF THE CAR TO SUPE AROUND UNTIL THE VEHICLE HAS COMPLETED A 180° DEGREE FORWARD TURN, THE DRIVER SIMPLY




J - TURN

THE J - TURN IS NORMALLY USED WHEN THERE IS LIMITED MANOEUVRING SPACE. THE DRIVER SHOULD
STOP AND REVERSE AND WHEN AT SPEED, TURN THE STEERING WHEEL SHARPLY WHICH WILL CAUSE
THE CAR TO SPIN 180 - DEGREES AND AS THE FRONT OF THE CAR IS SLIDING AROUND, SHIFT INTO DRIVE
AND ACCSLERATE OUT OF AMBUSH.



AMBUSH



1. DRIVER STOPS


2. DRIVER REVERSE VERSE VEHICLE IN A 180 - DEGREE TURN

TURN STEARINGWHEEL SHARPLY,TURN INTO SLIDE AND SHIFT INTO 1st GEAR OR DRIVE

3. THEN ACCELERATES FORWARD AND MOVE INTO OPPOSITE DI -

Y-TURN

THE Y-TURN IS USED WHEN THERE IS MORE ROOM. THE DIVER STOPS REVERSE IN A 90° DEGREE TURN THEN BEGINS TO ACCELERATE AS THE TURN IS COMPLETED



Breakdown

One tactic to use if the motorcade breaks down is to switch the principal to another vehicle. Look at the diagram below, showing a breakdown of a motorcade of three vehicles – a lead escort vehicle, a principal vehicle, and a back-up vehicle.

Key to letters used in the diagram:

L is the lead escort vehicle.

P is the principal vehicle.

B-UP is the back-up vehicle.


You have three vehicles, a lead vehicle in front, your principal vehicle in the middle, and a back-up vehicle behind. The order of the vehicles is L, P, B-UP. They are in transit phase.

Situation A: The back-up vehicle breaks down. The principal vehicle will then become lead, and lead will become back-up. One CPO will stay with the broken-down vehicle, and the CPOs that were in that vehicle will jump in with the new back-up vehicle and move on.

Situation B: If the lead vehicle breaks down, the motorcade will not change positions. The lead vehicle's CPOs will drive with the back-up vehicle, and the driver of the lead vehicle will stay with the broken-down lead vehicle.

Situation C: The principal vehicle break down. The back-up vehicle becomes the principal vehicle, and the lead vehicle moves in behind the back-up vehicle. The back-up vehicle becomes the principal vehicle.

In the event of a flat tyre, the broken-down vehicle will catch up with the motorcade after the CPOs have changed the tyre.




SEATING POSITIONS IN A AIRCRAFT

IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR CPO's TO OCCUPY AISLE SEATS AROUND THE PRINCIPAL FOR SUFFICIENT PROTECTION BY THE TEAM.

THE DIAGRAM WILL DEMONSTRATE A BASIC LAYOUT OF THE POSITIONING OF THE CPO's , BUT CAN
VARY, DEPENDING ON VARIOUS ASPECTS. ie NO OF STAFF, FAMILY ETC.





AIRLINE TRAVEL

TRANSPORTING WEAPONS

SINCE THE 9/11 ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE THE SECURITY AT AIRPORTS BE-CAME MUCH TIGHTER AND AS APASSANGER YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO CARRY A WEAPON WITH YOU ON A PLANE .

THE ONE OPTION IS TO ARRANGE AT THE SECURITY DESK ON THE AIRPORT TO HAND IN THE TEAMS FIRE -
ARMS BEFORE DEPARTURE . THE AIRPORT THEN TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRANS-PORTATION THERE OF TO THE DESTINATION AIRPORT . ON ARRIVAL THE SAME PROCEDURE ARE FOLLOWED.

THE ACTUAL PROCEDURE IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. UPON ARRIVAL WELL IN ADVANCE YOU WILL ENQUIRE AT THE HELP DESK WHERE TO HAND IN
   WEAPONRY.
2. COMPLETE THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION AND SIGHN THEIR FIRE-ARM REGISTER.
3. HAND IN A COPY OF YOUR ID . DOCUMENT AND FIRE-ARM LICENCE.
4. STRIP DOWN THE WEAPON COMPLETELY.
5. THEY WILL SUPPLY A BAG - THEN PLACE ALL PARTS PLUS MAGAZINE WHICH WILL BE COVERED ON ITS OWN , IN THE SUPPLIED BAG WHICH WILL BE SEALED IN YOUR PRES-SENCE.
6. A FEE OF PLUS , MINUS A R100 WILL BE CHARGED FOR THE TRANSPOTATION.
7. KEEP ALL DOCUMENTATION AND RECEIPTS TO PRESENT ON ARRIVAL

THE COMPLETE PROCEDURE WILL TAKE UP AN ADITIONAL 15 — 30 MINUTES OF YOUR TIME PER WEAPON
- BE SURE TO CALCULATE THAT TIME FACTOR INTO YOUR TIME TABLE.

USING COMERCIAL AIRLINES CAN BE MORE TIME CONSUMING THAN USING PRIVATE OR CHARTERED
AIRCRAFT INTERMS OF DELAYS AND HASSLES AT AIRPORTS.

PASSPORTS

ALWAYS`S BE 100% SURE OF YOUR DOCUMENTATION BEING VALID AND IN ORDER AS WELL AS YOUR PRINCEPALS.
INCASE WHERE A COUNTRY HAS A REPUTATION FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY IT MIGHT BE WISE TO LET THE AIRLINE SECURITY KNOW IN ADVANCE TO BE FAST TRACKED ON BOARD-ING.

SECURITY SCREENING

SOME AIRPORTS OPERATE ON THE STERILE CONCOURSE SYSTEM WHEREBY PASANGERS HAVE TO CLEAR SECURITY LONG BEFORE THEY REACH THE DEPARTURE GATE, SOME AGAIN DON'T DO THE SECURITY CHECK UNTIL PASSENGERS REACH THE GATE.
FIRST MENTIONED IS PREFERABLE SINCE IT IS MAKING AN ATTACK AT THE GATE MORE DIF-FICULT BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE SECURITY CHECK AND THE BOARDING AREA.

LARGE AMOUNTS OF CASH CAN ALSO DRAW SUSPESION WHICH CAN LEAD TO DETENTION AND QUESTIONING .
ALWAYS PLAN AHEAD IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES IN ADVANCE TO PREVENT EMBAR-RESMENT AND
DO NOT TAKE UP UNNECESSARY TIME .

HELICOPTERS

THE PROCEDURE IN SECURING A LANDING ZONE IS DEMONSTRATED ON THE DIAGRAM (NEXT PAGE)

- WHEN THE TEAM ESCORT A PRINCIPAL ABOARD AHELICOPTER AT AN UNSECURED LANDING ZONE
  THE CPO`S APPROACH IN A BOX FORMATION


- AS THEY NEAR THE HELICOPTER B/G 1 AND B/G 2 SPLIT AND SWING WIDE AROUND THE ROTOR AND TAKE UP HIGH KNEEL POSITIONS FACING OUTWARD.
- B/G 3 AND B/G 4 CONTINUE TO COVER THE REAR UNTIL PRINCIPAL AND T/L OR M/B/G ARE MET BY CREW, BY WHICH THEY WILL POSITION THEMSELVES TO SECURE THE REAR CORNERS OF LANDING ZONE ALSO TAKING UP HIGH KNEEL POSITIONS.
- ONCE THE PRINCIPALS HELICOPTER HAS TAKEN OFF, THE B/G`S AT THE CORNERS OF THE LANDING ZONE CON BOARD THEIR OWN HELICOPTER.
- THE TEAM LEADER MUST MAKE SURE THAT HIMSELF AND THE PRINCIPAL CROUCHES TO AVOID THE ROTORS AND GIVE BODY COVER FROM THE REAR FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL TO CHOPPER BY PLACING HIS HAND ON PRINCIPALS HEAD OR SHOULDER.
- MOSTLY ONLY THE T/L WILL ACCOMPANY THE PRINCIPAL AS RESULTOF LIMITED SPACE FOR A NUMBER OF PEOPLE. IF ADITIONAL B/G`S CAN BOARD , B/G 3 AND B/G4 WILL BE THE FIRST.

SAFTY ARROUND CHOPPERS

* THE MOST DANGEROUS PART OF HELICOPTERS IS THE ROTORS, ESPECIALLY THE SMALL TAIL ROTOR.

- NEVER TRY TO ENTER THE OPOSITE SIDE OF CHOPPER TAKING SHORTCUT UNDERNEATH TAIL (MOVE IN WIDE CIRCLES AROUND CHOPPER.)
- HOLD TIGHTLY TO LOOSE ITEMS — CAPS - CLIP ON TIE`S - HOLDING JACKETS OVER SHOULDERS WOMAN`S SCAFS ETC.
- IT IS ADVISABLE TO WEAR EYE PROTECTION BECAUSE OF THE GRIT THAT WILL BE KICKED UP BY THE ROTORS

SECURING A HELI - PAD




THE BOX FORMATION ABOVE WILL TRANS-
FORM INTO THESE POSITIONS DOWN BELOW

BG 4




MBG P



BG 5





BG 2



BG 1



THE 4 BODYGUARDS SECURING THE CORNERS OF THE HELI- PAD WILL TAKE UP KNEELING PO-
SITIONS

Summary

This completes our study of transit protection, including aircraft and helicopters. Regarding motorcades, remember that your protection team will adapt the formal motorcade formation discussed to suit its needs. In the next chapter we'll discuss typical ambushes and counter-measures.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 6

1. Give four reasons why the principal is at risk while travelling by vehicle.

2. (a) Where will the principal sit in the vehicle while in transit?

   (b) Who will open the door for the principal on arrival?



Self-assessment answers 6

1. The risk factor is high during transit because a vehicle is:

   easily identifiable;

   exposed;

   vulnerable to attack;

   an easy place to attack several CPOs at once; and

   vulnerable to collision.

2. (a) The principal will sit on the left-hand side of the back seat.

   (b) On arrival, the bodyguard will open the door for the principal.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Ambushes and Counter-measures'.

CHAPTER 8: AMBUSHES AND COUNTER-MEASURES

Learning outcomes for Chapter 8

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

list and describe types of ambushes;

describe counter-measures in the event of an ambush; and

describe route planning.

Surprise is the primary weapon of an attacker in an ambush.

CPOs should be familiar with the basic types of ambush and the most effective counter-measures, which we'll describe in this chapter. CPOs should practise counter-measures and review case studies regularly to identify new trends.

Types of ambush and counter-measures

There are two basic types of ambush:

the static ambush; and

the mobile ambush.

We'll discuss each of these types of ambush and the counter-measures you can use to protect against them. Then we'll briefly consider route planning.

Static ambush

In a static ambush, the road is blocked by a physical obstruction, forcing the principal vehicle to stop. The obstruction could be caused by the following:

a vehicle suddenly approaching and turning in front of the principal vehicle;

a vehicle suddenly moving out of a driveway, parking space or side street;

a vehicle in front of the principal vehicle suddenly braking or reversing into the principal vehicle;

rocks, tree trunks and so on placed on the road, particularly at a blind rise or bend; and

a ditch dug across the road.

An explosive device placed next to or beneath the road is a variation of the static ambush.

Counter-measures in the event of a static ambush

1. In the event of a static ambush by one or more vehicles, the prey (that will be you, the CPO, and the principal!) must try to hit the blocking car on its front or rear mudguard and then speed away. (Do not try to speed around the ambush, as you will then become an easier target.)

   Alternatively, the prey must try to bring his or her vehicle to a standstill about 20 m from the ambush, put the vehicle into reverse gear and do a 180° reverse turn. A 180° hand-brake turn can be made if there is an opportunity. Where the road allows it, a U-turn or a Y-turn can be made. The object is to break 'line of fire' contact with the ambush as quickly as possible.

2. If your team has a follow-up car, this car should pass the principal (the prey) and take up a defensive position about 20 m from the ambush.
   If it is possible for the follow-up car to break through, the driver must do this by hitting the ambush vehicle on a chosen point on the front or rear mudguard. The escort vehicle must stop about 20 m on the other side of the ambush and give covering fire. At the same time, the prey must speed through and break visual contact. If it is not possible to break through, then the escort vehicle must still take up a defensive position in front of the prey. The prey can then do a 180° reverse turn and speed away. It if is impossible to do a 180° reverse turn, then the driver should do a U-turn or Y-turn.

3. If the prey makes use of a follow-up and lead escort car, then the lead escort car must take up the defensive position or ram the ambush out of the way for the prey and the follow-up car. If it is not possible to push the ambush out of the way, the lead escort must take up the defensive position and fight. The follow-up must take up a diagonal position in front of or next to the prey. The prey makes a 180° reverse turn and speeds off, followed by the follow-up vehicle. The driver can use a Y-turn or U-turn.

4. In order to avoid an obstacle, the prey may jump a curb if it is not too high, or use a 180° hand-brake turn.

5. The drivers should always maintain a safe following distance. They should stop at least half a car's length behind the car in front, and keep their car in gear. The driver must identify escape routes to the left, right and behind the car. When stopping he or she must, when looking over the edge of the bonnet, just see where the front car's rear wheels make contact with the tar – then the distance will be safe for an escape.

Mobile ambush

In a mobile ambush, the following types of attack may occur:

Pincer attack. In the pincer attack, one vehicle moves past the prey's vehicle, and swerves in front of the prey's vehicle. The prey is forced to stop. A second vehicle blocks from behind.

Side street attack. In this attack, a static vehicle suddenly moves in front of the principal from a side street or alley at the attack point. At the same time a second vehicle blocks the prey from behind (for example, the attack on Attorney-General Lorenz in West Germany).

Side attack. In this attack, attackers come from behind and hit the prey from the left or the right on the rear mudguard. The prey is rammed off balance. The prey can then be forced off the road, Alternatively, the occupants of the attack vehicle fire at the prey's vehicle.

Motorbike or scooter-attack In this case, the motorbike or scooter with a passenger drives next to the prey. At a traffic light or stop street, the passenger on the motorcycle fires on the prey (for example, attacks on Colonel Schugaiver, Cape Tsantes (CIA) and Judd (CIA), in Greece).

Counter-measures

Diagonal attack. Brake hard, so that the attack vehicle drives past.
Make use of the opportunity to do a U-turn and break visual contact.

Pincer attack. Brake hard first, then ram the vehicle in front out of the way, or jump the curb and break visual contact.

Side street attack. Ram or push the vehicle in front or rear out of the way and break visual contact.

Side attack. Brake hard, make a U-turn and break visual contact.

Motorbike or scooter attack. The key is alertness and observation. The escort vehicle should not allow motorcycles to move to the principal vehicle.

Effective counter-action during an attack can be summarised as follows:

split-second evaluation of the situation;

split-second decision-making concerning actions, especially the drivers;

split-second, purposefully executed decision;

maximal use of available space, equipment and other aids;

maximum use of fire power (but accurate and responsible); and

optimal use of cover.



In the hands of a well-trained and prepared driver, a vehicle is a powerful weapon that can be used with maximum effe
ambush
tactics.

Route planning

Route planning is a prerequisite for the prevention of an attack on a principal in transit. When the principal travels regularly between two points, for instance between residence and office, the team must plan, number and code several routes. These routes must be changed daily so that no pattern is formed. Also change routes at unexpected times. Departure and arrival times must be varied. Through the use of two simple graphs, the protector can record the use of routes, departure and arrival times, and at the same time ensure that they are changed regularly, avoiding a pattern.

Have accurate timing on record but only give approximate times to any assisting agencies, on a strict need-to-know basis.

Pay particular attention to the debus area.

Using maps and other aids to work out times or distances, including alternative routes.

Reconnoitre intended routes on the same day on which the journey is planned. Identify black spots and vulnerable points, and double-check possible ambush or debus points. Record registration numbers of cars.

Always plan for the worst.

Don't take risks!

Now consult your study guide

That brings us to the end of our discussion of ambushes in transit. In the next chapter we'll move on to a new topic, Principals of threat assessment.

There are no self-assessment questions in this chapter. Make sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes. Then consult your study guide.

CHAPTER 9: PRINCIPLES OF THREAT ASSESSMENT



Learning outcomes for Chapter 9

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

understand and explain the importance of threat assessment, and the basic principles of threat assessment;

identify possible targets and sources of threats, and motives for threats;

discuss key elements of threat assessment; and

identify and discuss threat indicators.

In this chapter we will introduce you to the importance and fundamental principles of threat assessment. We'll discuss threats under the following headings:

threat assessment;

targets, sources and motives;

key elements of threat assessment;

capability of the threat source;

intelligence; and

development of scenarios.

Threat assessment

In order to ensure the optimal use of limited resources to protect a principal who is under threat, these resources should be deployed selectively. Firstly, the close protection team must carry out an accurate threat assessment.

This is especially important in the sensitive area of foreign protection operations.

Depending on the protocol category accorded to a foreign dignitary's visit, protective support from the host country may be limited. Even if it is, accurate risk assessment is crucial for the determination of the volume of resources that should be deployed on a foreign protection operation. It is extremely difficult to deploy additional resources once a foreign visit has commenced. Because of the exceptionally high costs involved, the close protection team must also be careful not to over-deploy resources.

Targets, sources and motives

Before discussing threat assessment in greater detail, we'll summarise:

possible targets of threats;
the sources (origins) of threats;
methods of attack; and
possible motives for threats.

Possible targets

Possible targets include any high-profile individual VIPs who represent government, other institutions, business corporations, political organisations and so on. They may also include people who are celebrities in their own right.

Potential attacker's preparations may follow these three steps, and the close protection team should be able to avert potential danger at any one of the three stages:

Target recon (reconnaissance). The close protection team should be able to detect this recon activity around a potential target's home, place of work, recreational venues, vehicles, travel arrangements and entertainment. Vulnerable points to look out for include extra-marital affairs and any other weaknesses on the part of the target.

Weapons procurements and preparation. The close protection team must watch out for attackers' preparations, such as test runs and training. Attackers may gain access to the target by various means, including bribery and blackmail. For example, they may succeed in becoming personally involved with the VIP's secretary, partner, staff and so on.

Execution. The close protection team may use diversionary tactics to gain information or access to blackmail material and threats to the target's family, and so on.

Sources of threats

Threats may come from the following five sources:

institutional, or state-directed terrorism;

organisational, or state-sponsored terrorism;

non-state-supported terrorism;

individual stalkers or assassins; and

incidental contingencies.

Firstly, we'll define terrorism.



Terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, *whether acting for or in opposition to established government authority*, when such actions are intended to influence a target group beyond that of the immediate victims.

(Definition according to a US State Department terrorism report, 1983)

Institutional or state-directed terrorism

In institutional terrorism, a state both sponsors and directs the actions of the organisation that is responsible for the terrorist actions.

EXAMPLES

Examples of institutional or state-directed terrorism include the following:

French intelligence agents sank the *Rainbow Warrior,* the flagship of the international environmental activist group Greenpeace.

North Korea used a team of assassins to murder several South Korean officials in Rangoon, Burma, in 1983.

State-directed terrorists from Nicaragua attacked and assaulted a Roman Catholic cardinal who had spoken out against the Sandinista government, in Miami, in 1985.

President Mubarak of Egypt survived an attempted assassination by a group alleged to be controlled by the Sudanese government.

Organisational or state-sponsored terrorism

Organisational terrorism differs from state-directed terrorism in that the sponsoring state does not direct the actions of the organisation.

The sponsoring state gives support in the form of training, weapons, logistics, financial and administrative functions.

Non-state-supported terrorism

Non-state-supported groups are usually relatively small militant groups with a particular cause or interest. Their interest may be environmental or anti-abortionist, for example, or another political or socio-cultural trend.

Individual assassins

Lone assassins are often successful in killing their target. They are often mentally disturbed people harbouring a personal grievance or obsession..

These potential assassins commonly manifest as stalkers who hound the target. Stalkers will write letters and make telephone calls to the target, and follow the target around, particularly at public appearances.

EXAMPLES

Examples of assassinations and attempted assassinations by lone individuals include the following:

the assassination of US presidential candidate Robert Kennedy by Siran Siran;

the attempted assassination of US President Reagan by John Hinckly; and

the assassination of South African Prime Minister HF Verwoerd by Dimitri Tsafendas.

Fanatical or mentally disturbed attackers will seldom be inhibited by this protection blanket, so they may be more dangerous – for example, the assassination of the Israeli Premier Rabin on 4 November 1995.

CPOs must also determine what level of violence is necessary to eliminate the target or achieve the attackers' objective – for example, a car bomb, a grenade, a fire-arm, a knife, or a disruptive technique such as arson. The degree of violence used will depend on whether the aim is to kill, injure or intimidate the target.

The use of a protection team does not necessarily reduce the vulnerability of a target and may even subjectively increase the target's exposure and 'visibility.'

The level and quality of security accorded to the target has a direct bearing on the vulnerability of the target.

The level of physical security at the principal's home and office, as well as the level of security of information regarding the target's habits, scheduled movements and protection measures, affect the level of vulnerability.

Other protection-related factors that affect vulnerability include:

the standard of selection and training of protectors;

the morale and discipline of protectors;

the suitability and effectiveness of equipment used by the protection team;

the extent of the team's compliance with protective measures; and

the co-operation of the principal.

Visibility of target

In close protection, *visibility* refers to the exposure of the target to the public, and to possible danger. A visible target often represents or is identified with a cause, or represents an organisation, a corporation, an institution or government.

EXAMPLES

A judge or a police official often represents or is identified with the judicial authority of a government when he or she expresses an opinion in public.

A cabinet minister represents the policy of his or her department, or that of the government. A minister could be high profile or low profile.

A protection and intelligence agency's perceived estimate of a target's visibility may differ from that of the potential attacker, particularly when the potential attacker is mentally disturbed.

Methods of attack

Methods of attack that may be used in assassination attempts include:

close-range shooting (from a handgun used in a crowd);

long-range sniper fire (high-powered rifle fire from cover);

the detonation of explosive devices (including booby-traps that are remotely triggered);

explosive ambushes of convoys; and

poisoning (intravenous or food poisoning).

Incidental contingencies

Incidental contingencies may also pose a threat to the principal. They include:

fires;

medical emergencies;

hijacking of vehicles;

unruly crowds; and

aggressive reporters.

Possible motives

Attackers may have a range of motives, some of which remain a mystery. Attacks are often politically or ideologically motivated. Even an unsuccessful assassination receives extensive media coverage. This guarantees maximum exposure to the assassins' cause. Attacks may also be triggered by economics, religion, racism, socio-political grievances, or personal reasons.

Key elements of threat assessment

The close protection team can determine what threats a target may face by measuring the target's profile against the 'three Vs':

vulnerability;

visibility; and

value.

Vulnerability of target

Vulnerability is a primary factor to consider when weighing up a threat against a target. For instance, a target with a high degree of public exposure may be more accessible than a target with a lower degree of public exposure.

CPOs can determine *vulnerability* by calculating the degree of effort attackers require to gain access to a position from where they can launch an attack on the target without their being compromised by the protection blanket around the target.

Other factors that may affect visibility include:

the position or post that the target holds;

the opinions expressed or action taken by the target, or the institution that the target represents; and

the involvement of the target or institution in controversial or high-profile actions, for example, an Italian judge in a mafia trail.

Value of the target

The value of the target is the strategic value that an attack on the target holds for the source of the threat.

The target has direct (individual) value and indirect (representative) value to the potential attacker.

The critical value of the target may be indicated by the effect that an attack on the target may have on the institution or community that he or she represents. For example, there was widespread civil disruption after the assassination of Chris Hani in 1993, quite apart from the loss to the country of an exceptional future politician.

Questions to ask include how long it will take an institution to recover from the effects of an attack on the target, and whether the value of the target can be replaced. In the case of Chris Hani, the ANC as an institution recovered fairly quickly from his loss, but his potential contribution to the country was irreplaceable.

Could the value of Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-American or Bill Gates of Microsoft be replaced? Would the computer industry be threatened if Bill Gates were assassinated?

Attackers may gain value if the attack benefits their cause.

After the assassination of Lord Mountbatten by the IRA in 1979, many Irish people and sponsors condemned the IRA. The IRA did *not* appear to benefit from this assassination.

The target's direct value may be replaced after the initial loss. However, there may be huge secondary losses, for example:

the direct and indirect cost of the subsequent investigation or commission of enquiry;

the upset in the balance of political or economic power;

the forfeiture of foreign investment; and

the fluctuation in capital markets (the gold price, shares and so on).

Again, the value of the target as perceived by protection and intelligence agencies on the one hand, and the source of the threat on the other, may differ.

Threat indicators

We'll look at general and specific threat indicators.

General threat indicators

General threat indicators include the following:

political – an unpopular or oppressive government;

social – discrimination against specific groups (race, gender, creed), a high crime rate;

economic – a high rate of unemployment, an imbalance between 'haves and have-nots';

ideological – powerful opposition from groups opposed to the current political situation;

geopolitical – large groups of legal or illegal foreigners in the country, or border conflicts with neighbouring countries (for example, the Egypt-Sudan border dispute);

religious – religions encourage or condone violence, for example radical, rightwing churches and Muslim fundamentalism;

socio-political – civil conflict, mass action, or civil disobedience – large-scale or regionally restricted; and

personal; or

any combination of the above.

Specific threat indicators

Specific threat indicators include the following:

dissention along socio-political or ethnic lines, possibly triggered by large-scale changes in these areas;

formation of or activities by radical groups;

meetings, rallies or demonstrations in which provocative speeches are made and violence objectively or subjectively encouraged, especially if incidents of violence occur after or during a meeting or rally;

anti-government agitation, particularly when aimed at specific members of government;

anti-government posters or pamphlets, or posters or pamphlets criticising an organisation or cause;

organised civil disobedience aimed at the target's department or organisation;

foreign support or influence to extremist groups or persons;

political violence, particularly when aimed at individuals in semi-leadership positions;

threatening phone calls, correspondence or 'strange happenings' involving the target;

identification of surveillance or intelligence collection on the target;

target's involvement in controversial issues;

intelligence reports;

attacks on associated targets;

previous attacks on the target;

attacks on non-associated targets in similar circumstances (for example, attackers could have compared similarities between the circumstances under which Rabin functioned and President Mandela functioned); and

wealth (for example, Oppenheimer and Gates).

Capability of the threat source

When determining the seriousness of a threat, CPOs must take into account the potential ability of the source of the threat to actually carry out a direct or indirect threat against the target. They should ask the following questions:

Does the threat source have access to weapons or explosives?

Does the source have access to the necessary expertise to enable him or her to use weapons or explosives?

Does the threat source have the human resources, finances, logistics and support systems to launch an attack?

Does the threat source have the necessary mindset and determination to carry out an attack?

Does the threat source have the necessary intelligence sources?

Intelligence

Historically the intelligence community has not actively gathered, collated or co-ordinated information for the specific purpose of compiling the principal's threat analysis. Such intelligence has mostly been the product of incidental information, or been discovered during the course of other investigations.

CPOs should establish a database of all information relating to analysis and threat sources, and a counter-intelligence programme should be established. Members of the intelligence community should liaise and interact to provide information, and their liaison should be co-ordinated from a central point.

Protection services should use covert surveillance to determine whether any client is under surveillance by a third party.

In this way, they can observe the work performance of protection personnel, and identify any weaknesses in the principal's protection network.

Now we'll discuss how you can develop various protection scenarios based on real attacks.

Development of scenarios

Protection service agencies should develop scenarios based on real incidents. Research and case studies can provide valid operational indicators when they are compared to local circumstances.

Real-life, creative scenarios can be used to provide hands-on training and allow measurement of levels of preparedness and performance in field-training simulation exercises. Studying scenarios can help both commanders and protectors to develop effective crisis management.

A lot had been said about threat assessment already, yet I would like to simplify it, as we learned out of experience That this subject could be a horror to students once they have to implement it in their planning phase. when they do their practical. The following template will assist you in understanding of what a threat assessment is and what to do with it and how to implement it.

One rule you need to remember regarding threat assessment is that it is an **on going process** and need constant Updating because every thing the principal do will effect the level of risk/threat.

To determine the level of threat you need to follow the next steps:

- Identification of potential threats/risks
- The analysis of identified threats/risks
- Prioritization of threats by relative risks
- Implementation of strategy

The level of threat will determine the level of protection. It might get difficult for the protection team when a principal are not willing to compromise their lifestyle as much as would be necessary to ensure maximum protection. Some principals are not willing to except a level of protection that would isolate them from the public.

- Is it a **specific threat**-is there a known or suspected action relating directly to the principal.
- A **non specific threat** is an action that can be initiated by the principals position, wealth, lifestyle, media exposure and political or religious believes, it is also called indirect threats.
- Starting your threat assessment, the specific or direct threats should be determined first to give you a foundation to work from .
  EG - The principal got a phone call and has been threatened to be killed

- Confirm factual correctness of threat
- Is there a history of threats or attacks
- Does the principal know the person making the threat
- Motive - Determine why is there a threat
- Is it personal orientated
- Did his /her picture appear in newspaper or magazine
- Did he/she say something on TV
- Does principal owe money
- Does he have a staff turnover
- Is he/she involved in a love affair
- Is he /she a celebrity
- Is it financial, psychopathic, personal, religious, racial political or a combination there off

Once you determine the nature of threat (Direct or indirect) and the impact thereof, you will be able to categorise the risk/ threat level.

- **Risk** level will be known by medical history, lifestyle, sports, hobbies etc.
- **Threat** level will be determined by actual or possible threats. (Predictions and assumptions could be made from statistics to assist you in the planning phase.

Threat levels will include the following;

These are just examples to guide you.

LOW - RISK

- Your principal is a low risk, because of ;
- His/ her position
- The place he/ she visits reflect no danger - No or low criminal activity
- No or very little danger

But safety precautions still have to be taken.

MEDIUM - RISK

The level of risk is categorised as medium risk because of the following;

- The principals position makes him vulnerable to a possibility of threat;
- Kidnapping
- Assassination
- Invading of privacy

HIGH - RISK

- High risk could imply substantial danger of attack

EXTREME HIGH - RISK

- Extreme high risk might indicate that an attack is anticipated (by an organised group of individuals for what ever course.
- Virtually any thing your principal does will change your risk level.

Summary

Threat assessment is a crucially important element of VIP protection.

Without threat assessment and related activities, protection service provision cannot be superior to the threat, and therefore cannot limit risk. However, if protection service providers use threat assessment effectively, they can stand up to the challenges facing them in a competent and professional manner.

> We only have to be lucky once. You have to be lucky every time.
>
> *(IRA message after the attempted assassination of British Prime Minister Margeret Thatcher)*

In the next chapter, we'll discuss some real case studies.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 9

1. A high-profile VIP representing a government institution, a company or a political party could be a _____.

2. List five possible methods of assassination.

3. List five incidental contingencies.

4. What do we mean by the *visibility* of the target?



4 Self-assessment answers 9

1. A high-profile VIP representing a government institution, a company or a political party could be a possible target for assassination, or threat.

2. Methods of attack may include the following:

   close-range shooting (from a handgun used in a crowd);

   long-range sniper fire (high-powered rifle fire from cover);

   detonation of explosive devices (including booby-traps that are remotely triggered);

   explosive ambushes of convoys; or

   poisoning (intravenous or food poisoning).

3. Incidental contingencies may include the following:

   fires;

   medical emergencies;

   hijacking of vehicles;

   unruly crowds; and

   aggressive reporters.

4. In close protection, *visibility* refers to the exposure of the target to the public, and to possible danger. A visible target often represents or is identified with a cause, or represents an organisation, a corporation, an institution or government.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Planning Phase.

. What do we mean by the *visibility* of the target?

CHAPTER 10: PLANNING



Learning outcomes for Chapter 11

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

understand and explain the importance of threat assessment, and the basic principles of threat assessment;

identify possible targets and sources of threats, and motives for threats;

discuss key elements of threat assessment; and

identify and discuss threat indicators.

In this chapter we will introduce you to the importance and fundamental principles of threat assessment. We'll discuss threats under the following headings:

PLANNING

Planning phase

A proper and thorough threat assessment will ensure a reliable planning process which again will enhance the methods and ability of execution to a successful operation.

In your threat assessment you have already established who your principal is;

- Background
- Status
- Why he need protection etc

Phase 1 of planning

In the first phase you gather all the facts and identified possibilities which is now known to you through the threat assessment, now place your self and your team mates in the attackers position in order to cover all possibilities .

- Know your principal
- Know the enemy
- Determine their weak points
- Determine their strong points
- See what you can capitalise on
- What will be disadvantages
- Weak links in terms of confidential information leaking from people known to principal (Neighbours, Family, Friends, Staff, Business associates)
- Continuous gathering of intel;

Execution methods by attacker - Assassination - Hostage taking - Hijacking - Physical Attack - Intimidation.

PLANNING SHOULD INCLUDE; (Attacker planning)

- Method of execution
- Where execution could take place (Home - Business - On Route)
- Who is involved
- Vehicles and escape vehicles
- Routes and escape routes
- Tactics and escape tactics
- Weapon selection and weapons dump
- Safe house
- Close to blend in and changing of clothes
- Alibis

Once his planning (assassin) has been completed and events been tested and possible risks been accounted for the plan will be ready for execution.

The attacker as who could be a professional assassin include our way of thinking into his planning, and that is why it is essential to place yourself in his shoes and think like he does which should be part of your planning to plan accordingly.

PLANNING OF CPO`S continue

- Venue checks and reports - Evaluation must include;
- Knowing the area and venue where your principal will move around and visit
- Determine perimeters and threat areas
- Obtain plans of buildings
- Know the escape routes
- Identify location of safety equipment (Fire extinguishers - check to be in working order)
- Locate power points
- Make copies of guest lists and do Security checks on them
- Screening of personnel
- Measure distances and monitor moving times
- Obtain sweeping reports
- View access control systems in use at venues
- Check if all doors, locks, and windows is serviceable
- Check intrusion, smoke detectors and panic buttons if in working condition ,effectives and positioning.
- Check cctv surveillance systems, especially if it only monitor or does it record to.

PERIMETER PLANS - EVALUATION (Planning)

- A perimeter plan should be drafted, which consist of the following;
- Physical Barriers - Fences and Gates
- Hiding places - Plants and trees
- Lighting - Security lights
- CCTV Systems - Positions and covering areas
- Obstacles in between buildings and fence
- Dogs on premises
- Guards on duty - Their shifts and shift changes

VEHICLES - ROUTES - TRAVELLING

VEHICLES (Planning)

- What type of vehicles should be used
- Determine the level of protection of the vehicles used
- Which will be the best vehicle formations to use
- Are the drivers familiar with the vehicles to be used
- Will it be necessary to use a decoy motorcade
- Do you have a (Precaution vehicle in motorcade board)
- Is time tables drawn
- Is vehicle services up to date
- Parking plans for arrivals and Departures
- Heli-Pads if any

ROUTES (Planning)

- Plan specific routes and escape routes
- Familiarise your self with the routes and distances. (Physically drive the routes)
- Also drive the alternative routes
- Route planning should include all transit movements from A-B and back - stops -

TRAVEL (Planning)

- Find out who is aware of the travel arrangements
- Does principal carry large amounts of cash, confidential documentation or other valuables whereby Special security measures should be taken. (the protective team should know about it)

THE FOOT PROTECTION TEAM (Planning)

- Will decoy protectors be used
- Where would which foot formation be used
- How many CPO`S is needed for operation
- How many teams and number of CPO`s in teams will be needed
- What will the dress code be
- The team should be properly informed and briefed
- Stress the fact that info should be kept safe
- Identify a safe house
- Identify the closest hospitals in the area
- Draw up a list of all relevant cell phone numbers (Back up for communications)
- Check all Radios for coms - Be sure batteries are fully charged and taken with.
- Examine the medical kit
- Check and take your bullet proofe vests
- Decide on the type of weapons for specific application
- Select the ammo for weapons

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (GENERAL)

HUMAN RESOURCES

- Select manpower for operation (PES TEAM / ADVANCE TEAM / BACK UP TEAM ETC.

LOGISTICAL RESOURCES

- All equipment, contacts, arrangements, buying etc, needed for operation.

BUDGET/ FINANCIAL RESOURCES

- The budget will determine up to what extend the requirements of operation can be accommodated
- Be sure the financial resources (Company or person contracting you) is reliable in terms of contractual-payment and ensue the % deposit to be well in advance.

RESERVATIONS

- Flight Reservations - Decide on travelling commercial airlines or chartered aircraft.
- Accommodation Reservations - Principal might have a preferred Hotel - maybe a favourite suite. Security measures should be considered but the budget can also influence the choice of accommodation.

OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCIES/ EMERGENCIES AND PROCEDURES (Planning should include)

- Physical attack/ threat on or to Principal/ Venue/ Vehicles
- Close Quarter Attack
- Sabotage
- Ambush
- Explosives
- Sniper
- Surveillance
- Fire
- Medical
- Power failure

SAP TEAM - PLANNING (Special Advance Party)

The SAP TEAM play`s a major role in any operation and planning g phase by doing the advance preparation, which will include the following;

- Physically inspect all venue`s, routes and area which will be visited by Principal
- Gather information by means of interviews/ questioning
- Investigate all relevant matters concerning the operation
- Every aspect of the investigations/ inspections should be documented, which means all findings should be recorded by means of the following;
- In writing and drawings
- Typing
- Electronically - Audio/ Visual

VENUE INSPECTION - Should include;

- Venue layout
- Area and route maps
- Floor plans of venue
- Description of topographical features (Detailed description on map of town/ District/ Natural and artificial features
- Road / City Maps
- Take Photographs
- Measure Distances and calculate times to get from point A-B

COMMUNICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES

- Allocate call signs to the team members and relevant parties involved. Eg Team Leader`s - call sign could be, Tango Lima
- Voice procedures/ Bass and RSVP Principals etc (Full description in chapter 10 Radio coms)
- Determine what type of net to use - Will Repeaters be needed/ will simplex be sufficient

RESPONSIBILITIES AND TASKS OF PROTECTION TEAMS to be planned and orders to be given to

- Sap team
- Residential security team
- Counter surveillance team
- Pes team
- Counter sniper team
- What is the resource requirements for protecting the principal at venue/ route/ in transit (would Additional man power, vehicles, information, maps, plans etc be required.)

* An operational command structure and control measures should be planned for protecting the principal at the venue /route/ area
  The placing of personnel - eg Oc, Team Leader, Motorcade Commander, structuring of different teams and control measures

- Establish the location of ops room
- Requirements for ops room
- Relevant maps and plans
- Principals itinerary
- Logs (Vehicles Keys, Personnel)
- Emergency Plans
- Telephone Numbers of Emergency Services, on and off Duty
- Protection Personnel, Key Corporate Personnel, other Security services
- Checklists of (Advance and Route Reconnaissance, and Searches) Relevant
- Spare Keys
- Search Equipment
- Firearms and Ammunition
- Radios, Telephones, Cellular Telephones, and chargers
- Telephone Directories
- Fire Extinguishers
- CCTV Monitors, Portable Alarm, Cameras, Recorders
- Safety Gear
- First Aid Equipment
- Refreshments
- Toilet Facilities

SEARCHING (FULLY DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER 5)

SEARCHING SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE

- Buss and IED's
- Searching floors, Walls, Furniture, Appliances, Ceiling
- Adjacent and Surrounding areas
- Electronically

VERFICATION MUST INCLUDE

- Inspection
- Testing

The next few pages will consist of documentation needed for the operational planning and the execution thereof.. (Plan your work and work your Plan)



.



THREAT ASSESSMENT PROTECTEE QUESTIONNAIRE ***TAPQ-1***

Client's personal life :

Name _____ Place of birth (nationality) _____
Places lived within the past 20 years _____
Places frequently visited on business or pleasure _____
Current profession or government position _____
Past profession or government position _____
Military or diplomatic service _____
Any military combat experience_____
Known medical problems _____
Specific info about spouse (profession, government service, etc) _____
_____
Children – names, ages place of residence _____
_____
Noteworthy, relatives, business associates or friends -
_____
_____
Religious affiliation _____ Political affiliation _____
Social/fraternal affiliation _____
Employees – at residence _____
_____
Personal employees (ie. Admin asst, secretary) _____
_____
Lifestyle – private/low profile r outgoing/high profile _____
How often photographed – society page, business page, sports section, entertainment section, scandal sheets_____
Vices – gambling, drinking, lovers_____
Is there a driver ? For the principal _____ For spouse _____
For children _____ Are the drivers trained _____
Known enemies _____
Has there been threatening phone calls, letters, etc _____
Have there been threats or attacks in the past _____
What is the nature of any threats – Assassination? Kidnapping? Against the family?
_____
What security precautions are already in effect _____
_____
_____

Client's professional life:

In what type of business is the client engaged _____
Who provides the primary competition _____
Are there any pending lawsuits, particularly over injuries _____
Is the client's corporate raider or engaged in hostile take-over actions _____
_____
How are employees related_____
Any particularly disgruntled employees _____
Any who have been fired or have left with substantial bitterness _____
Any strikes or other labour unrest_____
What type of security is in effect at the place of business _____
_____
Is there a secure parking facility_____
What type of screening is in effect for visitors, mail and phone calls _____
_____
If in government service, do the client's decision affect :

- Military affairs or operations_____
- Law enforcement_____
- Relations with other countries_____
- Financial or trade matters _____

Where does the principal travel on business _____
Is there a private aircraft and/or yacht _____
Who does the travel planning _____
Who normally knows the itinerary _____
Where does the principal usually stay when travelling _____
_____
Hw often and where does the principal make public appearances _____

CPO Compiling Profile S _____ Name: _____

VIP

PERSONAL PROFILE

Name: _____

Position / Status: _____



PERSONAL PROFILE

PERSONAL DETAILS

Full Name: _____

Surname: _____

Call Name: _____

ID Number: _____

Address: _____

_____

Postal Address: _____

_____

Postal Code: _____

Email: _____

Home Telephone: (_____) _____

Work Telephone: (_____) _____

Fax Number: (_____) _____

Cell Number: _____

Gender: Male / Female

Marital Status: _____

Dependants: _____



INDEMNITY **PP-3**

I_____, ID no:_____hereby irrevocable indemnify the South African Bodyguard Association, Mpumalanga Bodyguard Association, Cape Province Bodyguard Association, Gauteng Bodyguard Association, Kzn Bodyguard Association, Limpopo Bodyguard Association, North-West Bodyguard Association, Free state Bodyguard Association, SA Bodyguard Training Academy, any SA Bodyguard company and any agent, staff member, officials or trainers of above mentioned, against any claim for injuries or death which may arise from my participation in and travelling to and from such events, as per contractual engagement in the form of close protection or displays or training organised by or for the Association or companies with full knowledge and appreciation of the risk inherent in these activities and hereby waive any claim that may arise there from.

SIGNED ON THE_____DAY OF _____2005

AT_____

SIGNATURE:_____ WITNESS:_____.



MEDICAL PROFILE

PP-4

HISTORY

Allergies: _____

Medication: _____

Past Cardiac: _____

Respiratory: _____

Neurological: _____

Endocrine: _____

Diabetes: _____

Surgical: _____

Blood Group: _____

Current state of health: _____

Smoker / Non-Smoker How many cigarettes per day: _____

Alcohol consumption: Yes / No

Other: _____

Medical Scheme Name: _____ Member no: _____

Any level of medical qualification: Level 1 2 3 4 (5BA) (ALS) (ILS) (N Dip) (Doctor)

GP's Name: _____ Phone no: (_____) _____

Family Members for emergency purposes:

Name: _____ Phone no: (_____) _____

Name: _____ Phone no: (_____) _____

Name: _____ Phone no: (_____) _____

GENERAL INFORMATION

PP-5

Firearm no: _____ Licence no: _____

Drivers Licence: Code: _____ PDP: _____

Principal Vehicle: Registration no: _____

Make: _____

Model: _____

Type: _____

Colour: _____

Spouse Vehicle Registration no: _____

Make: _____

Model: _____

Type: _____

Colour: _____

Criminal Record: Yes / No Type of Conviction: _____

Neighbours – Close friends: _____

Affair: _____
_____
_____
_____

Hobbies: _____

_____

_____

High Lights of your Career: _____

_____

No of dogs on premises or other pets:

_____

Favourite Colour: _____

Favourite Food: _____

……../4

Favourite Hot Drink: _____

Favourite Cold Drink: _____

Star Sign: _____

I like to plan my day: _____

I like to address people: _____

I am a private person: _____

I say what I think: _____

I think what I say: _____

I like to watch TV: _____

My favourite TV programme is: _____

My favourite subjects to talk about are: _____

_____

Signature **Date**

VIP APPEARANCE SITE SURVEY ***VAS-1***

Site _____ Type of site _____
City _____ Date of appearance _____
Site manager/event organiser _____ Phone _____
Time of event _____ Approx duration _____
Will principal speak _____ When _____ Approx duration_____
Will principal dine _____ Will there be a receiving line _____
Preferred receiving line set up_____
Entrances to site _____ Exits from site _____
_____
Preferred entrance _____
Preferred exit_____
Alternate entrances _____
Alternate exits_____
Command post location _____
Additional security :_____
Local law enforcement _____ Private security _____
Other protective teams _____
Number of fixed security posts (mark on diagram) _____
_____
Liaison with local police _____ Phone _____
Liaison with private security _____ Phone _____
Number of radio channels needed_____
ID badges needed : Protective team _____
Local law enforcement _____
Armed private security _____
Unarmed private security _____
Other personnel_____
How much publicity has the VIP visit received _____
umber of employees at site : Permanent _____ Temporary _____
Special security precautions in effect _____
_____
Will a search be carried out by bomb-detection canines _____
When will it be carried out and will the site be sealed afterwards _____
Nearest police station _____ Phone _____
Normal response time _____
Nearest hospital with emergency centre _____
If there is a sporting event, is there a rivalry with a history of violence _____
_____

For sporting events, where is the most secure seating (boxes, private clubroom, etc)
_____
For theatre, opera, etc., where are the most secure boxes _____
_____
Counter-sniper team deployed_____
Where_____
If principal is speaking outside, can podium/platform be positioned to limit exposure to snipers_____
Other information :

(Attach plans, diagrams, schedules, etc.)



RESTAURANT SURVEY

RS-1

Name of restaurant _____ Date of visit _____
City _____ Address_____
_____
Phone _____ Serving hours _____
Manager _____ Head waiter _____
Secure parking_____
Number of entrances/exits_____
Acceptable attire _____
Normal seating capciy _____ Bar/lounge _____
Number of private dining rooms _____ Private seating capacity _____
Average time for a four-course meal_____
Average cost for a four-course meal wit wine _____
Are any receptions, banquets, etc., scheduled on day of visit _____
If so, what type _____
Does restaurant attract persons of any specific ethnic/national background?
_____
Do employees tend to be of a specific ethnic/national background?
_____
Best points to locate members of the protective detail _____
_____
Nearest police station _____
Normal police response time _____
Nearest hospital with emergency centre _____
Do restaurant and kitchen appear clean_____
Are emergency exists easily accessible_____
Are any portions of the restaurant particularly vulnerable to attack from the street
_____
How well lit is the restaurant _____
Other information _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

CITY CHECKLIST

CC-1

*(Items marked with * have a related security survey on file)*
(Maps and diagrams to be attached)

City _____ Country _____
Principal language spoken _____ Time difference from Greenwich _____
Last visited _____ Currency and current exchange rate _____
Airport _____ Airport code _____
Distance from airport to city centre _____
Police contacts : Local _____ National _____
Private security contacts
_____
Electronic security specialists_____
Bomb dog handler_____
Limo services and trained drivers_____
Linguists/translators _____
Acceptable medical facilities _____
Medical evacuation air service _____
English speaking/US or European trained doctors _____
_____
_
Favourite hotels :
_____ Manager/Reservations and number
_____
_____ Manager/Reservations and number _____
_____ Manager/Reservations and number _____
Favourite restaurants ;
_____ Manager and number _____
_____ Manager and number _____
_____ Manager and number _____
Special threats or dangers :
Criminal_____
Terrorist_____
Ethnic/religious_____
Medical _____
Weapons restrictions and licences_____
Gun shop/armourer/gunsmith _____
Embassies :
Other applicable : _____
_____
Information regarding use of radios (frequencies, regulations, etc.) _____
Information regarding use of mobile phones _____
Local customs regarding gratuities (an bribes) _____
Important local taboos_____
Principal religions_____

Location of :
All night pharmacies_____
Dry cleaners & laundries_____

Other transportation : _____
Yacht basin/harbour _____
Rail station _____ Heliport _____

Other useful information :
_____
_____
_____



ROUTE CHECK-LIST

RC-1

(NOTE : *A route check-list is most effective if it is prepared in conjunction with a map upon which features may be marked. Computer programs now allow the generation of maps, to which comments, alternate routes and potential problem areas may be added)*

Date and time route will be travelled_____
Distance to be covered _____
Driving time based on advance team travelling the route _____
Mark factories, offices, schools and other buildings that increase traffic at certain times during the day _____
Locations of police stations. _____
Locations of hospitals with emergency centres. _____
Locations of overpasses._____
Locations of bridges _____
Locations of tunnels ._____
Points where road construction may cause slow-downs _____
Other traffic check points_____
If an official motorcade, note whether police can control traffic lights to speed progress _____
Note any parades or other events scheduled that will affect traffic _____
One-way streets and the direction of the flow _____
Wooded areas including parks _____
Buildings that other particularly good shooting positions for snipers _____
_____
Mark particularly dangerous sites for a command detonated explosive devices _____
_____
Pedestrian areas, especially where crowds are likely _____
Communication dead zones_____
Areas where loud noises may occur, especially if they could be mistaken for gunfire or explosions_____
Note potential alternate routes at critical points _____
Note speed limits_____
Will a local police or office/s be assigned to a motorcade? _____
How many cars will comprise the VIP motorcade _____
Are several cars of the same type available _____
Mark entrance to be used at destination _____
(If a map generation program is used or an overlay added to a standard street map, it may be useful to colour-code the route, alternate routes and other key features)



HOTEL CHECK-LIST

HC-1

City _____ Date of visit _____
Hotel _____ Address_____
Phone _____ Fax _____
Web site/e-mail_____
General manager/manager _____ Phone _____
Head of security _____ Phone _____
Rooms needed for member of the party as follows : Principal _____
Family _____ Staff _____ Protective team _____
Reservations made : Date _____ Under what name _____
Confirmed _____ Rooms reserved _____
Command post location _____
Check-in/check-out procedure _____
_____
Restaurants (including hours of service and acceptable attire) :
_____
Hours of room service_____

Special facilities :
Computer/business centre_____
Gym and spa
_____
Swimming pool_____
Shops_____
Medical _____
Valet/dry cleaning/laundry _____
Translators_____
Security vault/safe deposit _____

Hotel security :
How many guards on duty each shift _____
How are they dispatched_____
Are they armed _____

Nearest police station _____

Fire safety : HC-2

Check smoke detectors _____

Check electrical wiring

_____

Check fire extinguishers _____

Check fire hoses_____

Nearest fire station_____

Evacuation procedure_____

Nearest hospital with an emergency centre _____

Number of hotel entrances _____ Exits _____

How many allow a limo to pull up nearby _____

Lifts_____

Are any lifts express _____

Can it be arranged to lock out one as a express _____

Are lifts limited access by key card _____

Staircases_____

Parking facilities _____

Can secure parking be arranged _____

Other personnel and phone numbers_____

Assistant manager_____

Concierge_____

Restaurant managers_____

_____

Head waiters

_____

_____

Head porter _____

Doorman _____

Other use full information

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(*Attach floor and room plans, restaurant and room-service menus, photos of key staff)*



AIRLINE CHECK-LIST

AC-1

Name of airline_____
Flight number _____ Gate number _____
Contact person and number_____
Airline security contact and number_____
Departure time _____ Arrival time _____
Type of aircraft (attach cabin diagram)_____
Special notes on aircraft type _____
_____
Origin of flight _____ Any stops _____
Preferred seating for principal and party _____
Preferred seating for protection team _____
Are there any other known VIP's on the flight _____
Do they have a protection team_____
Is this an airline that flies with armed security personnel_____
Express check-in procedures _____
Location of airline VIP lounge _____
Special VIP disembarkation arrangements _____
Special baggage procedures _____
Procedures for transporting weapons _____
Alternate flight in case of cancellation
_____
Flight reconfirmed on _____

Other information :
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____



AIRPORT CHECK-LIST

AC-2

Airport _____ City _____

Airport code _____ Time (approx) Greenwich _____
Hub for which airlines_____
Other major airlines providing service _____
Number of concourses (attach airline map) _____
Is there a separate international terminal_____
Transfer time _____
Passenger volume _____
Approx flights per 24 hours_____
Flights announced in which languages _____
Location of, and number for :
Airport police_____
Airport emergency medical services _____
Lost luggage _____
VIP lounges _____
VIP drop-off points_____
VIP pick-up points _____
Car rental agencies _____
Limo services _____
Taxi stands _____
Restaurants _____
Express baggage claim _____

Normal waiting time for luggage _____
Customs and Immigration_____
Time from representative gates to limo pick-up area _____
_____
Normal time to clear customs _____
Bureau de Change_____
Company pick-up board_____

Other information :
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

SCHEDULED MOVEMENTS.

DAILY ROUTINE RELAITING TO MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERING FROM A – B AND BACK.

DEPARTING RESIDENCE +_____
ANY STOPS BEFORE REACHING OFFICE_____
ARRIVAL AT OFFICE_____H_____ ARRIVAL AT MEETING DIRECT FROM HOME ____H____

DEPARTING OFFICE FOR ANY REASONS (BUSINESS LUNCH – MEETING – HOME)
1._____H_____TO VENUE_____REASON_____
2._____H_____TO VENUE_____REASON_____
3._____H_____TO VENUE_____REASON_____
4._____H_____TO VENUE_____REASON_____
5._____H_____TO VENUE_____REASON_____.

PERSONS IN FORMED OF PRINCIPALS ITINERARY OR SPESIFIC MEETINGS
A._____TEL:_____
B._____TEL:_____
C._____TEL:_____
D._____TEL:_____
E._____TEL:_____

TIPE OF VEHICLES USED BY PRINCIPAL.
MAKE_____MODEL:_____COLOUR:_____REG No:_____
MAKE:_____MODEL:_____COLOUR:_____REG No:_____
MAKE:_____MODEL:_____COLOUR:_____REG No:_____

ATTACH MAPS OF ROUTES USED BY PRINCIPAL.



DAILY OPERATION PROFILE

DOP-1

Principal :
Name_____
_____
Special considerations :
Health problems _____
Religious idiosyncrasies _____
Political affiliatio _____ Member of royalty _____
(Attach photos of all relevant members of VIP party if not known to all team members)
Date _____ **City**_____
Predicted weather _____
Intelligence :
Local situation _____
Government _____
Police _____
Military _____
Economic _____
Other _____
(Attach photos of local persons of importance whom team members should be able to recognise)
Potential threats :
Political _____
Religious _____
Personal _____
Criminal _____
Terrorist _____
Other _____

(Attach photos, descriptions, modus operandi of identified threats; also attach summary of overall threat assessment)



Itinerary : **DOP-2**

1200 – 0200 :
0200 – 0400 :
0400 – 0600 :
0600 – 0800 :
0800 – 1000 :
1000 – 1200 :
1200 – 1400 :
1400 – 1600 :
1600 – 1800 :
1800 – 2000 :
2000 – 2200 :
2200 – 2400 :
Meetings and appointments (relevant information) _____
_____
(Attach blueprints, fllor plans, advance surveys, photos, etc)
Routes between venues and estimated travel times :

(Attach maps, surveys, etc)
Meals (for principal and team members) : Times _____
_____
Locations _____
_____
(Attach surveys, menus, etc)
Local security assistance at avenues :

Venue _____
Private _____
Local _____
State_____
National_____

(Include names of supervisors and/or liaison officers: include ID procedures)
Protection team :
Team leader_____
Asst team leader _____
Security advance party _____
Drivers _____
Medic _____
Others and assignments :
_____ _____
_____ _____
_____ _____
Attire _____
Equipment :
Weapons to be carried _____
Medical kit _____
Communications equipment (include frequencies) _____
_____



Other _____

Vehicles :

_____

_____

_____

(Include types, licence numbers, driver assigned to each, location of spare keys, garaging or parking arrangements, etc.)

Co-ordination :

(If working with several teams, with teams for other VIP's, etc., include special co-ordination instructions, IF procedures, etc)

_____

_____

_____

Fixed-post security :

Office _____

Residence/hotel _____

(Include all relevant information including ID procedures)

Phone number :

Police _____ Fire _____

Ambulance _____ Doctor _____

Hospital _____ Embassy _____

Residence/hotel _____ Other _____



*BUSINESS:*_____

TYPE OF BUSINESS:_____
COMPETITORS:_____
_____
_____
No OF EMPLOYEES:_____
WHATS THE ANNUAL STAFF TURN – OVER:_____
ARE THERE UNION CONSIDERATIONS OR OPPOSI-
TION:_____
_____
IS THERE ACCESS CONTROLL TO OFFICE YES_____ NO_____
TYPE: SIGHN IN (GUARDS)_____
ELECTRONIC_____ TYPE OF SYSTEM_____

ARE THE CALLS AND MAIL SCREENED:_____
METHOD:_____

IS THERE A CAR PARK_____ OPEN AREA _____ ENCLOSED_____ GARAGE_____
BASEMENT _____ UPPER LEVEL_____
ARE THERE PARKING ATTENDANCE YES_____ NO_____

TRAVEL:

TO WHAT COUNTREIES DOES HE/SHE FREQUENTLY
TRAVEL:_____
_____
BUSINESS OR RESIDENCE OUT OF STATE:_____
_____

TRAVEL – COMMERCIAL:_____ AIRLINE:_____
TRAVEL – PRIVATE:_____ FROM:_____

WHO DOES THE TRAVEL PLANNING:_____
HOW MANY PEOPLE KNOW THE ITINARARY:_____
ARE PUBLIC APPEARANCES SCHEDULED IN ADVANCE:_____
_____
HOTELS NORMALLY USED:_____
VISITING CASINO'S OR NIGHTCLUBS:_____
VALUEBLES OR CASH NORMALLY CARRIED WITH:_____
_____



RESIDENCE

LOCATION OF RESIDENCE: _____

ARE THERE EXISTING RESIDENTIAL SECURITY PROCUDERES YES___NO___

ELECTRONIC: _____
_____
GUARDS: _____
REACTION UNIT: _____NAME:_____TEL:_____
INTRUSION DETECTORS: _____
SMOKE DETECTORS: _____
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS: _____
FIRE ESCAPES: _____
PANNIC BUTTONS: _____

INDICATE THE FOLLOWING ON PERIMETER PLAN:
FENCES: _____
GATES – ELECTRONIC _____
POSITIONING – CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS: _____
INTRUSION SYSTEMS: _____
DOGS: _____
SURROUNDINGS 380 AND LANDMARKS: _____
LIGHTING: _____

PERIMETER PLAN:

NO OF EMPLOYEES AT RESIDENCE: _____
NAMES: 1._____ 2. _____ 3._____
4._____ 5._____ 6._____

DRIVER:_____ NAME:_____
HOW LONG IN SERVICE:_____
DRIVER TO PRINCIPAL: _____SPOUSE: _____CHILDREN:_____

CHILD 1._____ CHILD 2._____
SCHOOL:_____ SCHOOL:_____
ADDRESS:_____ ADDRESS:_____
TEACHER:_____ TEACHER:_____
GRADE:_____ GRADE:_____

CHILD 3._____ CHILD 4._____
SCHOOL:_____ SCHOOL:_____
ADDRESS:_____ ADDRESS:_____
TEACHER:_____ TEACHER:_____
GRADE:_____ GRADE:_____

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION:_____PREACHER:_____
POLITICAL AFFILIATION:_____

IS FAMILY SECURITY CONCIOS IN RELATION TO ACCESS CON-
TROLL:_____
VISITOR VERIFICATION:_____

<u>RESIDENCE PHOTO PAGE:</u>
(ALL RELEVENT PHOTOS)

PHOTOS



IMMEDIATE FAMILY

PHOTOS

STAFF:

PHOTOS

REGULAR VISITERS:

PHOTOS

CHAPTER 11: CASE STUDIES



Learning outcomes for Chapter 11

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

apply the lessons you learn from case studies.

Study this chapter carefully. It will help you to learn from the mistakes that others have made, so that you don't repeat them.

Case studies are used extensively in business and management education. They are becoming increasingly popular as a way of providing practice in applying theoretical knowledge in a real-life context. In this chapter we'll explain what case studies are and how you can use them. (You will derive most of the benefits described if you discuss a case with friends.) Then we'll examine two case studies – the assassinations of Chris Hani and Yitzhak Rabin.

What are case studies?

Case studies are descriptions and analyses of situations that are used as a basis for learning, through study and discussion. They present a 'slice of life', and may be used to examine any topic. Usually they are a complex mix of 'fact', feeling and reason, centred on one or more issues. Case studies are generally text-based, but they can be supported by audio-visual material to add interest.

Cases chosen for discussion should be believable, or true, and contain suitable elements for discussion. They can vary in length from a few sentences to hundreds of pages. Length is no indication of a case's difficulty or usefulness as a training medium.

The term *case leader* refers to the person using the case to provide the learning opportunity, and *learner* refers to the individual who is there to learn.

Why do we use case studies?

Features of cases that contribute to their popularity as a training medium include the following:

They are only a simulation of the real world, so students can experiment and learn from their mistakes, without the loss that could be incurred in the real world.

They provide an opportunity to practise and develop both analytical and practical skills, as well as to acquire knowledge.

As a 'slice of life', cases present a composite picture of inter-related symptoms and problems, causes and effects, issues and principles that people are likely to encounter in their everyday work. (By contrast,

unrealistic divisions are often created when individuals are taught subject by subject.)

Cases can reveal how different parts of an organisation interact and how the appropriate style of communication and co-operation between departments can create, prevent or resolve problems.

Case study is relatively free of time pressures, unlike in real life, where often decisions need to be made quickly. Learners can take their time to analyse, evaluate and make decisions, and so develop effective problem-solving skills.

What can be achieved using case studies?

In the process of trying to understand the situation depicted in a case and to resolve the problems it contains, learners are given the opportunity to practise and develop a broad range of skills. These can be grouped into six main areas:

Analytical skills, such as reasoning, generalising, classifying, ordering and evaluating information, are developed through practice in identifying and analysing problems, and in decision-making.

Application skills are developed when learners apply rules, concepts, techniques, theories and so on, in analysing the case and solving the problems it contains.

Creative skills are developed in generating alternative solutions to these problems and predicting their possible outcomes.

Communication skills are developed when learners are required to make oral and written presentations of the results of their study of the case, either individually or in groups. This provides practice in formulating clear and effective communication, making oral presentations, structuring written presentations, communicating and clarifying points of view, and listening to others.

Social skills can also be developed through the case study method if learners practise communicating with, and responding to, others in the group. They also gain a better understanding of how groups function and of the role played by the individual in contributing to the team effort.

Self-analysis skills can be stimulated in a case discussion. When analysing the actions of characters in a case and proposing solutions to any problems it contains, learners often have to make value judgements, inferences and so on. In describing these, and perhaps defending them against criticism, individuals are encouraged to examine the basis of their values. For example, if the only way to win a major contract was by bribery, would you pay?

In addition to these major groups of skills, the study of a range of cases during a course imparts a considerable degree of knowledge – for instance, about the way different organisation and the people within them operate, and about principles and practices.

Learners develop these skills and acquire this knowledge through the process of analysing the situation depicted in a case study and proposing appropriate action. In group discussion of cases, how effectively individuals learn will depend largely on the skill of the case leader as a facilitator. By encouraging

reflection on the content of the case, the leader helps group members to focus on the process, and gain both insight and practice in applying it to the content of the case study. Now we'll analyse two assassinations.

CASE STUDY 1: CHRIS HANI'S ASSASSINATION

At 10.25 am on 10 April 1993, in the driveway of his home at Dawn Park in Boksburg, Chris Hani was shot dead by Januz Wallus, a Polish-born immigrant.

Mr Hani was part of the ANC delegation that had returned from exile, and was meeting the South African government for talks, a process that led to the first democratic elections in South Africa. Extreme right-wing groups were opposed to this process.

The day before his assassination, Mr Hani had given his bodyguards leave for the weekend. On the morning of his assassination, Mr Hani went for a run in his tracksuit. Then he drove to a nearby supermarket to buy a newspaper, and drove home again.

In his driveway, he stopped his car and got out to open his garage door. Close behind him, Januz Wallus, following in his car, also stopped and got out. He stepped towards Mr Hani, who turned to speak to him. Wallus drew a gun and fired four rounds, resulting in three head shots and one shot behind the ear. Wallus then drove away. Apparently he did not notice that a woman had watched the assassination. She phoned the police and gave them the registration number of Wallus' car.

A few minutes later Wallus, still in Boksburg, was arrested for speeding. Police found that his car's registration number matched the number recently given by the witness.

Wallus, a transport worker, had links with extreme right-wing organisations that opposed the ANC and the SACP, in which Mr Hani was a National Executive Committee Member and General Secretary respectively.

Personal and political background:

born 28 June 1942 in Cofimvaba, Transkei;

brought up in a working-class family;

returned to South Africa in 1990 after 28 years in exile;

survived several assassination attempts while in exile;

targeted by right-wing organisations for his political influence.

Place: Gauteng, Boksburg, Dawn Park, at home.

Date: 10 April 1993

Time: 10.25 am

Run up:

The day before the assassination, Mr Hani gave his bodyguard leave.

Januz Wallus followed Mr Hani's car without Mr Hani noticing that anything was amiss.

Mr Hani had to open his garage door manually, and got out of his car to do so.

In spite of his high profile and previous attempts on his life, Mr Hani risked spending a few days without a bodyguard or any other protection.

Attack:

Mr Hani stepped out of his car to open the garage door and, realising that a car had stopped behind him, turned to speak with the driver.

Januz Wallus stepped out, drew his gun and shot Mr Hani four times, three shots in the head and one behind the ear. Mr Hani died instantly. Wallus drove off.

Conclusion:

A woman driving past witnessed the incident and called the police to report the killing.

Wallus was arrested for speeding in Boksburg.

It was established that Wallus had links with a right-wing organisation.

Analysis:

Mr Hani's protection could have been better planned if his importance had been given due respect. It would have prevented any shortcomings in his protection in any given scenario.

Januz Wallus had almost certainly been told exactly when and where to strike. Mr Hani's bodyguard was off duty and Wallus soon exploited the opportunity.

According to findings made by the police, the assassination had apparently been planned for at least three months.

NOTES

CASE STUDY 2: YITZHAK RABIN'S ASSASSINATION

At 21.40 on Saturday 4 November 1995, in Kings of Israel Square, IBN Gviro Street, 73-year old Labour Party leader and premier of Israel Yitzhak Rabin was shot twice by Yigal Amir, a law student, using a 9 mm pistol. Rabin died a few minutes after his arrival at hospital.

In 1967 Israel, after defeating its Arab neighbours in the Six-day War, annexed the so-called West Bank (part of Jordan), the Golan Heights (part of Syria) and the Gaza Strip (part of Egypt). Israel established settler communities in the occupied territories. The settlers were mostly fundamentalist, orthodox Jews who believed that they had an indisputable birthright to the occupied territories, in particular the West Bank and Jerusalem.

In the 1980s various bomb explosions and other acts of terror attributed to Palestinians were committed in Israel. In retaliation, various radical, right-wing Zionist groups launched attacks on Palestinians in the occupied territories.

In 1993 the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) accepted the Labour Party proposal for Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories, with a majority vote of 61 to 59. Accordingly, on 13 September 1993, Rabin and Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed the Oslo Protocol in Washington. There was opposition to the peace process from both Israelis and Palestinians. Islamic fundamentalists staged obviously futile attacks against Israel. Splinter groups of the PLO, such as Hamas, refused to observe the truce signed by Arafat and Rabin.

The Israeli Likud Party, then the official opposition to Rabin's Labour Party in the Knesset, were opposed to the peace process. They did not want the Jewish state to relinquish the territories it had occupied. The Likud Party leader issued a statement to the effect that the peace process was equivalent to treachery against Israel. Some radical orthodox rabbis were also opposed to making peace with Palestine. Rabbi Abraham Hecht of Shaare Zuin Synagogue in Hebron said 'Jews are permitted to kill leaders… .' Opponents of the peace process saw Rabin as the leader and symbol of the peace process.

In October 1995 a radical right-winger stated during a TV interview, 'Rabin is endangering the lives of Jews, creating a terrorist state and taking severe measures, so he (Rabin) should not be surprised if harsh measures are taken against him.'

On the day of the assassination, at 21.30, after addressing the rally, Rabin proceeded down the stairs accompanied by three bodyguards and five police officers. Rabin's driver got out of the VIP car parked near the bottom of the stairs. He left the engine running while opening the car door for Rabin.

Two bodyguards walked around to the other side of the car, while one bodyguard and the driver watched Rabin get into the vehicle.

As Rabin put his right foot into the car, Yigal Amir approached the car, raised his gun and shot Rabin twice at a range of 1 m to 1,5 m. The bodyguard watching Rabin was hit in the shoulder by a third shot as he hit Amir's arm. As he fired, Amir shouted that he was firing blanks, not real bullets.

As Rabin collapsed, the wounded bodyguard and his driver pushed him into the waiting car. The wounded bodyguard got in with Rabin. The driver drove them to the Ishilov Hospital.

The hospital was only 800 m away, but the driver had to take a detour due to the crowds. They were further delayed at a police roadblock. The hospital was not expecting the emergency, Rabin's driver and the wounded bodyguard carried him inside. Rabin died a little later.

Amir was over-powered by security personnel and arrested.

After the assassination, it was discovered that in September 1995 Amir had been filmed while heckling Rabin during a peace meeting. In June 1995 a classmate of Amir's informed the Shin Bet that he had overhead a discussion regarding a plot to kill Rabin. He did not reveal Amir's identity.

Authorities admitted to having received information from the classmate, Shlomo Halevi, but claimed that the information had not been sufficient to warrant further investigation. So they had not questioned Halevi intensively.

Several weeks before the assassination, Shin Bet increased the level of security provided to Rabin. This was because they perceived a bigger threat emanating from the right-wing. In August the Shin Bet allegedly ordered an informant to report on Yigal Amir's activities. The informant reported that Amir planned to attack Arabs. He did not suspect that Amir planned to kill Rabin.

Discuss these case studies with friends. Then test your understanding with the self-assessment questions that follow.



Self-assessment questions 10

1. What is the main lesson that CPOs can learn from the assassination of Chris Hani?

2. What other lessons can CPOs learn from Chris Hani's assassination?

3. What is the main lesson that CPOs can learn from the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin?



Self-assessment answers 10

1. In spite of his high profile and previous attempts on his life, Mr Hani risked spending time without bodyguards.

2. Among the answers you could give to Question 2 are the following:

   Mr Hani had to get out of his car to open his garage door.

   Mr Hani reacted in a helpful manner when the assassin drove up and stepped towards him.

3. Don't look towards the principal, but at the environment around the principal.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Surveillance'.

CHAPTER 12: SURVEILLANCE



Learning outcomes for this Chapter

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

understand and explain the term *surveillance*;

identify different methods of surveillance;

apply counter-measures;

develop observation and awareness skills.

Introduction

Surveillance is the gathering of information by means of observation. A surveillance team usually gathers information through electronic surveillance, mobile surveillance, or surveillance on foot. The CPO should constantly be on the lookout for signs that the principal is under surveillance. Surveillance can take many forms, depending on who is interested in your principal and you, the CPO.

As in politics and business, espionage is common in the close protection profession. Although the information gained may not assist in an attack, it could be used as a blackmail tool. It could include compromising photographs, tapes or anything that the principal and the CPOs would rather have kept secret.

Determining an individual's schedule can provide valuable information, such as the time the target leaves for work, what route is normally taken and if it is occasionally changed, whether any family member might make an easier target, and the kind of vehicle driven.

The danger may be greatest near the principal's residence and workplace, as the potential attacker knows that the target must be at either one of these two locations at some point during the working day. Potential attackers will gather information on the principal's habits and routines in preparation for an assassination, kidnap or other violent attack. Remember that in almost every cases a hit will be preceded by surveillance.

In this chapter we'll discuss surveillance under the following headings:

observation and awareness;

gathering and control of information;

methods of surveillance and observation;

Observation and awareness

The ability to identify and recall a situation accurately, completely and clearly results in efficient observation. Our ability to observe can be sharpened by experience and education. However, we must beware of making excessively subjective observations.

We can distinguish between two types of observation:

Sporadic observation refers to spot-check observation. It takes place on an occasional or regular basis, rather than a fixed or continuous basis.

Continuous observation refers to the observation of people and places on a fixed, continuous basis.

When observing *objects*, take note of:

their general characteristics;

their distinguishing features;

details regarding their specific order; and

details that vary.

When observing *vehicles*, take note of:

their colour;

their make and model;

their registration number; and

any damages or shortcomings.

When observing *people*, take note of:

their height (relative to your own);

their build and apparent age; and

their physical characteristics (such as birthmarks, shape of head, style of walking, signs of violent encounters such as scars).

Levels of awareness

We can differentiate between the following five levels of awareness:

lack of awareness of our surroundings – for instance, when people drive through intersections without looking at the traffic light;

general awareness of our surroundings – most people can remain in this condition all day;

heightened state of awareness – we can stay in this condition for about three to four hours, for instance when a threat is identified and contingency plans are made for dealing with the situation;

state of action – we can only stay in this condition for a few minutes, experiencing high stress levels, while we are reacting to a situation; and

shock – we are overwhelmed by a situation, and cannot react.

Gathering and control of information

Surveillance gatherers are usually interested in the following information:

military information;

information regarding prominent people (such as politicians);

scientific information;

economic and technical;

society-related information; and

political information (regarding political plans).

Information may be gathered by:

human sources: agents and informants;

open sources: publications and other media;

technical sources:

- telephone conversations;
- mail searches;
- radio broadcasts;

listening devices, or 'bugs.

People can gather information by means of:

direct observation;

investigation and field work; and

interrogation.

Information control

Every organisation must try to control leaks of sensitive information, by staff or others. Phases of the information control process include the following:

Prevention. This includes all measures and regulations required to protect and secure classified information.

Identification. This refers to the identification of a real or suspected security risk, which may be internal or external, before it appears.

Investigation. This refers to the investigation of a suspected or real security risk by means of overt or covert security methods.

Elimination. This refers to the handling of the result of an investigation.

Alterations. This refers to consequent alterations to the regulations.

Departmental actions. This refers to action by affected departments.

Counter-espionage actions. This refers to action at organisational level.

Criminal prosecution. This refers to legal action against information thieves.

A combination of the above.

Methods of surveillance or observation

Methods of surveillance include electronic surveillance and mobile surveillance.

Electronic or technical surveillance

Electronic or technical surveillance is also known as 'bugging'. This form of surveillance is often used to spy on:

competitors;

private detectives;

kidnappers;

terrorists; and

journalists.

The CPO could also be bugged.

Types of bugs include the following:

telephone bugs;

audio-transmit bugs;

recorders; and

external bugs.

Bugs may be planted by intruders, repairmen, contractors, office or home cleaners and so on.

Mobile surveillance or vehicle pursuit

Mobile surveillance includes single vehicle pursuit, multi-vehicle pursuit, and pursuit on foot.

The single vehicle pursuit method

In single vehicle pursuit, only one vehicle is used for pursuit. The principal's vehicle is constantly kept in sight. Pursuers maintain a safe distance to increase the chances of success. Should the MST (mobile support team), become suspicious; they will everything they can to lose the pursuers.

This method is seldom applied in practice, because the CPO will soon become aware of the pursuers, even if they keep another vehicle between themselves and the principal's vehicle. With changing traffic lights, heavy traffic or the decision to change lanes, the principal's vehicle can quickly disappear from sight and the pursuit can therefore fail.

The multi-vehicle pursuit method

At least four vehicles are used in this type of pursuit. One vehicle drives in front of the principal's vehicle and a second one follows. The third and fourth vehicles drive in parallel streets and are in constant radio communication with the other vehicles.

More than four vehicles can be used. The additional vehicles can either move with vehicles one and two, in other words, with the principal's vehicle, or with vehicles three and four. These vehicles can then be arbitrarily changed in an attempt to ensure the success of the pursuit. When pursuit takes place over a period, vehicles may be changed on a daily basis. The pursuers will change their clothing often, and disguise may be part of the daily routine.

Pursuers will obey all traffic signs, because a CPO may become suspicious if he or she notices that a vehicle has been behind the principal period for a while and has deliberately disregarded a red traffic light. It is also possible that every vehicle will have an extra member in case the pursuit has to continue on foot.

Pursuit on foot

The one-person pursuit

The pursuit of a principal by a single observer is risky, because a CPO may notice the observer pursuing them, especially if there is little pedestrian traffic.

The team method or ABC method

In the team method, the principal is pursued by a team of three observers, which is why it is also called the ABC method. Depending on the pedestrian traffic, Observer 'A' walks as close as possible behind the principal or CPO without jeopardising his or her pursuit, while observer 'B' walks behind 'A'. However, he or she stays at a safe distance behind 'A', which allows him or her to keep 'A' in sight. Observer 'C' walks on the opposite side of the street, parallel with 'A', in order to keep the principal or CPO in sight as well. The observers can also change positions regularly through secret communication, to prevent the CPO from detecting that he or she is being followed.

Hand signals are often used to keep the principal in sight should he or she suddenly disappear around a corner. To ensure that he or she is not being followed, a CPO often gets another CPO to walk some distance behind to see if one person carries on walking behind the principal. If so, the pursuers will try to follow the second CPO or discontinue the pursuit altogether. CPOs should be familiar with the techniques used by pursuers to ensure that they are not being pursued.

Counter-measures

Note these general guidelines for counter-measures to combat surveillance:

Top secret material must be cross-shredded after use.

Principals and CPOs must use own phones for important calls.

All personnel and acquaintances of the principal may be potential targets for surveillance.

CPOs should be aware that all conversations and negotiations may be recorded.

Telephone conversations (especially on mobile phones) are not secure.

Use only secure premises for high-level meetings.

Beware of unsolicited gifts.

Pursuit while in a vehicle

CPOs can consider taking the following measures if they suspect pursuit while they are travelling in a vehicle:

Cross traffic lights as soon as they turn red and see if anyone follows.

Commit traffic violations, such as:

- Turn across a solid line at the last moment.
- Make a U-turn, especially where it is forbidden. See if anyone follows.
- Ignore a compulsory left-turn lane.

Stop on the highway, where it is prohibited – act as if the vehicle has broken down.

Drive alternately fast and slow.

Park often.

Drive more slowly than normal traffic speed, and note who does the same.

Drive into a cul-de-sac and note if anyone follows. (However, this may facilitate an ambush.)

Stop immediately after a corner or turn.

Change lanes without indicating, or indicate without changing lanes or turning.

Turn into driveways of buildings or homes.

Stall the vehicle at a green traffic light and note the reaction of the surveyor.

Make use of fly-overs.

Drive fast on an uphill and slow down on the downhill.

Circle the same block.

Points to keep in mind

Keep the following points in mind:

Keep the principal up to date with what is happening.

Do not turn and look at pursuers conspicuously.

Do not adjust the rear-view mirror to improve your view of the pursuer.

Remember! Surveillance teams usually have two or more vehicles.
Do not relax your guard if one suspect vehicle disappears.

Always be on the lookout for pursuers.

If pursuit is identified and the situation permits, you don't show that you are aware of the pursuit. Obtain as much information about the pursuers as possible. Call for assistance to identify or arrest the pursuers, while taking the principal to safety.

Pursuit on foot

If you are being pursued on foot, remember the following:

Pedestrian pursuit usually involves a team of three or more people.

This type of pursuit is very difficult to detect. Protectors should take careful note of all people in their or the principal's immediate vicinity.

Try to develop your instinctive memory of faces.

Be aware of how the pursuer may behave when detected. (See common surveillance mistakes.)

Suddenly slip into a shop.

Unexpectedly go round a street corner and then stand still.

Suddenly jump into a taxi and drive away.

Common surveillance mistakes

Vehicle pursuit

You should be able to detect when people following you in a vehicle are making the following common surveillance errors (and avoid making them yourself!):

parking in prohibited zones;

parking in the same spot for a long time;

stopping or starting when the principal moves;

passing and parking;

driving fast and then slowly;

signalling a turn and failing to execute the turn;

following the motorcade through a red light;

flashing lights between vehicles;

moving at the same speed in parallel streets; and

stopping nearby when the motorcade stops.

Pursuit on foot

You should be able to detect when people pursuing you on foot are making the following common surveillance errors (and avoid making them yourself):

leaving the vehicle when the principal arrives;

turning away when looking at the principal;

hesitating or looking around when entering a building;

leaving the venue at the same time as the principal;

moving or stopping when the principal moves or stops;

standing on street corners or in lobbies, reading newspapers or magazines; and

dressing inappropriately for the venue.



Self-assessment questions 11

1. What is surveillance?

2. Name three methods of surveillance.

3. Differentiate between the two types of observation.

4. If you were conducting surveillance by observing vehicles, what five things would you look for?

5. List five common mistakes made by people pursuing you in a vehicle to conduct surveillance.



Self-assessment answers 11

1. Surveillance is the gathering of information.

2. Methods of surveillance include electronic and mobile surveillance. Mobile surveillance may be carried out by vehicle pursuit, or by pursuit on foot.

3. *Sporadic* observation refers to spot-check observation. Sporadic observation does not take place on a fixed or continuous basis.

   Continuous observation refers to the observation of people and places on a fixed, continuous basis.

4. You would note the vehicle's colour, make and model, and registration number, and any signs of damage.

5. You should be able to detect when people following you in a vehicle are making the following common surveillance errors (give any five):

   parking in prohibited zones;

   parking in the same spot for a long time;

   stopping or starting when the principal moves;

   passing and parking;

   driving fast and then slowly;

   signalling a turn and failing to execute the turn;

   following the motorcade through a red light;

Summary

As a CPO you need to make sure that you are familiar with the latest surveillance tactics, and counter-measures to prevent or control surveillance.

Now test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.

flashing lights between vehicles;

moving at the same speed in parallel streets; and

stopping nearby when the motorcade stops.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Hostage survival

CHAPTER 13: HOSTAGE SURVIVAL



Learning outcomes for this Chapter

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

react if your principal is taken hostage.

In this chapter we will discuss how best to react if your principal is taken hostage. We'll look at hostage survival and negotiations under the following headings:

introduction;

case study;

categories of hostage-takers;

how to survive as a hostage; and

standard operational procedures for negotiation in crisis situations.

Introduction

The taking of hostages as a form of attack against governments and government officials has become an everyday occurrence. Thousands of people worldwide die in attacks while being taken hostage and the damages amount to millions of dollars. Nobody is completely safe against such attacks.

During the 1970s about 80% of such attacks were against property and 20% against people. In the 1980s the attacks against people rose to 50% of such cases. Worldwide there are about 800 different organisations in 88 countries, all with close links, who are known to be involved in hostage-taking.

Military personnel have become a target of kidnapping groups. One well-known case was the kidnapping of an American general, James Dozier. He was kidnapped in Italy by the Red Brigades in 1981, and was held for 42 days before being rescued by a defence force rescue team. Other cases in which military personnel were the targets include the attacks on:

the Indonesian Embassy in Den Hage, by South Moroccans, in 1973;

the American Embassy in Teheran, by Iranian students, in 1979; and

the Iranian Embassy in London, by Iranians belonging to the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan, in 1980.

As a CPO you must know how to react and what to expect if you or your principal is taken hostage. You can save your own life and keep your principal and colleagues alive if you are prepared and professional in your approach. Before we discuss rules for survival, we'll look at a case study.

CASE STUDY: THE KIDNAPPING OF HANS-MARTIN SCHLEYER IN WEST GERMANY

The Red Army Faction (RAF) was born of student disaffection in Germany in 1968. RAF members were frustrated by their inability either to influence Germany's stable political system, or to get any support from the growingly prosperous proletariat whom they wanted to lead. After the first and second generations of the RAF had been broken down, in 1972 and 1975-6 respectively, a third more ruthless and more professional generation of terrorists emerged in April 1977. They were self-contained and scorned the support of the idealistic students who had sympathised with their predecessors. To show their contempt for the state, they chose as their victims well-guarded public figures such as the public prosecutor, Siegfried Buback, and the chairman of the Dresdner Bank, Jurgen Ponto. Then, in September 1977, they targeted the president of the Employers' and Industrial Association, Dr Hans-Martin Schleyer.

Schleyer's name was one of the 60 on the coded RAF list found by German police in November 1976. Schleyer himself had no doubts that the threat was real. At the memorial service to Jurgen Ponto, he remarked to a friend that 'the next victim of terrorism is almost certainly standing in this room now.' Schleyer was therefore provided with three police guards and an escort car. Surprisingly, his car was not fitted with the kind of security features that might have been expected for someone sufficiently under threat to justify a special police guard.

He was kidnapped at 5.30 pm on Monday 5 September 1977, in a one-way street close to his home. As his car came round a corner, a white Volkswagen minibus blocked the road, and a female terrorist pushed a pram off the pavement into the path of Schleyer's car. Another car, a yellow Mercedes, approached head on, going the wrong way down the one-way street. The driver of Schleyer's car, rather than run into the pram, braked so hard that the escort vehicle ran into the back of the car. About five terrorists emerged from the minibus and, from behind fired about 100 rounds in 90 seconds to kill the driver and all the bodyguards. They skilfully avoided damaging their potential trump card, Schleyer himself.

It is now possible to piece together the movements of the gang and their hostage for the first three weeks after the kidnap. These can teach CPOs a number of important lessons.

Siegfried Haag was arrested in November 1976. Papers captured during his arrest contained details (in code) that may have been meant for this kidnapper or for kidnapping generally. These details included an instruction to establish several alternative hideouts within one or two kilometres of the kidnap site (though most were actually much further away).

The police found the place from which the operation was mounted, and also the first two hideouts – but both just too late. Ironically, one of reasons why they missed the second one was the extent of the public desire to help the police. The police received such a flood of information that no particular significance was attached to one report, from the occupants of a flat next to the hideout, which in fact contained the vital clue, and no action was taken on it.

The kidnap was mounted from a block of flats with a basement car park, in 1 Wiener Street, in Cologne – about 3 km from the spot where Schleyer was taken. Flat 2065 and parking space 127 had been rented by a woman using the name of Lisa Ries, about six weeks before the kidnap. She was in fact Friederike Krabbe, sister of one of the terrorists imprisoned after the Stockholm siege (and among the eleven whose release was demanded in return for Schleyer's life). A man pretending to be Lisa Ries's fiancé, who had some dealings with the caretaker over the parking of vehicles in space 127, was Willy Peter Stoll, also on the wanted list. The caretaker was able to describe them both, and he had also noted the registration number of the white Volkswagen minibus and the yellow Mercedes, which had regularly been parked there.

The caretaker, hearing the news of the kidnapping on the radio, informed the police. They found the minibus back in space 127 at 8 pm and searched flat 2065 but it was, of course, empty. The kidnappers may have intended this to happen, as the first kidnap message was waiting for the police in the minibus.

The kidnappers probably transferred Schleyer from the minibus to another vehicle, for delivery to what is now believed to have been his first hideout, at the University Centre, or Uni Zenter, a huge, 43-storey block of flats located not far away. This contained 960 flats, housing 2 500 people (including 650 students). Few of the occupants knew their neighbours, many of whom didn't stay long, and as many as 100 flats might normally be expected to be empty. (On one occasion a man wanted by the police got hold of a key and occupied an empty flat on the 37th floor for several weeks. No-one noticed until someone complained about the noise of his radio.) Between five and ten flats changed hands every week and some occupants were not Germans.

So there seemed nothing unusual about a 22-year old woman renting a flat on the 26th floor, producing normal evidence of identity and paying two month's rent in advance. This was on 15 August (three weeks before the kidnapping). She used the name of Marquand, but was in fact Adelheid Schultz, who was already on the wanted list on suspicion of complicity in the murder of Jurgen Ponto. She was given the key to her flat, together with a parking permit in the basement and a key giving access to the lift to take her directly from the basement to the 26th floor. Once in the lift, of course, she did not have to pass the desk of the concierge.

A few days after the kidnapping, an Alfa Romeo car was found in this basement. Its registration number linked it to one 'Konrad Binder' – known to be an alias used by Rolf Heissler, one of the original first-generation terrorists still at large, and wanted for an armed bank raid. Its parking place did not link it to the flat, but was one of hundreds among the maze of concrete pillars, nooks and crannies in the basement. The kidnappers are unlikely to have used the Alfa Romeo to bring Schleyer in, or to have left it there if they had, so it was probably used only for access for gang members after the kidnap. Assuming that he was delivered in a van, it would have been very easy to take him up to the 26th floor in the lift, possibly rolled up in a carpet or locked in a box or wardrobe – nothing unusual about that, with so many people moving in and out.

After identifying the car, the police discreetly guarded all exits, did a quick check with the block office and searched any flats about which there was any doubt. Meanwhile a couple of plain-clothes police officers rented a flat, and detailed plans were made both for a full search and, if the hideout were located, for a raid by the GSG9. The search took eight days – but the birds had flown even before the car was found.

They had, in fact, moved to a third-floor flat in a much smaller block in the quiet little dormitory town of Liblar, 16 km out of Cologne. Since this block was smaller and less impersonal, some of the neighbours had noticed that the third-floor flat had been taken and the rent paid in advance, but that no-one moved in. When the kidnapping occurred, this unusual fact was reported to the police – one of a total of 3 826 such messages – but seemed of no great consequence. A day or two later some people did move in, with a box or cupboard – which must have contained Schleyer. About two weeks later they moved out, again with one large piece of furniture, which was put into a van. That did seem a little odd, and was reported again. This time the report was acted upon – but by then the flat was empty.

It is uncertain where they went next – possibly across the Belgian or Dutch borders, scarcely an hour's drive away, with many minor crossings and little control. There was a report of Schleyer being held for a time in a boat in a canal or an inland sea in Holland, and even a (false) conjecture that he might have been taken to England. His body was, in fact, found in France.

His own behaviour was staunch and courageous. He had left a letter with a friend saying that he wished the government to make no concessions to obtain his release. In his letters to his wife, written at gunpoint and censored by his kidnappers, he studiously avoided any words that might suggest that the government should give in to the kidnappers. This also applied to two statements on film, which were later shown on television worldwide.

Meanwhile, the RAF's older intellectual sympathisers were putting their case in France. One of their lawyers, Klaus Croissant, had crossed the frontier to escape arrest by the German police, and he spoke on French television in support of the RAF. A well-known French playwright, Jean Genet, was given a prominent space in *Le Monde* for an article expressing gratitude to Beader, Meinhof and the RAF. He claimed that their violence was justified by the brutality of the state system in West German, which he described as an American outpost against the Russians.

The first kidnap message had demanded the release of 11 RAF terrorists serving sentences in prison, including Beader, Ennslin, Hanna Krabbe and two others convicted of the hostage murders in Stockholm – but, surprisingly, not Siegfried Haag (who, it is reported, was much put out by this). These 11 were to be taken to an airport by 10 am on Wednesday, 7 September, to be flown to a country of their choice, each with 45 000 dollars. The kidnappers also demanded that their communication should be read out in full on television on that Tuesday evening,
6 September. The government ignored both deadlines, and demanded proof that Schleyer was still alive.

The deadline was twice extended (to midday on 9 September and midnight on 12 September), but again ignored. Germany's Chancellor Schmidt warned the terrorists that they were fighting a losing battle, and imposed a news blackout. In view of the suspicion that there was contact between the kidnappers and their comrades in prison, he also suspended visits by their lawyers.

While maintaining an uncompromising line in its negotiations and public pronouncements, the German government was meanwhile displaying considerable shrewdness in playing for time. There were periodic reports of German ministers flying for consultations to places such as Algeria, Libya, Iraq, South Yemen and Vietnam. While nothing was said about the purpose of these visits, the press predictably conjectured that they were examining the possibilities of those countries receiving the terrorists if they were released from prison. This probably encouraged the kidnappers to delay killing Schleyer, so long as there seemed to be a chance of their demands being met. However, in the end they did kill him.

Categories of hostages-takers

People may take hostages for a wide variety of reasons, including political, religious, criminal, domestic, suicidal, work-related or psychotic reasons.
It is useful to divide hostage-takers into three broad categories, according to their motivation and behaviour. This can help you to establish who you have to deal with, and to adapt your conduct accordingly. The three main categories of hostage-taker are the psychopath, the criminal and the political hostage-taker.

The psychopath who takes hostages

People who show signs of being psychotic are responsible for about 80% of hostage-takings.

Such disturbed people are not always interested in reaching their own goals, as the attention they receive through taking hostages is enough to satisfy their ego. It shows the world that they too can do something important and newsworthy. While in a psychotic state, they may be unaware of the gravity and consequences of their actions. Those who are aware may be driven by specific delusions. Psychopaths' actions may be unpredictable and sometimes difficult to understand in terms of conventional behaviour.

Mentally disturbed people may take hostages to fulfil an underlying need of which they are unaware. Once you have established their mental state, you are in a far better position to predict or anticipate their next actions. For instance, some psychopathic individuals may react badly to certain stimuli, resulting in sudden temperamental outbursts.

Mentally disturbed hostage-takers usually work alone. For some people, it is a cry for help. However, you should never underestimate their potential to do harm. Authorities have learnt some very expensive and unpleasant lessons this way.

The criminal hostage-taker

Criminals are responsible for only a small percentage of hostage-taking. Normally criminals will only take hostages when their escape route from the scene of a crime is cut off. In an effort to escape, they may take a hostage to ensure their safe getaway.

Criminals' greatest priority is their own safety. They are normally the easiest group to convince to surrender. They are always armed, and often pretend to have explosives on them. They usually want to stay alive because they have no cause for which they are prepared to die.

Usually, negotiations with criminal hostage-takers are successful, and the hostages are set free unharmed.

The political hostage-taker

The third group comprises political or revolutionary hostage-takers. They are the most dangerous hostage-takers. They are responsible for the smallest percentage of hostage-taking worldwide, but usually get the most publicity. Their actions are normally aimed at obtaining worldwide media coverage, to propagate the cause they are fighting for. Taking hostages is just part of a much broader campaign to reach their goals.

Their actions are usually well planned and carefully considered. They normally act as pawns for a large organisation. They do not talk as individuals, but rather as spokespersons for an organisation. Normally they are not psychopaths, and they seldom show signs of mental illness. They are typically of above-average intelligence and some have almost perfected the art of indoctrination. They may have carefully worked-out plans for an escape route.

Hostages taken by this type of hostage-taker have a good chance of staying alive. We'll look in some detail how you can plan ahead to increase your chances, and your principal's chances, of surviving as a hostage.

How to survive as a hostage

We'll discuss how to survive as a hostage under the following headings:

precautionary measures;

first reaction to being taken hostage;

the hostage-taker's condition;

what to avoid doing as a hostage;

transportation and the first day after being taken hostage;

a survival plan;

keeping your dignity and self-respect as a hostage;

reasons why hostages die;

why it is important not to carry classified or other important information;

psychological phases that hostages go through; and instructing the principal.

Precautionary measures

Take the following precautionary measures in case you, or your principal, are taken hostage:

Know what to expect.

Set up a plan of action in the event of your being taken hostage, or your principal being taken hostage.

Remember that the majority of hostages are set free.

Ensure that your personal affairs, such as your accounts and your will, are in order. This will prevent your having to worry about these matters while you are being held hostage.

Your family must be aware that you might be held hostage, and know what they should do in the unfortunate event of this happening to you – for example, how to handle the media should a ransom be claimed.

Should you be on important medication, always carry enough stock for at least one week.

Memorise the name of the medication and know where you can get it.

Carry a photograph of your family with you. This normally changes the attitude of hostage-takers towards hostages.

First reaction to being taken hostage

People's first reaction to being taken hostage is usually:

a feeling of fear, shock, disbelief and confusion; and

a need to defend yourself and fight back, which is normally fatal.

Analyse the situation very carefully before offering any resistance.

Hostage-taker's condition

Remember that hostage-takers will not be feeling relaxed either:

They will be very tense.

They will be anxious.

They will be nervous.

They will tend to over-react.

They are restricted to limited resources, and may be separated from their superiors who could support them.

What to avoid doing as a hostage

Do not try to be a hero.

Among the many other things you should not do if you are to survive as a hostage are the following:

Do not be aggressive or lose your temper.

Do not threaten your captors.

Do not feel sorry for yourself.

Do not pretend to be what you are not.

Do not panic.

Do not be demanding.

Do not do anything that could result in an argument among your hostage-takers.

Do not talk too fast or swear.

Do not use slang language.

Do not show any sympathy for the hostage-takers' cause.

Do not get into any argument with them.

Do not run down your own government or the cause you represent.

Avoid arguments or making insulting remarks about the kidnappers. However reasonable they may seem, they may be unstable individuals whose behaviour is unpredictable.

Usually the possibilities for escape are small, and you should not try to escape, unless you are absolutely sure of success.

A thoughtless action could prove to be fatal. Under no circumstances should you talk to the kidnappers about their conditions of release. If the conditions cannot be met by the authorities or institutions, it could lead to fatal results for the kidnapper. Never criticise the food or accommodation provided by the kidnapper. Such actions could result in hostility, including physical pain (for example, assault).

Transportation and the first day after being taken hostage

Remain calm. Use your five senses – smell, sight, hearing, touch and taste – to try to establish where you are and in which direction you are moving. Do not make any sudden movements, as they might be your last.

The first day of being a hostage is very important and can determine whether you will survive this traumatic experience or not. Waking up for the first time after being taken hostage is traumatic, and is accompanied by a sense of emotional exhaustion.

Survival plan

During the process of being taken hostage, lie flat on the floor. Be observant and try to memorise the kidnappers' physical features.

Try to remain calm during the attack, because this is when your captors are most nervous and tense.

Plan a survival strategy while you are being held hostage. Plan ahead in case you will be held for a long time. Your plan should include the following:

Keep your mind clear by playing mind games and daydreaming.

Avoid getting bored, depressed or anxious.

Prepare yourself for being alone and isolated.

You are dependent upon your hostage-keepers for basic needs such as food, water and rest. Eat and drink what they offer you.

Read everything that is given to you. It will keep your mind occupied.

Take your time in executing your personal duties.

Do not hesitate to ask your captors for medication. Remember they want you alive and your illness might be your passport to freedom.

You will lose track of time, but keep in touch with sounds, light, traffic sounds and the activities of your captors.

Keep a calendar by making scratch marks on the wall, knots in a piece of string, small stones or anything else that is available.

Guard against the Stockholm syndrome, in which the victim develops sympathy towards the captor.

Do what your captors tell you to do.

Try to engage your captors in dialogue.

Show them that a hostage is worth more to them alive than dead, because the organisation or authorities will not enter into any negotiations if the hostage is killed.

Be observant. Note what is outside the window, where the sun rises, sounds of aeroplanes, trains, farm or animal sounds in the area.

Leave your fingerprints everywhere.

Listen to the conversations your captors have among themselves. Find out their names, what they plan for the future and so on.

Never tell a terrorist that you will identify him or her at later stage

Now we'll give you some guidelines for keeping your dignity and self-respect as a hostage.

Keeping your dignity and self-respect as a hostage

It is very important to maintain your dignity and self-respect while you are naked, embarrassed, observed while performing your most personal daily bodily functions, and perhaps enduring physical torture. Your captors will find it easier to murder you if you come across as being an inferior or a weakling. If they respect you, they may hesitate when the time comes to execute you.

Try to resist the Stockholm syndrome, in which hostages quickly begin to feel empathy for their captors and their cause.

Maintain your dignity and self-respect by doing the following:

Maintain your personal hygiene.

Keep your living space clean.

Try to insist on privacy while taking a bath or using the toilet.

Do not beg for anything.

Maintain a daily exercise programme.

Obey orders.

Remain friendly.

Maintain a daily routine.

Be prepared for disappointments.

Speak to your captors in their own language, if possible.

Remain calm and composed.

Create your own personal space.

Do not lose hope.

Remember that you will experience feelings of boredom, anxiety, humiliation, withdrawal, tearfulness, sickness, confusion, hate and many other emotions. You will lose track of time. This is normal and it will not kill you. Be prepared to handle all these emotions in the event of this happening to you (or your principal). Remember that logical thinking is the key to safe release.

Reasons why hostages die

Avoid being killed. Note that hostages may die for the following reasons:

Most hostage deaths occur at the beginning of the process of hostage-taking. They die from injuries sustained while being taken hostage.

Hostages may also be killed during rescue – mainly because they jump up during the fight, try to escape and get caught in the cross-fire. The correct procedure is to lie flat and remain in that position until your captors order you to do something else, or you are rescued.

Why it is important not to carry classified or other important information

Do not carry classified documents on you. Do not carry telephone numbers, combinations and codes about your person. You should be able to explain everything you have on your person and persuade your captors that you don't know anything important.

Psychological phases that hostages go through

Most hostages go through four psychological phases, each with distinctive characteristics. If hostages are familiar with these characteristics it will be easier for them to control their own feelings better.

Capture (phase 1)

The main characteristics of the capture phase are:

denial;

shock; and

disbelief.

Alienation (phase 2)

The main characteristics of the alienation phase are as follows:

The hostage feels alienated from society and from the protection of the law. He or she can suffer from shock, and may cry and tremble.

In this phase the hostage may also suffer from so-called 'traumatic psychological infixation', the beginnings of the Stockholm syndrome. If a hostage does so, he or she may later refuse to testify against the kidnappers.

A classic example is that of Patty Hearst, an heiress who was kidnapped for ransom. She associated so closely with the kidnappers that she joined their gang and later married one of the gang members.

Traumatic depression (phase 3)

The characteristics of traumatic depression are as follows:

apathy;

anger;

irritation;

sleeplessness; and

nightmares.

Resolution (phase 4)

The hostage can only go through the resolution phase after his or her release.

Instructing the principal

Your principal is far more likely than you to be kidnapped. You should prepare him or her – and his or her family and household – as follows:

Ensure that they know everything we have covered in this chapter.

The principal, the PES team and his or her entourage should decide on a certain code word that may provide basic information about the principal's position during a kidnapping or hostage situation.

If they are taken hostage by people who are unaware of their identity, attention must not be drawn to their real identity. It will give the captor more power.

You and your principal must know how to prevent and cope with a hostage situation. Now we'll look at a draft of standard operational procedures for negotiation in a crisis situation, especially in the event of hostage-taking or suicide.

Operational procedures for negotiation in crisis situations

We'll describe the procedure for negotiation in hostage-taking situations under the following headings:

purpose and mission of the procedure;

command and control;

command post;

cordoning;

media; and

guidelines.

Purpose and mission of the procedure

The purpose of this standard operational procedure is to establish a uniform policy, procedures and considerations that can be used when dealing with hostage and suicide situations.

During hostage and suicide situations the mission is, in order of priority, as follows:

the safe release of hostages;

the protection of lives and all role-players in the hostage situation, as well as spectators and inquisitive people;

the arrest and/or referral of the person who took the hostages; and

the protection of property and equipment.

Command and control

During any hostage and/or suicide situation, the senior member at the scene takes command and control. The hostage negotiator is not in command of the scene but is merely an advisor to the commander at the scene. In any situation where the task force is deployed, command and control, without reserve, goes to the commander of the special task force.

In cases of national interest, command and control will be at Visible Policing Head Office.

Command post

When and if circumstances justify it, a combined operational centre (COC) will be established at the scene.

Only representatives of the various disciplines who are actively involved in the hostage situation will be allowed entry to the COC.

All liaison and co-ordinating will take place from the COC. The senior representatives of each discipline present will form a special advisory group (a think-tank).

All decisions that affect the life of a hostage or the people who have taken the hostages, will be made here. All tactical operations will be co-ordinated by the commander.

Cordoning

The scene must be cordoned off with two cordons, using a human cordon, chevron ribbon or wire.

An inner cordon will be drawn directly around the scene and guarded by relevant police units. Nobody will be allowed to enter the inner cordon without the permission of the commander at the scene.

An outer cordon will be determined by the location of the scene, and will be guarded by the Visible Policing division.

The purpose of this is to keep inquisitive spectators away from the scene.

Media

A media centre will be established within the outer and inner cordons, and staffed by a liaison officer. All information made available to the media must be cleared by the liaison officer. The media will not be allowed inside the COC inner cordon. Only identified members of the media will be allowed at the media centre.

The following must be attended to:

The person taking hostages may only have done so for the sake of publicity.

In the interests of the safety of hostages and the police, tactical information may not be given to the media.

If information is refused, it may lead to inaccurate news releases.

Communication between the media and the person who has taken hostages will not be allowed during the hostage situation.

The taking of photographs must be controlled as far as possible, especially if hostages are involved.

Publishing photographs of the special police units, their equipment, tactics and techniques is strictly forbidden.

The liaison officer may provide as much information as possible, on condition that it does not harm the negotiations.

Unless the hostage negotiator has informed members of the force or the hostages themselves about the interview, direct interviews with members or hostages will not be allowed.

Guidelines

Action at the scene of a crisis must be co-ordinated. Communication and co-ordination between the hostage negotiator or negotiation team, the commander at the scene and the reaction team is essential.

General guidelines

In-depth negotiations with a person who has taken hostages or is threatening suicide must be undertaken by a trained hostage negotiator, if available. Under no circumstances must others attempt to be 'heroes'.

Only the first persons, and specific help summoned, will be allowed at the scene.

Conspicuous police actions within a visible distance of the scene must be limited to a minimum.

The use of loudspeakers, sirens and radios must be limited to a minimum and must not be heard by the person who has taken the hostages.

After a hostage or suicide situation has been dealt with by the SAPS, a report (irrespective of whether the situation has been dealt with by a hostage negotiator or not) must be compiled by a hostage negotiator and sent to the appropriate address.

First member at the scene

The actions of the first member of the police service at the scene of a hostage or suicide situation are crucial. Don't be hasty, as people's lives can be placed in jeopardy.

The first member(s) must:

determine whether the situation does, in fact, exist;

isolate or cordon off the scene, control the traffic and limit spectators;

gather sufficient evidence without becoming directly involved with the person who has taken hostages;

contact control and supply the following information:

the address of the scene, as well as a description;
the number of those injured;
the number of persons holding hostages;
the number of hostages.

control vehicle and pedestrian traffic;

divide the witnesses into three separate groups:

persons who know the holder of the hostages;
persons who know the hostages;
eye-witnesses,

be available for the hostage negotiator and data collector;

maintain firing discipline:

i. firearms must not be aimed at the person who has taken hostages;
ii. firearms must not be fired except when lives are directly in danger;

ensure the locality of the hostage situation (buildings) are not penetrated;

check that in-depth negotiations are avoided at this stage;

maintain communication between the holder of the hostages and the members if it has already been established;

ensure that the radio communications of the police cannot be heard by the person who has taken hostages;

ensure that nobody is allowed to offer himself or herself as a hostage;

ensure that nobody is exchanged for hostages, and

ensure that firearms, alcohol and medication are not made available to the holders of the hostages.

Senior members at the scene

When the first senior member of the police arrives at the scene, he or she must take control. He or she must ensure that a negotiator is summoned, and must not get involved in the negotiating situation. He or she must:

establish a control centre;

establish an inner and outer cordon, and, if necessary, clear the area;

establish a media centre; and

keep an accurate record of the incident.

Control or radio control

As soon as the hostage or suicide situation has been confirmed, the following persons, where necessary, must be advised immediately.

the hostage negotiator;

the special police units;

a police psychologist;

a police photographer or video unit;

ambulance services;

the traffic department;

an explosives expert (where applicable); and

the Station Commander, District Commander or Regional Commissioner.

Public relations

The police must keep in constant contact with the vehicle at the scene.



Self-assessment questions 12

1. List three different categories of hostage-takers.

2. Which type of hostage-taker is usually the most dangerous?

3. Most hostage-takers fall into the category of ____ .



Self-assessment answers 12

1. The main categories are psychopath, criminal, and political hostage-taker.

2. The political hostage-taker is usually the most dangerous.

3. Most hostage-takers fall into the category of *psychopath*.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Bombs, explosive devices and fire-arms'.

CHAPTER 14: BOMBS, EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND FIRE ARMS

Learning outcomes of this lesson

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

identify the most commonly used bombs, explosive devices and fire-arms; and

take the correct course of action in the event of a bomb explosion.

All organisations should have a standard procedure in place in case of a bomb threat or similar crisis. Terrorism is the most common cause of such attacks, but even in areas where the threat of terrorism is small, CPOs must be prepared. Bombs and explosives may be used to destroy property, or target people.

All organisations should have a standard procedure in place in case of a bomb threat or similar crisis. Terrorism is the most common cause of such attacks, but even in areas where the threat of terrorism is small, CPOs must be prepared. Bombs and explosives may be used to destroy property, or target people.

You must be able to recognise the characteristics of bombs and explosive devices, and know what action to take in the event of a bomb explosion. In this chapter we will introduce you to the most commonly used bombs, explosive devices and firearms, under the following headings:

the golden rule of preventing bomb attacks;

types of bombs and types of explosives;

what to do if you find a bomb or mine, and precautions; and

weapons and equipment.

The golden rule of preventing bomb attacks

The golden rule is to recognise any suspicious-looking object that looks out of place in the environment. See Table 4 below.

TABLE 4: BOMB TARGETS	
The following are likely bomb targets:	
	Petrol
ESSENTIAL SERVICES	Electricity
	Water
OFFICIALDOM	Courts
	Police stations
HIGH-DENSITY AREAS	Sports complexes
	Shopping centres
TRANSPORTATION LINKS	Trains
	Buses
COMMUNICATION CENTRES	Fuel and industrial installations

Types of bombs

There are two basic categories of bombs:

military bombs – limpet mines, hand-grenades, mortars, landmines, anti-personnel mines; and

home-made bombs – what they look like and what they consist of depends upon the ingenuity of the designer.

Home-made bombs

Home-made bombs can be:

Thrown by hand. Molotov cocktails.

Sent through the post. Letter or parcel bombs.

Left unattended. In briefcases, or parcel bombs.

Parked near the target. Vehicle bombs.

The chain reaction sequence

The following sequence applies to all explosive devices or bombs:

Ignition. This is achieved by electric charge or someone igniting the fuse.

Initiation. This is the burning of the fuse after ignition.

Detonation. The detonator will detonate.

Explosion. The main charge will explode.

Types of explosives

Explosives can be:

military; or

commercial.

Military explosives fall into many categories. The most common is generally termed *plastic explosive*. As the term implies, it resembles a type of putty and can be moulded into various shapes. It is initiated by means of a detonator, and size for size is more potent than commercial explosives.

Commercial explosives in this category are used in the mining and engineering industries. Although less compact than their military counterparts, they are still extremely effective.

We'll examine some of the most common limpet mines.

Limpet mines

USSR Magnetic – non-metallic assault mines (limpet mines)

The limpet mine comprises a high-explosive (HE) charge contained in a moulded plastic semi-cylinder, fired by a mechanical time delay. It is attached to a metal target by powerful magnets, or to a non-metallic target by a webbing strap. The basic colour of the plastic is an orange-brown, almost marbled effect, which has had a light grey paint (in some instances a black paint) applied over it.

At the base of the mine, in other words at the uncurved part, is a brown plastic plate, fastened by several screws on which identifying batch digits and letters are usually printed. An olive green webbing strap is attached to one end of the mine.

At the other end is a threaded fuse well, which is kept airtight and water resistant by a black plastic screw-threaded transit plug. Once the plug is removed, the time-pencil and detonating device fit into this well. The time-pencil and detonating device are essentially a two-part unit with a variable third portion, a time delay tab, which will be selected according to the attacker's choice.

The firing mechanism is a strong spring, which, when released by the withdrawal of the safety ring pin, drives the firing pin down into the detonator. However, the spring is restrained by a wire that passes around the delay tab, and that, drawn by the spring, will gradually cut through the delay tab, thus finally releasing the spring. The time taken for cutting through a tab depends on the thickness of the tab used, and the ambient temperature. Six different tab thicknesses are provided in a miniature cardboard envelope, with each limpet. Each tab is colour-coded to indicate its delay period – delays range from five minutes to 823 hours. The action of the time pencil is initiated by pulling away the safety ring.

Once the limpet mine is armed, the fuse arrangement gives no outward indication of how much time is left before the detonator will fire. The limpet is attached to a ferrous-metal target surface by two powerful horseshoe magnets, one at each end of the mine, which protrude beyond the base plate to a height of 16 mm. This distance is referred to in some descriptions as a *standoff*. The cling of these magnets is sufficiently powerful to require a pull of about 10 kg of force, applied in a 'sliding away' sideways movement to detach the mine.

A length of strong line may be attached to the mine's webbing, to be pulled from a distance. Pulling the mine away from the target at right angles is virtually impossible. While the magnets are fairly powerful, they have their limits. Where a non-magnetic layer about 1 cm in depth overlays a ferrous target, the magnets will not hold the limpet. A limpet transit-plate is provided with each limpet. The limpet clings to this plate until it explodes. Two slots in the plate enable it to be carried on a belt. It allows the whole limpet, attached to the slotted plate, to be tied to a non-ferrous magnetic target or to a ferro-magnetic target that has been coated with a sufficient thickness of non-magnetic material to negate the effect of the magnets' power. Accessory items for the limpet, other than those already described, include a locking key that matches a hexagonal base on the head of the time pencil, a cardboard container for the fuses, and a small colour-coded time chart for identification and selection of the appropriate delay tab.

USSR 158 Magnetic – non-metallic assault mine (mini-limpet mine)

General features

All sides of the mine are flat, with the exception of the top, which is rounded. There is a recess at the top, with a holding strip of metal on one side to take the time-pencil detonating device.

The mine is made of a Bakelite material, is filled with TNT explosive and is normally a red or brown colour. The limpet mine is attached to a ferrous metal target surface by two powerful, horseshoe magnets, one at each end of the mine. The cling of these magnets is sufficiently powerful to require a pull of about 3 kg of force (sliding the mine sideways) to detach it from the surface.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of this mini-limpet mine are:

size: 146 mm x 71 mm x 46 mm;

filter material: TNT;

weight: 735 g;

colour: normally red or brown; and

fuse delays: 8 to 40 minutes.

What to do if you find a bomb or mine, and precautions

If you find a bomb or mine

If you find a bomb or mine:

Don't panic and don't cause panic.

Notify the operational commander. The advance team will handle the situation.

Mark the location of the bomb or mine.

Safeguard the immediate area.

Do not touch or handle the bomb or mine.

Precautions

Good housekeeping

Keep to these good housekeeping rules:

All areas must be kept as clean and neat as possible.

All refuse, empty containers and unused articles must be removed as soon as possible.

Neat offices and stores enable people to identify any strange or suspicious object.

Neutralise bomb hiding places

Follow these guidelines for neutralising bomb hiding places:

Check all ash bins and small containers that may be used as bomb.

Hiding places must be checked regularly.

Public places, such as lobbies and toilets, must offer no opportunity for hiding bombs or explosives.

All offices, cabinets, drawers, panels and service lifts must be kept locked when not in use.

Supervision over cleaning personnel

Follow these guidelines for supervision over cleaning personnel:

Cleaning personnel must not be allowed to work on their own, but must be supervised.

Cleaning personnel must be selected and screened.

Cleaning personnel must be checked.

What can *you* do?

Everyone should be on the lookout for:

suspicious articles (a parcel left unattended);

suspicious vehicles (why is it parked there?); and

suspicious persons (what is he or she doing here?).

Look for what should not be there! Observe – record – report.

After a bomb explosion

If a bomb *does* explode:

The CPO's main priority is to evacuate and get the VIP to a safe room or safe house.

Notify control room and the SAPS.

Do not touch or handle anything.

SAPS will cordon off and evacuate the area.

Keep people away from the scene.

Activate emergency procedures and assist the injured.

To conclude the unit, we'll describe some basic weapons and equipment that you should be familiar with.

Weapons and equipment

We'll describe the following weapons:

the AK47 assault rifle;

the VZOR 61 pistol (the Scorpion);

the Tokarev pistol;

the Makarov SL pistol;

the F1 personnel hand-grenade;

the RPG 7 rocket launcher;

the RG42 personnel hand-grenade; and

the PMN personnel mine.

7.62mm AK47 assault rifle

During World War II, the Russians understood the value of a sheer volume of fire, particularly if it could be produced from simple weapons operated by people with only basic training. As a result, they armed whole battalions with sub-machine guns. However, although these are effective in their way, they have a very limited range. The Russians quickly realised that this disadvantage could be offset by using assault rifles as well.

The AK47 has been the most outstandingly successful rifle in service since World War II. The designer was Mikhail Kalashnikov, who took up weapon design after being badly wounded. During his convalescence, he designed a sub-machine gun that was not accepted. He continued designing weapons and his 1947 model, the AK47, came into service in 1951. In 1959 he improved the method of production and his new rifle was called the AKM. The basic principles of the AK47 profile have been applied to a family of light machine guns – the RPK. The AK47 is manufactured in several Warsaw Pact countries throughout the world.

General features

The AK47 assault rifle is a box-magazine-fed, gas-operated rifle. It is a compact weapon capable of single shots and automatic fire. It has been used extensively in most of the world's trouble spots'. The AK47 is supplied in two configurations, one with a rigid butt and the other with a double-strut, folding, metal butt.

Various Warsaw Pact countries have produced a variety of materials for butts and head officers, ranging from laminated sheets of plywood to various types of plastic.

The Russian AKM has a separate bayonet that slips over the muzzle, and the Chinese AK47 has a permanently attached folding bayonet.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of the AK47 are as follows:

calibre: 7,62 x 39 (intermediate cartridge);

method: 30 or 40 round-box magazines;

method of operation: gas;

weight AK47: 4,3 kg (empty);

weight AKM: 3,15 km (empty);

maximum effective range: 300 m; and

muzzle velocity: 715 m/s.

7,65 mm VZOR 61 pistol (or the VX61 Scorpion*)*

The Scorpion, which was used by the Czech army, is an unusual side arm. This pistol is a good example of a true machine pistol. Although its use as a military weapon is relatively limited, it is useful for tank crews, motor-cyclists and people for whom the compactness of a secondary weapon is more important than its performance. Its small calibre reduces its stopping power, although its automatic fire offsets this disadvantage. There is also a bigger version (made in limited quantities only) that fires a 9 mm round. This pistol is a good deal heavier.

Although the size and capacity of the Scorpion reduces its military efficiency, it is an excellent weapon for the police and CPOs, as it is inconspicuous and easily concealed. Its low muzzle velocity make it relatively easy to silence and an effective silencer is available. It has been sold to many African countries.

General features

The Scorpion works on the normal blowback system and fires a standard 7,65 mm round on either single shot or full automatic. Very light automatic weapons often have the disadvantage that their cyclic rate of fire is unacceptably high, but in this weapon the problem is largely overcome by a type of buffer device in the butt. The pistol has a light wire butt so the weapon can be used off the shoulder. This can be folded forward without affecting the operation of the weapon.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of the Scorpion are as follows:

calibre: 7,65 mm;

method of feed: 10- or 20-round box magazine;

method of operation: blowback action;

weight: 1,31 kg (empty);

maximum effective range: 50 m; and

muzzle velocity: 300 m/s.

7.62 mm Tokarev (RR-33) pistol

Although the Tokarev pistol is no longer used by the Warsaw Pact countries, having been replaced by the Makarov pistol, it is still widely used throughout the world. The Tokarev pistol was first introduced in 1930, with a modified version appearing in 1933, hence the name RR-33. It was based closely on the Colt and Browning pistols, with some modifications to simplify production and one or two improvements. The Tokarev is not a very reliable weapon – it has a high stoppage rate.

General features

The Tokarev is box-magazine-fed, recoil, single-action-operated weapon that fires single rounds only. It has no separately applied safety and the pistol is normally carried with a round in the hammer and the hammer at half-cock. The action of firing is very similar to that employed with a single-action revolver. However, it is not entirely safe to use the pistol in this way because there is a distinct possibility of an accidental discharge if the weapon is dropped or jolted.

Basic characteristics

Basic characteristics of the Tokarev are:

calibre: 62 mm x 25 (short);

method of feed: 8-round box magazine;

method of operation: recoil, single action;

weight: 0,85 kg (empty);

maximum effective range: 50 m; and

muzzle velocity: 420 m/s.

9mm Makarov SL pistol (PM)

The Makarov dates from the early 1960s. It was the standard pistol for the USSR and for most of the Warsaw Pact countries. It also appeared in some of the smaller countries that received Soviet military aid.

General features

The Makarov is a box-magazine-fed, blowback-action-operated weapon that fires single shots. Unlike the Tokarev, it has a safety catch, which makes it a lot safer to handle.

The basic characteristics of the Makarov are:

calibre 9 mm x 18;

method of feed 8-round box magazine;

method of operation blowback, self-loading, double action;

weight 663 g;

maximum effective range 50 m; and

muzzle velocity 315 m/s.

F1 personnel hand-grenade

General features

The F1 grenade was introduced during World War II. It is a fragmentation grenade, with a cast-iron body patched into cubes on the outside surface like the American grenade (pineapple) or the British Mills 36 grenade. It suffers the same defects as the latter and produces a number of fragments from the base plug and filler that can be lethal up to 20 m, making it advisable for the thrower to throw the grenade from under cover. The F1 grenade is a common weapon among adversaries.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of the F1 are:

type: fragmentation;

weight: 600 g;

body material: cast iron;

filler material: TNT (Trinitrotoluene);

fuse delay: 3,2 to 4,2 seconds;

range thrown: 30 m;

effective fragment radius: 15 – 20 m; and

colour: olive green.

RPG-7 rocket launcher

The Russian infantry fought World War II with somewhat outmoded anti-tank weapons. They relied on a combination of high-powered grenades (which at best were suicidal weapons) and anti-tank rifles – the latter were extremely long and heavy weapons and therefore relatively immobile. It was not until some years after the war that the Soviet Union produced its first shoulder-controlled launcher, the RPG-2. It was a simple device and a reasonably effective weapon, its main disadvantage being its high trajectory, which limited its range to 100 m and made it hard to aim at moving vehicles.

Its penetrative power was said to be in the region of 178 mm through armour plate. This was adequate at the time, but later, when used by the Viet Cong against modern United States tanks, its shortcomings were obvious. It was later replaced by the RPG-7, which is a much superior weapon all round. The RPG-7 still consists of a basic tube open at both ends and it also fired a projectile, of which only the tail unit and its folding fins went into the launcher, the body remaining outside.

The RPG-7 is a relatively effective weapon for a 'stand-off' attack.

General features

The RPG-7 has a conical blast shield and much of it is covered by wood, which acts as a heat shield. It has a fixed battle-sight and is effective up to 500 m. Unlike the RPG-2, its rocket has a double method of launching, being launched by the normal propellant and then boosted by its own motor – this gives better velocity and consequently a low trajectory. Its penetration is said to be up to 320 mm through armour plate, which makes it a highly effective weapon. The projectile has an electric fuse and destroys itself automatically at 920 m from the muzzle – its sight can be illuminated for night use.

The RPM-7 is still in service in old Soviet Union and Soviet satellite countries, many of whom made their own versions. There is also a light version (RPG-7D) that can be divided in two for transportation. This version was used mainly by airborne troops of the Warsaw pact countries. Like many other Soviet weapons, the RPG-7 was widely distributed to a variety of guerrilla and subversive organisations. These weapons may often be seen on TV newsreels, slung casually over the operator's shoulder with the body of the rocket protruding from the top. A few appeared in Ulster in the hands of the IRA, but they do not seem to have been used with any great success against the British.

RGD-5 personnel hand-grenade

General features

The RGD-5 is an egg-shaped personnel fragmentation grenade, with a smooth exterior on the two-piece steel body and a serrated fragmentation liner. It is a compact, easily handled grenade that can be thrown slightly further than the earlier Soviet defence hand-grenades. The detonator assembly protrudes in the same way as the F1 grenade.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of the personnel hand-grenade are:

type: fragmentation;

weight: 310 g;

type of filter: TNT (Trinitrotoluene);

fuse delay: 3,2 to 4,2 seconds;

range thrown: 30 m;

effective fragment radius: 15 – 20 m; and

colour: olive green.

RG-42 Personnel Hand Grenade

General features

The RG-42 is a fragmentation concussion hand-grenade that was used in World War II and retained for some years in the Soviet Army as the hand-grenade type 42. It was taken up by all the Soviet satellite countries and used for several years. It has now been relegated to the various militia bodies of these countries.

The grenade body is a plain steel, light-gauge cylinder with no serration. It encloses a separate fragmentation sheet that is formed into a pre-grooved diamond-shaped pattern. The grenade is employed in much the same way as any other delay-fuse type and should be thrown from behind cover.

Basic characteristics

Basic characteristics of the RG-42 are:

type: fragmentation;

weight: 436 g;

body material: steel;

filler material: TNT (trinitrotoluene);

fuse delay: 3 – 4 seconds;

range thrown: 35 m;

effective fragment: 25 m;

radius: 25 metres; and

colour: olive green.

PMN personnel mine (black widow)

The Soviet PMN plastic mine is a World War II development that has been used in most countries to which the USSR gave military aid.

Both the Russian and Chinese models have been found in South Africa. This mine has caused many fatalities and serious injuries – hence its nickname, the black widow.

General features

The PMN is a delay-armed pressure-fitted mine designed for use against people. The mine case is a cylindrical casting of duro-plastic, similar to Bakelite in appearance. The two adapter plugs (initiator and firing assembly) are threaded through opposed holes in the rim of the mine. The underside of the case is reinforced with four equally spaced radial ribs. The pressure plate is a plastic disc, which is bonded to the underside of a moulded-sheet rubber cover. The edge of the cover is secured to the upper portion of the mine case by a metal band. The Russian PMN is either black or brown, whereas the Chinese model is olive green.

When a safety pin is withdrawn, there is a safety period of 15 – 20 minutes before the mine is armed. It takes 0,23 kg to actuate the mine, with severe results.

Basic characteristics

The basic characteristics of the black widow are:

weight: 600 g;

actuating pressure: 0,23 kg;

colour USSR: black or brown;

colour Chinese: olive green.



Self-assessment questions 13

1. Describe the chain reaction sequence of a bomb or explosive device.

2. Name the two basic categories of bombs:

3. A homemade bomb thrown by hand is called ____ .



Self-assessment answers 13

1. In this order, the chain reaction sequence is:

   ignition – initiation – detonation – explosion.

2. The two categories of bombs are military and home-made.

3. This is the *Molotov cocktail*.

CHAPTER 22: FIRE ARMS

Learning outcomes for Chapter 22

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

Identify the electronic devices in this chapter
Know what is needed in a ops room

The setting up of relevant equipment will be taught in your practical course with SABA.

You will not be installing with all the equipment in this chapter however you need to be able to identity

The devices.

UNIT STANDARD 10748 -- USE OF A HANDGUN

The unit standard appearing in this chapter for the purpose of the CPO-course is a copy of the Unit Standard 10748 and appears courtesy of the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).

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SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY

REGISTERED UNIT STANDARD:

Use of a handgun

SAQA US ID	UNIT STANDARD TITLE		
10748	Use of a handgun		
SGB NAME	**NSB**	**PROVIDER NAME**	
SGB Security	NSB 08-Law, Military Science and Security		
FIELD		**SUBFIELD**	
Law, Military Science and Security		Safety in Society	
ABET BAND	**UNIT STANDARD TYPE**	**NQF LEVEL**	**CREDITS**
Undefined	Regular	Level 4	10
REGISTRATION STATUS	**REGISTRATION START DATE**	**REGISTRATION END DATE**	**SAQA DECISION NUMBER**
Registered	2002-06-12	2005-06-12	SAQA 0742/02

PURPOSE OF THE UNIT STANDARD

This unit standard is for relevant persons to competently carry, handle, shoot and maintain a handgun through the application of knowledge of the relevant legislation and skills in the safe and responsible handling of a handgun.

This unit standard includes the requirements to gain the appropriate licence for the possession and/or carrying of handguns both private and for business purposes.

Benefit for society of this unit standard is that the person who completes this will contribute to safety in society.

A person credited with this unit standard will be able to:
- Understand the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use of a handgun
- Handle a handgun safely
- Operate, use and maintain a handgun
- Shoot a handgun competently.

LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE AND RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING

The following knowledge, skills, attitude and/or equivalent:
- A knowledge, comprehension and application of language at NQF 03.

UNIT STANDARD RANGE

This unit standard applies to persons competently carrying, handling, shooting and maintaining a handgun.

Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria:

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 1

Apply knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation required.

OUTCOME NOTES

Apply knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use of a handgun.

OUTCOME RANGE

The types of relevant legislation should include:
- Applicable sections of the Firearms Control Act 60/2000.
- Applicable section of the Criminal Procedures Act, 1977.
- Applicable section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993.
- Applicable sections of the Dangerous Weapons Act.
- Applicable sections of the SIRA Act 56/2001.
- Applicable sections of specific Acts relevant to unique job/workplace environments
- Private defence
- Moral & humanitarian considerations (proportionality)
- Continuum of force
- Vicarious liability
- Civil liability

Handgun should include:
- Semi automatic pistol and revolver

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1

1. The application of knowledge and understanding on the possession of a handgun is demonstrated in accordance with relevant legislation.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2

2. The application of knowledge and understanding on the use of a handgun is demonstrated in accordance with relevant legislation.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3

3. The requirements for possession of a handgun is demonstrated in accordance with relevant legislation.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4

4. The requirements for the use of a handgun is demonstrated in accordance with relevant legislation.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 5

5. Handgun and ammunition is kept according to operational procedures and legal requirements for safekeeping of firearms and ammunition.

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 2

Handle handguns safely.

OUTCOME RANGE

Standard safe handling procedures should include:
- Safe handling rules & Safety procedures/drills.
- Loading & unloading

- Handgun retention

Appropriate operational, specific tactical manner and in holsters should include:
- Types of holsters.
- Company policy/operational procedures
- Handgun conditions of readiness
- Handgun holster use
- Handgun carry methods

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1

1. Demonstrate and apply knowledge of safe handling of handguns in accordance with standard safe handling procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2

2. Safety of self and others ensured by handling and/or carrying handguns in appropriate operational, handgun specific tactical manner and in holsters that comply with legal requirements.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3

3. Safety of self and others ensured through proper retention of handgun in accordance with standard safe handling procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4

4. Ammunition carried is appropriate to handgun being handled and manufacturers specifications.

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 3

Operate, use and maintain handguns.

OUTCOME RANGE

Operated safely must include:

- Range safety
- Personal safety
- Public safety

Threat identification & analysis must include:

- Conditions of readiness
- Mental conditions
- Mindset
- Immediate surroundings
- Alertness
- Stress awareness
- Pre-emption & pre-visualisation

Manufacturers guidelines/operational procedures must include:
- Specific handgun (manufacturers) operating manual
- Names, parts & function of handgun
- Basic internal, external and terminal ballistics
- Components and functioning of handgun ammunition
- Disassembling and assembling of handgun
- Charge & emptying of magazine/cylinder
- Loading & unloading (range & operational)

Maintenance must include:
- Cleaning of handgun
- Cleaning equipment
- Care of handgun
- Care of ammunition

Visible faults must include:

- Fail to feed
- Fail to chamber
- Fail to fire
- Fail to extract
- Fail to eject
- Fail to cycle

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1

1. Handguns operated and used safely according to manufacturers guidelines, operational procedures and prevailing legislation.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2

2. Handgun used with specific attention to threat identification & analysis.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3

3. Safety of handgun and/or ammunition ensured by checking the handgun, ammunition and equipment on receipt and return to ensure they are in a safe and serviceable condition.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4

4. Demonstrate and apply maintenance procedures according to manufacturers specifications and safety procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 5

5. Visible faults identified and action taken according to operational procedures and prevailing legal requirements.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 6

6. Handgun and ammunition received, kept and issued in a clean and serviceable condition.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 7

7. Handguns and ammunition not in use transported & stored in a manner as required by prevailing legislation and employer requirements.

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 4

Shoot handgun competently.

OUTCOME RANGE

Malfunctions and immediate action drills must include:
- Firearm misfires
- Abuse
- Mechanical malfunction
- User malfunction
- Clearing of malfunction (range & operational)

Accurately must include:
- Accurate up to a minimum of 10 meters distance using all stances and light conditions.

Shooting range procedures must include:

- Range rules & safety
- Range commands
- Safety equipment

Handgun fired competently must include:
- Shooting fundamentals
- Fault analysis
- Low light shooting
- Cover (barricades) & concealment

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1

1. Handgun fired competently and accurately in accordance with current legal, operational and shooting range procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2

2. Handgun fired competently and accurately during low light situations, in accordance with current legal, operational and shooting range procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3

3. Handgun fired competently and accurately in accordance with current legal, operational and shooting range procedures whilst making use of a barricade/cover.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4

4. Malfunction and immediate action drills identified and corrected in accordance with standard safety procedures and in line with operational conditions.

UNIT STANDARD ACCREDITATION AND MODERATION OPTIONS

1. Anyone assessing a learner or moderating the assessment of a learner against this unit standard must be registered as an assessor with the POSLEC SETA ETQA/and any other body with whom a MOU was entered into.
2. Any institution offering learning that will enable achievement of this unit standard must be accredited as a provider through the POSLEC SETA ETQA by SAQA/and any other body with whom a MOU was entered into.

3. The POSLEC SETA ETQA/and any other body with whom a MOU was entered into will oversee assessment and moderation of assessment according to the moderation guidelines in the relevant competency and the POSLEC SETA ETQA/ and any other body with whom a MOU was entered into.

UNIT STANDARD ESSENTIAL EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE

Refer to the Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria and the Range of variables contained in this unit standard and specifically to:

- A comprehensive understanding of the relevant legislation, licensing requirements and procedures and practices.
- A comprehensive understanding of discretion in the use of firearms
- A comprehensive understanding of the operation & mechanics of handguns
- A broad understanding of ammunition and ballistics
- A broad understanding of shooting range procedures
- A comprehensive understanding of Guidelines for the safe use and handling of handguns
- A comprehensive understanding of Fundamentals of shooting a handgun.

Critical Cross-field Outcomes (CCFO):

UNIT STANDARD CCFO IDENTIFYING

Identify and solve problems related to the achievement of relevant legislative competencies.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO ORGANIZING

Organise oneself and one`s activities so that all requirements are met in achieving competence in lawfully possessing and using a handgun.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO COLLECTING

Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information related to the relevant legislation so that these are accurately interpreted into application performance standards.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO DEMONSTRATING

Understand the world as a set of related systems in that legislative requirements are interrelated with the overall safe and lawful possession and use of a handgun.

UNIT STANDARD NOTES

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS:

Specified requirements include legal and legislative specific requirements and are:

LEGAL
- Applicable sections of the Firearms Control Act 60/2000.
- Applicable section of the Criminal Procedures Act, 1977.
- Applicable section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993.
- Applicable sections of the Dangerous Weapons Act.
- Applicable sections of the SIRA Act 56/2001.
- Applicable sections of specific Acts relevant to unique job/workplace environments
- Private defence
- Moral & humanitarian considerations (proportionality)
- Constitution
- Continuum of force
- Vicarious liability
- Civil liability

CONTEXT SPECIFIC
- Training provider user manuals
- Specifications, company operational agreements and policies and procedures

Resources required for Assessment
- Relevant shooting range.
- Shooting exercise order.
- Tools, equipment and materials for range set up.
- Drill rounds and replica firearms
- Relevant handguns, magazines/speed loaders and ammunition.
- Holsters and magazine/speed loader pouches.
- Firearm cleaning equipment
- Safety equipment and protective uniform/clothes
- Communications equipment.
- Necessary administrative and stationary issue.
- First aid/fire fighting equipment.
- Criterion referenced assessment instructions/tools.
- Relevant shooting range standing orders.
- A suitable venue: either in the workplace or classroom.

SPECIAL NOTES WITH REFERENCE TO LEARNING HOURS REQUIRED WHEN LEARNING TOWARDS A COMBINATION OF UNIT STANDARDS:

Should a learner attempt the unit standard: Use of a handgun in combination with the three other unit standards namely, use of a shotgun/hand machine carbine/rifle the total hours required by the learner to achieve the required outcomes of all four standards (in combination) would be: 190 hours. The rational for shortening the total learning hours by more than half is that similar knowledge and skills are present in some of the specific outcomes and assessment criteria.

Such similarities is evident in outcomes such as the application of knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use of a shotgun/handgun/hand machine carbine/rifle and in the assessment criteria: demonstrate and apply knowledge of safe handling of a shotgun/handgun/hand machine carbine/rifle in accordance with standard safe handling procedures of specific outcome: handle handguns safely.

Finally, the learning hours required, combination should be as follows:

Learning towards first unit standard: 100 notional training hours.
Additional learning towards any one of the three remaining unit standards: 30 notional training hours.

Example:

First unit:
Unit Standard No. 10748: Use of a handgun. 100 notional training hours.

Combined with:
Unit Standard No. 10754: Use of a shotgun. 30 notional training hours and/or;
Unit Standard No. 10756: Use of a hand machine carbine. 30 notional training hours and/or;
Unit Standard No. 10750: Use of a rifle. 30 notional training hours.

When standards are attempted as a combination total notional training hours required for all four standards should be 190 notional training hours.

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CHAPTER 16: MAP READING



Learning outcomes for Chapter 16

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

use a map to orientate yourself;

describe and use various methods to orientate yourself; and

categorise various maps.

Purpose of map reading

As a CPO you should be able to orientate yourself on a map, plot your destination, and choose the best and shortest routes to and from a specific destination. You should also be able to identify hospitals, police stations and fire stations on the map, as they may be of use in emergency situations. In this chapter we'll discuss map reading under the following headings:

types of maps; and

orientation, using a map and other methods.

Types of maps

There are five basic types of maps that may be of use to the CPO:

Maps in a world or regional atlas. These usually contain maps showing large areas of the earth. Each map covers continents or large parts of continents.

Topographical maps. You can use these maps for map reading. They indicate various physical characteristics of areas of land, such as valleys, mountains and rivers. They are usually on a scale of 1:50 000, which makes them relatively large-scale maps. (The larger the scale of maps, the smaller the area they cover, so the greater the detail they can show.)

Road and city maps. You would use these maps in urban areas or to find routes between cities, towns or villages. These maps indicate routes that combine cities and towns, and also show more specific road networks within cities.

Plans. Together with road and city maps, you should be able to read and orientate yourself on detailed plans of specific areas in a city, or on plans of buildings.

If you don't already have examples of these maps, browse through them at your local library. Now we'll look at how you can orientate yourself on a map.

Orientation using a map and other methods

First we'll discuss how you can orientate yourself (find your position) and navigate (find your way) using a map. Then we'll look at other ways to orientate yourself, and give some pointers for reading city maps. Finally we'll discuss how to work out distance on the ground once you know the scale of a map.

Finding your way using a map

It is important to know that on a map north will always be at the top, south at the bottom, west on the left and east on the right. Then you can proceed as follows:

Orientate yourself accordingly to the map and the surrounding area so that north on the map corresponds with a northerly direction on land. (Hold the map so that the top of the map faces real north.)

Use identifiable landmarks or natural signposts to orientate yourself on the map. Then hold the map in the right direction. Now you can start to find your way.

For example, compare the map with the surrounding area and look for an easy identifiable landmark, such as a church steeple, a golf course, a dam or a mountain. Observe whether it lies in front of you, to your right or left, or behind you. Now turn the map as to match what you see around you.

Taking three or more landmarks, draw imaginary or pencil lines towards you on the map, in order to determine your exact location.

Other ways of finding direction

Using the sun

Finding north by looking at the sun

You can also find the approximate direction of north by looking at the sun:

in the early morning, the sun rises in the east;

at noon, the sun will be roughly overhead and due north (in the Southern Hemisphere); and

in the late afternoon, the sun sets in the west.

Finding east and west with a stick on bare ground in the sunlight

You can also make use of the stick method to determine direction:

Place a 1 m stick upright on a piece of flat, clear ground.

Mark the tip of the shadow formed by the stick on the ground.

Wait 15 minutes.

Mark the tip of the shadow again.

Join the two marks. The resulting line will be an east-west line, with the first mark indicating west.

North and south will be at right angles to the line.

Finding direction by means of a watch in the sunlight

You can also find direction using a watch, as follows:

Use a traditional analogue watch (one with a face that shows the numbers 1 to 12 in a circle, a minute hand and a shorter hour hand).

Make sure that your watch is set to true local time.

Keep your watch in a horizontal position and aim the figure 12 directly towards the sun.

The north-south line will run from the mid-point between the 12 and the hour hand of the watch.

The nearer you are to the equator, the less accurate this method is.

Orientation at night

You can use the Southern Cross, a constellation of stars shaped like a cross, to find south at night.

You will find the cross if you look up in a southerly direction at our night skies. Two cross-shaped constellations are visible at night. The Southern Cross is the smaller, less bright one, and lies next to a dark patch in the Milky Way. After you have located the cross, you will see that it appears to have a top end and a bottom end, and two stars known as the 'pointers' point towards the cross.

From the 'long' end of the cross, extend an imaginary line four-and-a-half times the length of the cross into space, and then drop your eye vertically to the horizon – where your imaginary vertical line hits the horizon will be south.

Using a road map to navigate a route

All the different types of roads in an area should be clearly indicated on a road map, and explained in a key to the map or an explanation legend column. Make sure you understand the key, and know which roads are national freeways, main roads and so on.

All national freeways and main routes are identified by a number, such as the N1 (the freeway from Cape Town to Johannesburg). Your map will show the road number next to each road. It will also name all city streets.

Steps for reaching a specific destination using a road map

Use your road maps correctly, and follow these steps to reach a destination:

Identify your destination.

Orientate yourself towards the direction of the destination.

Identify the direction in which you will have to travel.

Identify the most suitable route.

Determine the distance you will have to travel.

Plan your route properly.

Steps for reaching a specific destination using a city map

All the names of the streets and suburbs in the city are usually listed, in alphabetical order, at the back of a road atlas. Follow these steps to reach a destination in a city:

Step 1. Search for the street names, which will be listed alphabetically.

Step 2. In the second column of the index, the suburb will be indicated, for example, Church Street, Pretoria, Central.

Step 3. The relevant page number will be indicated, for example, p22.

Step 4. The exact position of the street will be indicated in a location block, for example D9.

Step 5. Turn to the relevant page.

Step 6. The page will be divided into zones, marked horizontally and vertically by letters and numbers at the top and sides of the page, for example, D9.

Scale of the map and distance on the ground

Before you begin to orientate yourself, you must look at the scale the map has been drawn to. The scale is usually 1:50 000 or 1:400 000, which means
1 cm:0,5 km (a large-scale map) or 1 cm:4 km (a small-scale map).

You can estimate distance on the map accordingly. You can also measure your route on the map with a piece of string. Start at one end of the piece of string and mark off on the string the point at which your route ends. Then convert this length to distance on the ground, with reference to the scale of the map. As we've seen, when the scale of the map is 1:50 000, then 1 cm of string is roughly ½ km on the ground. If your route measures 5 cm on the string, for example, then it will be 5 x ½ = 2½ km on the ground.

There is an easier and quicker method – topographical and road atlases usually contain a distance table for major routes, and show the distance between points at specific intervals along the route.

Summary

Practise your new orientation skills before moving on to 'Self-defence'. Test your knowledge of this chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.

Self-assessment questions 7

1. Name three types of maps.

2. The sun rises in an _____ direction. It sets in a _____ direction.

3. Describe a way to orientate yourself in sunlight, and a way to orientate yourself by looking at the stars.

Self-assessment answers 7

1. Types of maps that may be of use to the CPO include the following (give any three):maps in a world or regional atlas; topographical maps; road maps and city maps; and plans.

2. The sun rises in an *easterly* direction. It sets in a *westerly* direction.

3. *Using the sun to orientate yourself:*

   You can find the approximate direction of north by looking at the sun:

   in the early morning, the sun rises in the east;

   at noon, the sun will be roughly overhead and due north; and

   in the late afternoon, the sun sets in the west.

   You can make use of the stick method to determine direction:

   Place a 1 m stick upright on a piece of flat, clear ground.

   Mark the tip of the shadow formed by the stick on the ground.

   Wait 15 minutes.

   Mark the tip of the shadow again.

   Join the two marks. The resulting line will be an east-west line, with the first mark indicating west.

   North and south will be at right angles to the line.

   You can also find direction using a watch, as follows:

   - Use a traditional analogue watch
   - Make sure that your watch is set to true local time.
   - Keep your watch in a horizontal position and aim the figure 12 directly towards the sun.
   - The north-south line will run from the mid-point between the 12 and the hour hand of the watch.

   Using the stars to orientate yourself in the Southern hemisphere:

   From the 'long' end of the Southern cross, extend an imaginary line four-and-a-half times the length of the cross into space, and then drop it vertically to the horizon – this will be roughly south.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Legalities of self-defence'.

CHAPTER 15: LEGALITIES OF SELF-DEFENCE



Learning outcomes for Chapter 15

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

explain what constitutes private defence and necessity; and

differentiate between private defence and necessity.

Any physical, close-quarter combat (CQC) that you engage in as a CPO will be captured on video. You must therefore be careful that you always act within the law, and that you don't commit a crime when acting in self-defence. In this chapter we'll outline the legal limits of private defence and necessity, and describe the difference between private defence and necessity under the law.

Before we begin, note that *unlawful* conduct means *unjustified* conduct. Illegal conduct, by contrast, is any conduct that is against the law.

Requirements for a valid act of private defence (self-defence)

The requirements for a valid act of private defence (self-defence) are as follows:

There must be an *unlawful* attack, or such an attack must be imminent. (The attack must be either in process or immediately imminent.)

You must act to protect your life, bodily integrity or property, or that of someone else *if* that person wants your help. The action must be necessary for the protection of these rights and interests.

Your defence must be aimed at the *attacker*.

The act of defence must not be more harmful than is necessary to defend yourself from the attack. The degree of force or violence you use must, therefore, be *reasonable*.

Putative self-defence

When you believe that you are in danger, you may harm your alleged attacker, believing that you are acting in self-defence. Viewed objectively, later, it may become clear that there was *no* danger. In this case, there will have been no grounds for self-defence. Your actions will therefore have been unlawful.

However, you will not be guilty of a crime, because you honestly thought that you were acting lawfully. Being aware of the unlawfulness of your actions is an essential requirement for *intention*, one of the basic elements of a crime.

You can then plead putative self-defence in a court of law.

Necessity

You will act out of *necessity* if you protect yourself, or a recognised legal interest, against imminent danger by committing an offence. For example, if you break the speed limit while rushing to the aid of a wounded principal or colleague, you may raise the defence of necessity in a court of law.

You may rely on necessity as grounds for defence if your act:

infringes on the interests of an innocent third party, *or*

contravenes a rule of law,

and is directed at the protection of:

your own or another's interests, *or*

the interests of the innocent third party himself or herself,

against an emergency that has commenced or is imminent (and that is *not* an attack by a person whose own interests may be infringed in the process).

Difference between private defence and necessity

Private defence differs from necessity in the following ways:

In private defence, the defensive action is directed against the *attacker*. In the case of necessity it is directed against the interests of an innocent third party, or amounts to a contravention of a legal rule without causing damage to any specific person.

In private defence, you will have acted against an *unlawful attack by a human being*. In the case of necessity, you will have acted against a danger or threat of danger, which may have been of *any* origin.

If the interests of an innocent third party are infringed during the performance of an act in necessity, the court will weight the interests protected against the interests damaged far more cautiously than where private defence is at stake.

In the case of necessity, we are dealing with an infringement of the interests of an innocent third party or the contravention of a legal rule, and *not* with the warding off of an unlawful attack, so the defensive action must not only be reasonable, but must be the *only* reasonable way out.

In the case of private defence the attacker may be have been killed should circumstances have been thought to warrant it. In the case of necessity the position is not altogether clear. In the past, our courts have found that if someone is under serious duress and his or her life is endangered, he or she may kill an innocent third party to escape death himself or herself (*S vs. Goliath* 1972 (3) SA 1 (A)).

The essentials of a plea of necessity

The essentials of a plea of necessity are as follows:

The accused must have found himself or herself in an actual emergency. Alternatively, he or she must have found himself or herself in an emergency, viewed objectively.

The evil must have begun or be imminent.

Not only will a menace to life and limb sustain a plea of necessity, but a menace to any other lawful interest will also do so.

A person can also act in necessity to protect another person's interests.

To escape the emergency someone may violate any interest of a third party or contravene any legal rule.

Where a person is legally compelled to undergo the evil, the defence of necessity cannot be raised.

The defence will be sustained only if the person could not escape in any other manner.

A person acting in necessity may cause more harm that is necessary to escape the evil.

As a general rule, the interests sacrificed should not be of a greater value than those saved.

Summary

In this chapter we've outlined the grounds on which you could claim private defence or necessity. If you are in any doubt about your rights under the law, please feel free to contact your tutor.

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – 'Radio communication'.

DANGEROUS WEAPONS ACT NO 71 OF 1968

Introduction

The purpose of this Act is to provide for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession, manufacture, sale or supply of certain objects; to provide for the imposition of prescribed sentences where dangerous weapons of firearms have been used in the commission of offences involving violence.

Important Sections of this Act

Section 1: Definitions

In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates:

'dangerous weapon' means any object, other than a firearm, which is likely to cause serious bodily injury if it were used to commit an assault.

Commentary on Section 1

An object qualifies as a dangerous weapon not so much by its physical nature but according to the intent and purpose with which it is employed. The concept is wide enough to embrace any object of whatsoever character or shape, which can cause bodily harm to a human being (Milton and Fuller, *SA Criminal Law and Procedure).*

Section 2

This section deals with the prohibition of the possession of dangerous weapons, firearms and certain other objects.

1. Any person who is in possession of any dangerous weapon, or of any object which so resembles a firearm that, under circumstances such as those under which such person is in possession thereof, it is likely to be mistaken for a real firearm, shall be guilty of an offence, unless he is able to prove that he at not time had any intention of using such weapon or object for any unlawful purpose, and shall on conviction be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for period not exceeding two years.
   [Subsection (1) substituted by Section 2 of Act No. 156 of 1993.]

2. The Minister may from time to time by notice in the Gazette and subject to such terms, conditions, restrictions, directions or exemptions as may be specified in such notice or as may be provided for therein, prohibit any person or any person belonging to any class of persons specified in such notice, from being in possession at any time or during any period so specified and either generally or at or in any place or area so specified or at a specified gathering or at a specified gathering belonging to a class, type, kind or category of object which, in the opinion of the Minister, is a dangerous weapon and which is specified in such notice.

3. The Minister may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, from time to time by notice in the Gazette and subject to such terms, conditions, restrictions, directions or exemptions as may be specified in such notice or as may be provided for therein, prohibit any person or any person belonging to any class of persons specified in such notice, from being in possession at any time during any period so specified and either generally or at or in any place or area so specified or at a specified gathering or at any gathering belonging to any class specified in such notice, of any firearm, or a replica thereof in general or any firearm, or a replica thereof, belonging to a class, type, kind or category specified in such notice.

4. Any person who is in possession of any object, firearm or replica of a firearm in contravention of the provisions of any notice issued in terms of subsection (2) or (3), shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties prescribed in subsection (1).

5. The Minister may at any time by notice in the Gazette amend or repeal any notice issued in terms of subsection (2) or (3).
[Section 2 substituted by Section 2 of Act No. 29 of 1990.]

Explanation of Section 2

The State must prove:

i. possession,
ii. of a dangerous weapon;
iii. with *mens rea* (guilty intent). (Milton and Fuller, *SA Criminal Law and Procedure.*)

The Act does not define possession. Thus a physical detention as well as a mental intent to possess must be proved.

The guilty intent (*mens rea*) required is that the accused knew or must have known that he possessed a dangerous weapon. He must have been aware that he had an object which was a dangerous weapon.

Milton and Fuller, *SA Criminal Law and Procedure*, state that the defence in Section 2 (1) that the accused did not intend to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose is a special defence which is available to the accused after the State has proved the elements of the offence.

Other classes of objects may be prohibited generally or at a specific place or gathering by the Minister. Objects resembling firearms may also be prohibited by the Minister.

ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 29 OF 1989

Introduction

This Act consolidates and amends the laws relating to motor vehicles and other vehicles, and it regulates traffic on public roads. The Act also provides for other incidental matters.

Important Sections of the Act

Section 1

This section is the definition section. Here we will only deal with the following:

1. Driver
2. Motor vehicle
3. Public road
4. Operate on a public road
5. Pedestrian crossing

1. 'Driver' means any person who drives or attempts to drive any vehicle or who rides or attempts to ride any pedal cycle or who guides any draught, pack or saddle animal or herd or flock of animals, and 'drive' or any like word has a corresponding meaning.

Explanation of Section

A person who drives the vehicle is the person who is in control of the movements of the vehicle and who by means of the steering or operating mechanisms directs the movements thereof.

The fact that the vehicle proceeds by force of gravity or manpower and not on its own power, or that the motor is not switched on is irrelevant. See *S vs. Rooyen* 1968.

Section 1 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act No. 56 of 1972 reads:

> 'for the purposes of this Act a motor vehicle which is being propelled by any mechanical, animal or human power or by gravity or momentum shall be deemed to be driven by the person in control of the vehicle. Assuming that the word "control" means more than mere possession, it is "not synonymous with physical and continued regulation of the movement of a vehicle".'

2. 'Motor Vehicle' means any self-propelled vehicle and includes:

   (a) a trailer; and

   (b) a vehicle having pedals and an engine or an electric motor as an integral part thereof or attached thereto and which is designed or adapted to be propelled by means of such pedals, engine or motor or both such pedals and engine or motor, but does not include:

      i. any vehicle propelled by electrical power derived from storage batteries and which is pedestrian controlled; or

      ii. any vehicle with a mass of not more than 230 kg, and specially designed and constructed, and not merely adapted, for the use of any person suffering from such physical defect or disability and used solely by such person.

In *S vs. Maharaj* 1970, the accused was charged with failing to register and licence a motor vehicle of which he was the owner. Evidence showed that he had purchased a dismantled bus which had no engine, gearbox or seats. The court held that it has not been proved that he accused was the owner of a *motor vehicle*, and thus the court allowed the appeal.

3. 'Public Road' means any road, street thoroughfare or, except for the purposes of Section 8, any other place (whether a thoroughfare or not), which is commonly used by the public or any section thereof or to which the public or any section thereof has a right of access, and includes:

   (a) the verge of any such road, street or thoroughfare;

   (b) any bridge, ferry, ford or drift traversed by any such road, street or thoroughfare, and

   (c) any other work or thing forming part of or connected with or belonging to such road, street or thoroughfare.

Explanation of Section

In *S vs. Smith* 1968 the accused was charged with driving under the influence of liquor. The court held that it was sufficient proof that a road was a public road where it was proved that the road was a highway leading from one village to another, and furthermore one which all the people use.

In another case a person was charged with reckless driving of a motor vehicle on a public road. The offence took place upon a stretch of sandy beach close to

where a lagoon entered the sea. A tarred public road gave access to this area and the sand was sufficiently hard and firm to permit the driving of a motor vehicle thereon. Part of the area was private property but there was nothing to indicate that the public had restricted access. The court held that the area where the offence occurred formed part of a public road.

'Verge' means that portion of a road, street or thoroughfare which is not the roadway or the shoulder.

'Shoulder' means that portion of a road, street or thoroughfare between the edge of the roadway and the kerb line.

'Bridge' includes a culvert and a causeway.

4. 'Operate on a public road' or any similar expression, in relation to a vehicle, means to use or drive a vehicle or to permit a vehicle to be used or driven on a public road, or to have a vehicle or to permit a vehicle to be on a public road.

Explanation of Section

'Vehicle' means a device designed or adapted principally to travel on wheels or crawler tracks and includes such a device which is connected with a draw-bar to a breakdown vehicle and is used as part of the towing equipment of a breakdown vehicle to support any axle or all the axles of a motor vehicle which is being salvaged other than such a device which moves exclusively on rails.

A bicycle will also be regarded as a vehicle for purposes of this definition – *S vs. Keyser* 1971.

Section 18: Disqualification from obtaining or holding learner's or driver's licence

1. A person shall be disqualified from obtaining or holding a learner's or driver's licence:

   (a) if he:

      i. in the case of any licence for a motor cycle, motor tricycle or motor quadrucycle having an engine with a cylinder capacity not exceeding 125 cubic centimetres or which is propelled by electrical power or which is a vehicle as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of 'motor vehicle', is under the age of 16 years;
      [Subparagraph (i) substituted by Section 13 of Act No. 16 of 1955.]

      ii. in the case of a learner's licence for a light motor vehicle, being a motor vehicle not of a class as referred to in subparagraph (i) and the tare of which does not exceed 3 500 kilograms or, where such motor vehicle is:

         (aa) a bus or goods vehicle, the gross vehicle mass of which does not exceed 3 500 kilograms;

(bb) an articulated motor vehicle, the gross combination mass of which does not exceed 3 500 kilograms;

is under the age of 17 years; or

iii. in the case of any other licence, is under the age of 18 years;

(b) during any period in respect of which he has been declared by a competent authority to be disqualified from obtaining or holding a licence to drive a motor vehicle, while such disqualification remains in force;

(c) where a licence to drive a motor vehicle held by him has been suspended by a competent authority, while such suspension remains in force;

(d) where a licence to drive a motor vehicle held by him has been cancelled by a competent authority, while such cancellation remains in force;

(e) if such licence relates to a class of motor vehicle which he may already drive under a licence held by him;

(f) if he is suffering from one or other of the following diseases or disabilities:

i. uncontrolled epilepsy;

ii. sudden attacks of disabling giddiness or fainting due to hypertension or any other cause;

iii. any form of mental illness to such an extent that it is necessary that he be detained, supervised, controlled and treated as a patient in terms of the Mental Health Act 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973);

iv. any condition causing muscular in co-ordination;

v. uncontrolled *diabetes mellitus*;

vi. defective vision ascertained in accordance with a prescribed standard;

vii. any other disease or physical defect which is likely to render him incapable of effectively driving and controlling a motor vehicle of the class to which such licence relates without endangering the safety of the public; provided that deafness shall not of itself he deemed to be such a defect;

(g) if he is addicted to the use of any drug having a narcotic effect or the excessive use of intoxicating liquor; or

(h) in such other circumstances as may be described, either generally or in respect of a particular class of learner's or driver's licence.

2. Any Administrator may, if he deems it expedient and on such conditions as he may deem fit, declare that any person shall no longer be subject to any disqualification, suspension or cancellation referred to in subsection (1) (*b*), (*c*) or (*d*), respectively.

Explanation of Section 18

This section lists the persons who are disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver's licence.

1. A person has to be at least 16 years old to obtain a licence for a motor cycle, motor tricycle or motor quadrucycle having not more than 125 cc engine capacity.

2. A person has to be at least 17 years old to obtain a learner's licence for a light motor vehicle; in other cases at least 18 years.

3. If a person has been declared by a *competent authority* to be disqualified, such disqualification remains. Competent authority would be, for instance, a court.

4. If his or her driver's licence has been suspended by a competent authority, that person cannot obtain a driver's licence while such suspension remains in force.

5. If his or her driver's licence has been cancelled by a competent authority, that person cannot obtain a driver's licence.

6. A person cannot obtain a licence which relates to a class of vehicle which he may already drive under a licence held by him.

7. If a person suffers from any of the illnesses listed in Section 18 (1) (*f*), he or she cannot obtain a driver's licence.

8. It is interesting to note that a person addicted to drugs or liquor is disqualified from holding a driver's licence (Section 18 (1) (*g*)).

9. The reference to the Administrator in Section 18 (2) should be read as a reference to the premier of the province.

Section 55

A court may issue order for suspension or cancellation of licence or permit or disqualify person from obtaining licence or permit

1. A court convicting a person of an offence under this Act, or of an offence at common law, relating to the driving of a motor vehicle or a failure to stop after or report an accident, may, in addition to imposing a sentence, issue an order, if the person convicted is:

   (a) the holder of a licence, that particulars of the conviction, sentence and any other order of the court consequent thereupon be endorsed on such licence, and the registrar or clerk of such court concerned shall endorse such licence accordingly;

(b) the holder of a licence or of a licence and permit, that such licence or licence and permit be suspended for such period as the court may deem fit or that such licence or licence and permit be cancelled, and any such order shall be endorsed on such licence as provided for in paragraph (a);

(c) the holder of a licence, or of a licence and permit, that such licence or permit be cancelled, and that the person convicted be disqualified from obtaining a licence, or a licence and permit, for any class of motor vehicle for such period as the court may deem fit, and such order shall be endorsed on the licence as provided in paragraph (a); or

(d) not the holder of a licence, or of a licence and permit, declaring him to be disqualified from obtaining a licence, or a licence and permit, either indefinitely or for such period as the court may deem fit.

2. The making of an endorsement in terms of subsection (1) may be postponed by the court issuing the order until any appeal against the conviction or sentence or both has been disposed of.

Explanation of Section 55

This section provides for the suspension or cancellation of a licence. The effect is that a person is disqualified from obtaining a licence. The provisions of Section 55 apply in addition to any sentence imposed by the court.

Section 86: Certain drivers may exceed general speed limit

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 85, the driver of a fire-fighting vehicle, a rescue vehicle or an ambulance who drives such vehicle in the execution of his duties, a traffic officer who drives a vehicle in execution of his duties, or any person driving a vehicle while engaged in civil protection as contemplated in an ordinance made in terms of Section 3 of the Civil Protection Act 1977 (Act No. 67 of 1977), may exceed the applicable general speed limit: provided that:

(a) he shall drive the vehicle concerned with due regard to the safety of other traffic; and

(b) in the case of a fire-fighting vehicle, a rescue vehicle, an ambulance or a vehicle driven by a person while he is engaged in civil protection as aforesaid, such vehicle shall be fitted with a device capable of emitting a prescribed sound, or with a bell, and with an identification lamp, as prescribed, and such device or bell shall be constantly sounded and such lamp shall be in operation while the vehicle is driven in excess of the applicable general speed limit.

Explanation of section 86

The driver of an ambulance, a fire-fighting vehicle, and a rescue vehicle may, in the execution of his or her duties, exceed the speed limit. The provisos are that the vehicle must be driven with due regard to the safety of other traffic and that there must be a warning signal or lamp.

An ambulance is defined in Section 1 as a motor vehicle specially constructed or adapted for the purpose of conveying sick or injured persons to or from a place for medical treatment and which is registered as an ambulance.

A fire-fighting vehicle is defined in Section 1 as a motor vehicle designed or adapted solely or principally for fighting fires and which is registered as a fire-fighting vehicle.

A rescue vehicle is defined in Section 1 as a motor vehicle designed or adapted solely for the purpose of rescuing persons, and which is owned or controlled by a department of State, local authority or a body of persons approved by the premier of the province and is registered as a rescue vehicle.

A driver of such vehicle will be convicted of negligent driving if he or she does not have due regard to the safety of other traffic.

Section 97: Stopping of vehicles

Except in order to avoid an accident, or in compliance with a road traffic sign or with a direction given by a traffic officer, or for any cause beyond the control of the driver, no person shall stop a vehicle on the roadway of a public road:

(a) alongside or opposite an excavation or obstruction on the public road if other traffic would be obstructed or endangered by such stopping;

(b) within any tunnel or subway or on any bridge or within six meters of any tunnel, subway of bridge;

(c) on, or within six metres from the beginning or end of, any part of such roadway where the normal width thereof has for any reason been constricted;

(d) in contravention of any road traffic sign;

(e) on the right-hand side of such roadway facing oncoming traffic;

(f) alongside or opposite any other vehicle on such roadway, where such roadway is less than nine metres wide;

(g) within the railway reserve at a level crossing;

(h) within nine metres of his approaching side of a pedestrian crossing demarcated by appropriate road traffic signs; or

(i) in any other place where the stopping of a vehicle would or would be likely to constitute a danger or an obstruction to other traffic.

Explanation of Section 97

A vehicle may not be stopped on the roadway at the places mentioned in (a) to (i). Roadway is defined in Section 1 as the portion of a road, street or thoroughfare improved, constructed or intended for vehicular traffic, which is between the edges of the roadway.

Section 101: General duties of driver of passenger of vehicle on public road

1. No person driving or having a vehicle on a public road shall:

   (a) cause such vehicle to travel backwards unless it can be done in safety, and may cause it to run backwards for a distance or time longer than may be necessary for the safety or reasonable convenience of any occupant of that vehicle or of other traffic on such road;

   (b) follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent having regard to the speed of such other vehicle and the traffic on and the condition of the roadway, or more closely than is prescribed;

   (c) permit any person, animal or object to occupy any position in or on such vehicle which may prevent the driver thereof from exercising complete control over the movement of the vehicle or signalling his intention of stopping, slowing down or changing direction;

   (d) when driving such vehicle, permit any person to take hold of or interfere with the steering or operating mechanism of the vehicle;

   (e) when driving such vehicle, occupy such position that he does not have complete control over the vehicle or does not have a full view of the roadway and the traffic ahead of such vehicle;

   (f) allow the vehicle to remain unattended on such road without so setting its brake or adopting such other method as will effectively prevent the vehicle from moving from the position in which it is left;

   (g) if such vehicle is parked or is stationary at the side of such road, drive the vehicle from that position unless he is able to do so without interfering with moving traffic approaching from any direction and with safety to himself or others;

   (h) fail to give an immediate and absolute right of way to a vehicle sounding a device or bell in terms of Section 84 (3) or 86;

   (i) allow any portions of his body to protrude beyond such vehicle while it is in motion on such road except for the purposes of giving any hand signal which he is required or authorised to give in terms of this Act or unless he is engaged in examining or testing or parking such vehicle;

   (j) permit any person or animal to occupy the roof, any step or running board or any other place on top of a vehicle while such vehicle is in motion;

   (k) cause or allow the engine thereof to run in such manner that it emits smoke or fumes which would not be emitted if the engine were in good condition or ran in an efficient manner;

(l) cause or allow the engine thereof to run while the motor vehicle is stationary or unattended;

(m) negligently or wilfully deposit or cause or permit to be deposited any petrol or other liquid or any oil or grease or other flammable or offensive matter, ashes or other refuse, of whatever nature, from such vehicle upon or alongside such road; or

(n) cause or allow the engine thereof to run while petrol or other flammable fuel is being delivered into the fuel tank of such vehicle, or cause or allow such engine to be started up before the delivery of the petrol or other flammable fuel into the fuel tank of such vehicle has been completed and the cover of such fuel tank has been replaced.

1. No person, other than the driver, shall take hold of or interfere with the steering or operating mechanism of a vehicle while it is in motion on a public road, unless it may reasonably be inferred that the driver is no longer capable of steering or controlling such vehicle.

2. No passenger in a vehicle on a public road shall permit any part of his body to protrude beyond such vehicle.

3. No person shall enter or alight from any vehicle on a public road unless such vehicle is stationary and unless he can do so with safety to himself and other users of the road.

4. No person shall drive, pull or push a vehicle upon a sidewalk: provided that the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to a perambulator, invalid chair, baby cart or child's play vehicle.

Explanation of Section 101

It is important to note that these duties apply not only to drivers, but also to passengers.

In terms of Section 101 (2) another person than the driver may only take hold of or interfere with the steering wheel when it may reasonably be inferred that the driver is no longer capable of steering or controlling the vehicle. This would for instance be the case where the driver suffers a heart attack.

A passenger may not put his arm or leg out of the window of a motor vehicle (Section 101 (3)). A person getting out of or into a vehicle on a public road must ensure that it is safe to do so (Section 101 (4)). A motor vehicle may not be driven, pulled or pushed on a sidewalk (Section 101 (5)). The sidewalk is that portion of the verge intended for the exclusive use of pedestrians. The verge is that portion of a road, street or thoroughfare between the edge of the roadway and the kerbline.

Section 107: Animals on public road

1. Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), no person shall leave or allow any bovine animal, horse, ass, mule, sheep, goat, pig or ostrich to be on any section of a public road where that section is fenced or in any other manner closed along both sides, and no person shall leave such animal

in a place from where it may stray onto such section of a public road.

2. The provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply:

   (a) to any animal which is being ridden or is being used to draw a vehicle along a public road; or

   (b) to any animal which is being driven from one place to another in such manner as not to constitute a source of danger or injury to any person or vehicle using such road.

3. In any prosecution for a contravention of subsection (1), it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any animal referred to in subsection (1) was left or allowed to be on the section of the public road or place concerned by the owner of such animal, and a section of a public road shall be regarded as fenced or enclosed along both sides even though there is an opening providing access to such road in the fence or other enclosure.

4. No person shall drive any animal referred to in subsection (1):

   (a) along a public road during the period from sunset to sunrise, unless a person carrying a red light visible in clear weather for a distance of at least 150 metres tends such an animal or, in the case of a flock or herd of more than 10 animals, a person tending such animals and carrying a light as aforesaid follows such animals; or

   (b) along a public road during any other period, unless a person displaying in a conspicuous manner a red cloth, of not less than 300 millimetres by 300 millimetres, tends such animal or in the case of a flock or herd of more than 10 animals, a person tending such animals and displaying a cloth as aforesaid precedes and another such person displaying a cloth as aforesaid follows such animals.

5. A person in charge of an animal on a public road shall tend the animal in such a manner as not to constitute an obstruction or danger to other traffic.

6. A traffic officer may take charge of any animal referred to in subsection (1) on a public road or to take such steps in respect of the animals as may be prescribed.

Explanation of Section 107

No person may leave an animal on a public road. This prohibition does not apply to animals being ridden or driven (Section 107 (2)).

Section 107 (3) creates a presumption that an animal on the road was left there by the owner of the animal.

Section 107 (4) prescribes the manner in which animals should be driven along a public road. It is the duty of the person in charge of an animal on a public road to attend tot he animal in such a manner that the animal does not become an obstruction or danger to other traffic.

Section 110: Duties of pedestrians

1. Whenever a sidewalk or footpath abuts on the roadway of a public road, a pedestrian shall not walk on such roadway except for the purpose of crossing from one side of such roadway to the other or for some other sufficient reason.

2. A pedestrian on a public road which has no sidewalk or footpath abutting on the roadway, shall walk as near as is practicable to the edge of the roadway on his right-hand side so as to face oncoming traffic on such roadway, except where the presence of pedestrians on the roadway is prohibited by a prescribed road traffic sign.
[Subsection (2) substituted by Section 18 of Act No. 39 of 1993.]

3. No pedestrians shall cross a public road without satisfying himself that the roadway is sufficiently free from oncoming traffic to permit him to cross the road in safety.

4. A pedestrian, when crossing a public road by means of a pedestrian crossing or in any other manner, shall not linger on such road but shall proceed with due despatch.

5. No pedestrian on a public road shall conduct himself in such a manner as to or as is likely to constitute a source of danger to himself or to other traffic which is or may be on such road.

6. A pedestrian may cross a public road only at a pedestrian crossing or an intersection or at a distance further than 50 metres from such pedestrian crossing or intersection.

Explanation of Section 110

Many motor vehicle accidents involve pedestrians. This section prescribes duties to be followed by pedestrians. Where there is a sidewalk, the pedestrian must walk on it. Where there is no sidewalk, the pedestrian must walk as close as possible to the edge of the roadway on his right-hand side so as to face oncoming traffic.

When a pedestrian crosses the road, he or she must do so without lingering on the road (Section 110 (4)). The pedestrian must cross the road at a pedestrian crossing or intersection or at a distance further than 50 metres from such pedestrian crossing or intersection (Section 110 (6)).

Section 115: Damage to public road

No person shall on a public road:

(a) cause any wheel of any vehicle to drag or spin upon the surface of the roadway, except in the case of an emergency;

(b) make use of shocks or shoes between any wheel of any vehicle moving along the roadway and the surface of such roadway; or

(c) use any vehicle or thing or move any vehicle or thing on the roadway in a manner causing or likely to cause damage thereto.

Explanation of Section 115

It is an offence to damage the roadway. A person may not cause the wheels of his or her vehicle to drag or spin on the surface of the roadway, except in an emergency.

Section 118: Duty of driver in event of accident

1. The driver of a vehicle on a public road at the time when such vehicle is involved in or contributes to any accident in which any other person is killed or injured or suffers damage in respect of any property or animal:

   (a) shall immediately stop the vehicle;

   (b) shall ascertain the nature and extent of any injuries sustained by any person;

   (c) shall, if a person is injured, render such assistance to the injured person as he may be capable of rendering;

   (d) shall ascertain the nature and extent of any damage sustained;

   (e) shall, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address, the name and address of the owner of the vehicle driven by him and, in the case of a motor vehicle, the registration or similar mark thereof;

   (f) shall, if he has not already furnished the information referred in paragraph (e) to a traffic officer at the scene of the accident, and unless he is incapable of doing so by reason of injuries sustained by him in the accident, as soon as is reasonably practicable, and in any case within 24 hours after the occurrence of such accident, report the accident to any police officer at a police station or at any office set aside by a competent authority for use by a traffic officer, and there produce his driver's licence and furnish his identity number and such information as is referred to in that paragraph; and

   (g) shall not, except on the instruction of or when administered by a medical practitioner in the case of injury or shock, take any intoxicating liquor or drug having a narcotic effect unless he has complied with the provisions of paragraph (f), where it is his duty to do so, and has been examined by a medical practitioner if such examination is required by a traffic officer.

2. No person shall in an urban area remove any vehicle involved in an accident in which another person is killed or injured from the position in which it came to rest, until such removal has been authorised by a traffic officer, except when such accident causes complete obstruction of the roadway of a public road, in which event the vehicle involved may, without such authority and after its position has been clearly marked on the surface of the roadway by the person moving it, be moved sufficiently to allow the passage of traffic.

2A. Subject to subsection (2), no person shall remove a vehicle involved in an accident from the scene of such accident, other than for the purpose of sufficiently allowing the passage of traffic, without the permission of the owner, driver or operator of such vehicle or a person who may lawfully take possession of such vehicle.
[Subsection (2A) inserted by Section 20 of Act No. 39 of 1993.]

3. In any prosecution for a contravention of any provision of this section it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the accused was aware of the fact that the accident had occurred, and that he did not report the accident or furnish the information as required by subsection (1) (*f*).

4. In this section the word 'animal' means any bovine animal, horse, ass, mule, sheep, goat, pig or ostrich.

Explanation of Section 118

In *R vs. Chipunza* 1967, the accused was convicted for failing to stop after an accident. As he had grounds for believing that the collision had resulted in damage to another vehicle and not in injury to persons, and where in fact, no injury was caused to any person, the court found that it was not a case for the imposition of a prison sentence without the option of a fine.

Section 114 (1) (*b*) indicates that only if another person is killed or injured in and accident is there a duty on the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident to determine the nature and scope of any injuries sustained by any person. Where there is no evidence of injuries, the driver cannot be convicted of a contravention of the section (see *S vs. Nkone* 1970).

In *S vs. Mcelu*, the accused was charged with contravening a similar provision to section 114 (1) (*c*), which section required any driver of a vehicle at the time when such vehicle was involved in or had contributed to any 'accident' on a public road in which any person had been injured 'to render such assistance to the injured person as he may be capable of rendering'.

In this case evidence was disclosed that the accused's conduct towards a girl passenger had been such as to cause her to jump from the vehicle whilst in motion, thereby sustaining injuries. Evidence also showed that the accused had actually encouraged her to jump and thereafter failed to stop.

The court found that this was an 'accident' within the meaning of the word as used in the section, and that it 'involved' the vehicle in question. The court also held that, as the accused knew that the girl had jumped and that she would in all probability sustain serious injury, he was guilty of contravening the above section.

In terms of Section 114 (1) (*e*) a driver whose vehicle is involved in an accident must when required supply certain information to a person having reasonable grounds for requiring such information.

The accident together with the relevant information must be reported and supplied within 24 hours of such accident to any police officer or any prescribed traffic officer. It is an offence for any driver whose vehicle is

involved in an accident to take any intoxicating liquor or drug having a narcotic affect unless certain conditions are satisfied.

In any person contravenes or fails to comply with Section 1, he will be guilty of an offence and certain penalties are imposed on such person.

In terms of Section 114 (2A) no person may remove a vehicle involved in an accident in an urban area in which any person is injured or killed until such removal has been authorised by a police officer. Where, however, the vehicle involved in the accident has caused a complete obstruction of the roadway, such vehicle may, after its position has been clearly marked, be removed without the authorisation of a police officer. Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions commits an offence.

Section 120: Reckless or negligent driving

1. No person shall drive a vehicle on a public road recklessly or negligently.

2. Without restricting the ordinary meaning of the word 'recklessly' any person who drives a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be deemed to drive that vehicle recklessly.

3. In considering whether an offence has been committed under subsection (1), the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this section, the nature, conditions and use of the public road upon which the offence is alleged to have been committed, the amount of traffic which at the time actually was or which could reasonably have been expected to be upon that road, and the speed at and manner in which the vehicle was driven.

Explanation of Section 120

In *S vs. Van Zyl* 1968, the accused was charged with reckless driving.

From the evidence it appeared that he had, on the incorrect side of the road, collided with the front of an approaching vehicle which he had not noticed because he was busy doing something in the vehicle and had not had his eyes on the road.

The court found that he was guilty of gross negligence and that his conduct could be characterised as reckless.

See *S vs. Tuswa* 1975, where, in a review of a conviction of culpable homicide it appeared that the accused, who was unlicensed, had taken a Government tractor without authority and driven it with the deceased and another passenger standing holding onto the sides of the tractor, which only had one seat. The evidence of the other passenger was that the road was wet and that at a curve there was a horse in the middle of the road. 'The tractor gave way to the horse and skidded and left the road and rolled with us.' The deceased had died as a result of injuries received in the accident. The accused in evidence had merely falsely denied driving the tractor at all. The magistrate's court had convicted the accused on the basis that it was 'negligence per se (in itself) to carry a passenger on a tractor designed only for a driver and that the accused

should have foreseen the possible death of a passenger on a vehicle not designed for passengers'.

On review the court held that it was necessary for the State to prove that the 'accident' was due to a negligent act on the part of the accused.

The court held further that here was no evidence as to what caused the accident, other than that the road was slippery. Held, further, as the deceased had not fallen off and there had been no enquiry as the whether the deceased's mere presence on the tractor constituted a danger per se which the accused should have foreseen, that it has not been proved that the death of the deceased, or the 'accident' which caused such death, was the result of negligence on the part of the accused: the mere fact that the accused had allowed the deceased on the tractor was irrelevant to the question of what caused his death. Conviction and sentence therefore set aside.

In *State vs. Isaac* 1970, the appellant had been charged with and convicted of culpable homicide in that he killed a child. The appellant was the driver of a motor vehicle called a 'horse' which had behind it two trailers, the total length of the vehicle being 26 metres. Because of the nature of the vehicle it was not possible for the driver to see what was happening immediately on the left of the vehicle. The appellant had M as a passenger who sat on the left of the vehicle. When the vehicle entered a street at a low speed the driver and the passenger saw small children on the left side of the road. The appellant sounded his hooter and the children moved slightly off the road to their left. The children continued their playing by jumping up and down. One child ran alongside the vehicle and then disappeared under the left mudguard of the 'horse'. The passenger warned the appellant who came to a stop fairly soon. In an appeal the court held that the appellant should have instructed the passenger to keep a proper look-out; as neither the appellant nor he had done so, the appellant had, in the circumstances, been properly convicted.

In terms of subsection (3) of the above section, the court in deciding whether on offence has been committed under subsection (1), must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.

Where a person is found guilty of negligent driving he is liable on such conviction to a fine not exceeding R400, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 121: Inconsiderate driving

No person shall drive a vehicle on a public road without reasonable consideration for any other person using the road.

Explanation of Section 121

It is an offence for any person to drive a vehicle on a public road without reasonable consideration for any other person using the road.

In *S vs. De Villiers* 1974, it was held that the word 'driving' in a similar section to the above (Section 139 of Ordinance 30 of 1967 SWA), which makes it an offence to drive without reasonable consideration for any other road user, relates to a motor vehicle in motion and that the section does not apply to the stopping or parking of a vehicle.

Proof of conduct which is in the circumstances calculated to embarrass or inconvenience another user of the road is sufficient proof of a contravention of Section 121 of Act 29 of 1989 (T), viz., driving a motor vehicle without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road, even though such other user remains mercifully unaware of the conduct in question.
See *S vs. Killian* 1973.

Section 122:

Driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug having narcotic effect, or with excessive amount of alcohol in blood

1. No person shall on a public road:

   (a) drive a vehicle; or

   (b) occupy the driver's seat of a motor vehicle the engine of which is running,

   while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect.

2. No person shall on a public road:

   (a) drive a vehicle; or

   (b) occupy the driver's seat of a motor vehicle the engine of which is running,

   while the concentration of alcohol in any specimen of blood taken from any part of his body is not less then 0,08 gram per 100 millilitres.

3. If, in any prosecution for a contravention of the provisions of subsection (2), it is proved that the concentration of alcohol in any specimen of blood taken from any part of the body of the person concerned was not less than 0,08 gram per 100 millilitres at any time within two hours after the alleged offence, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such concentration was not less than 0,08 grams per 100 millilitres at the time of the alleged offence.

4. Where any prosecution under this Act evidence is tendered of the analysis of a specimen of the blood of any person, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any syringe used for obtaining such specimen and the receptacle in which such specimen was placed for despatch to an analyst, were free from any substance or contamination which could have affected the results of such analysis.

Explanation of Section 122

The purpose of this section is to protect the public from the tragic consequences which all too frequently result from the actions of persons driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.

It has also been held by the court that it is no defence under Section 122 for a person who has intentionally taken drugs and alcohol before driving, to say

that a drug taken by mistake in substitution for an intended drug had an even greater effect, in combination with alcohol, than such intended drug or alcohol would have had.

Section 122 (1) (*a*): In *S vs. Vorster* 1967, the accused was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. From the evidence it appeared that he had been found apparently asleep behind the steering wheel.

His right foot was on the brake and the engine was switched on, but the engine was not running. Accused stated that he was driving the car and that he was on the way to Johannesburg. On review, the magistrate admitted that his finding that the accused was driving the car was unjustified.

Held, that the accused also could not be convicted of attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Section 122 (1) (*b*): In *S vs. Geldenhuys*, the appellant was convicted of a contravention of Section 140 (1) (*b*) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, similar to Section 122 (1) (*b*), in that he was sitting behind the steering wheel of the vehicle whilst under the influence of intoxicating liquor and whilst the engine of the vehicle was running. The vehicle landed on a kerb stone of a public road and the appellant was busy changing gear in order to move the vehicle off the kerb stone, although it was physically impossible for the vehicle to move either forwards or backwards from its stranded position. In an appeal for a conviction, the court held that a vehicle which was not in motion fell within the definition of 'motor vehicle' in Section 1 of the Ordinance.

Held, further, that Section 140 (1) (*b*) [Section 122 (1) (*b*)] must not be so interpreted that it merely applied to a motor vehicle which is able to move under its own power.

In *S vs. Naidoo* 1974, the accused was charged with a contravention of Section 140 (1) (*a*) or alternatively Section 140 (1) (*b*) of the Road Traffic Ordinance similar to Section 122 (1) (*a*) and 122 (1) (*b*) of the 1989 Act. He was convicted on the alternative charge. He appealed against his conviction. In the appeal the evidence showed that he had been found asleep behind the steering wheel, lying with his hands folded and fast asleep. As State witness had switched off the engine, had opened the door and had shaken the appellant when he awoke. The State witness was of the opinion that the appellant was under the influence of liquor.

The court held that there was no evidence as to what he appellant's condition was when he awakened and when he parked the car. Thus it had not been proved that the above section had been contravened.

In terms of Section 122 (1) (*b*), it is an offence for any person on a public road to drive a vehicle or occupy the driver's seat of a motor vehicle, the engine whereof is running, while under the influence of liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect.

Section 122 (2) provides that it is an offence for any person on a public road to drive a vehicle, or occupy the driver's seat of motor vehicle, the engine whereof i running, whilst the concentration of alcohol exceeds a certain level in his blood.

Note the presumption in subsection (3) of Section 122.

In terms of Section 122 (4) it is presumed until the contrary is proved, that any syringe used for obtaining a specimen of blood of any person and the receptacle in which such specimen was placed for despatch to any analyst were free of any substance or contamination which could have affected the result of such analysis. See *S vs. Gregg* 1973.

NOTE: The presumption, which is in favour of the State, does not cover the cleanliness of the skin of the accused.

Section 130: Presumption that owner drove or parked vehicle

1. Where in prosecution under the common law relating to the driving of a vehicle on a public road, or under this Act, it is material to prove who was the driver of a vehicle, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such vehicle was driven by the owner thereof.

2. Whenever a vehicle is parked in contravention of any provision of this Act or a by-law made thereunder, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the owner of the vehicle parked such vehicle.

3. For the purposes of subsection (1) and (2) it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that, where the owner of the vehicle concerned is a corporate body, such vehicle was driven or parked, as contemplated in those subsections, by a director or servant of the corporate body in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporate body.

Explanation of Section 130

In terms of this section, where in any action under the common law relating to the driving or parking of a vehicle on a public road under this Ordinance is instituted, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proven, that the vehicle was driven or parked as the case may be by the owner, thereof.

The effect of (3) is that the corporate body will be liable and the State therefore does not have to make attempt to identify the driver.

Restatement

Introduction

The Act deals with the law relating to the registration and licensing of motor vehicles and drivers and the driving of motor vehicles on public roads.

Important Sections of the Act

Know the following definitions:

1. Driver
2. Motor vehicle
3. Public road
4. Operate on a public road

5. Pedestrian crossing

Section 18 deals with the disqualification of persons for obtaining or holding a learner's or driver's licence. This may be because of age or a declaration by a competent authority.

Section 55 provides that the court may order the endorsement, suspension or cancellation of a licence or permit. It also provides that the court may disqualify a person from obtaining a licence or permit.

Section 86 provides that drivers or certain emergency vehicles – fire-fighters, ambulances and rescue vehicles – may exceed the speed limit. They must give proper warning and have due regard to the safety of other traffic.

Section 97 prohibits the stopping of motor vehicles on the roadway in certain circumstances.

Section 101 lists the general duties of drivers of passengers of vehicles on public roads.

Section 115 deals with damage to a public road.

Section 118 describes the duties of a driver in the event of an accident.

Section 120 deals with reckless or negligent driving. In deciding whether a person was guilty of reckless or negligent driving the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.

Section 121 provides that any person who drives a vehicle on a public road without reasonable consideration for any other road user is guilty of an offence.

Section 122 makes it an offence for any person to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect or with an excessive amount of alcohol in his or her blood. Section 122 (1) makes it an offence for any person to drive a vehicle or occupy the driver's seat of a motor vehicle while the engine is running, while under the influence of liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect. Section 122 (2) makes it an offence for any person to drive a vehicle or occupy the driver's seat of a motor vehicle while the engine is running when the concentration of alcohol exceeds a certain level in his blood.

Section 130 creates a presumption that the owner drove or parked his vehicle on a public road.

CHAPTER 15: RADIO COMMUNICATION

Learning outcomes for Chapter 15

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

use the correct radio communication procedure.

As a CPO, you must be skilled in radio communication. You may need to use your skills at any stage in an operation. In this chapter, we'll discuss radio communication under the following headings:

the phonetic alphabet;

radio calls;

principles of radio procedure; and

security of communications.

When two or more radio stations communicate with each other on the same frequency, we say that a radio net is established. In order to ensure that messages are transmitted and received with speed and accuracy, radio operators must fully understand the need for radio discipline and standardised voice procedure.

Phonetic alphabet

In order to ensure that the receiver will understand a message containing call signs, codes, difficult words or names, a phonetic alphabet is used to spell out the word concerned. This international phonetic alphabet is common to the police and the defence force. Table 3 below shows the alphabet.

TABLE 3: PHONETIC ALPHABET

A	Alpha	J	Juliet	S	Sierra
B	Bravo	K	Kilo	T	Tango
C	Charlie	L	Lima	U	Uniform
D	Delta	M	Mike	V	Victor
E	Echo	N	November	W	Whisky
F	Foxtrot	O	Oscar	X	X-Ray
G	Golf	P	Papa	Y	Yankee
H	Hotel	Q	Quebec	Z	Zulu
I	India	R	Romeo		

All radio users must know this phonetic alphabet.

Radio calls

We'll discuss:

the difference between multiple calls and all station calls;

relaying a message; and

emergency calls.

Difference between multiple calls and all stations calls

Radio calls can be multiple calls or all stations calls.

Multiple call

In multiple calls, the control station calls several outstations on the net. The operator at control uses his or her own call sign to identify himself or herself, and after that the call signs of the stations that he or she is calling.

EXAMPLE

ZRA 3154	Roger Over
ZRA 3157	Roger Over
ZRA 3164	Roger Over

All stations call

In all stations calls, the control station calls all the stations on the net.

EXAMPLE

ZRA 3131 for all stations	Over

Stations will respond according to the order of the numerical sequence of call signs. The all stations call will normally be used only on a small net.

Relaying a message

When one station cannot communicate directly with another station, it may be possible to relay the message through a third station, as illustrated below.

EXAMPLE

Station	**Message**
ZRA 3131	ZRA 3131 for ZRA 3154 relay message to ZRA 3183. Over
ZRA 3154	ZRA 3154 (or ACS). Roger Over
ZRA 3154	ZRA 3154 for ZRA 3183 message from ZRA 3131. Over
ZRA 3183	ZRA 3131 (or ACS). Roger Over
ZRA 3154	ZRA 3154 for ZRA 3131 message relayed to ZRA 3183. Over
ZRA 3131	ZRA 3131 (or ACS). Roger Out

Emergency calls

Emergency calls are designed to arouse the attention of all stations. Emergency procedures must be pre-planned.

EXAMPLE

Station	**Message**
ZRA 3154	ZRA 3154 (or ACS) May Repeat Mayday. Over
Control	Control call sign ZRA 3154. Roger Out

Principles of radio procedure

In this section we'll discuss useful ways to remember good radio procedure, common words and phrases, radio and single calls, and do's and don'ts.

BASS and RSVP

One of the easiest ways to remember the principles of good radio procedure is to use the key words:

'BASS'; and

'RSVP'.

Every radio user must memorise these principles, shown below.

BASS

B	BRIEF	Message must be brief and
A	ACCURATE	Details given must be clear
S	SECURITY	Never transmit classified information unless it is dis-
S	SPEED	Do not rush the message but

RSVP

Common words and phrases

Word or phrase	*Meaning*
Call sign	The call sign of the station as registered and reflected on the radio licence.
Abbreviated call	Unofficial domestic call signs arranged by individuals.
Over	My message is complete and I am expecting a reply.
Out	My message is complete – do not reply.
Roger	I have received your message. I understand your message. Everything is going according to plan.
Sitrep	Situation report.
Mayday	Emergency call (repeat at least twice).
Say again	I am repeating my previous message or portion of the message.
Relay to	Pass my message on to (call sign).

Now we must differentiate between radio calls and single calls.

Radio calls and single calls

Radio calls

Before commencing a transmission, the user must ensure that the net is clear. The operator uses his or her own call sing to identify himself or herself, and after that the call sign of the station or stations he or she is calling. Once the link is established, an abbreviated call sign (ACS) may be used.

Single calls

The single call is a single transmission between two stations.

EXAMPLE

Sender's call sign	ZRA 3131
Receiver's call sign	ZRA 3154

The phonetic alphabet is used to spell out the call sign, which in this case is ZULU ROMEO ALPHA. The message transmission would be:

ZRA 3131 for ZRA 3154	Over
ZRA 3154	Roger Out

Only the sender can end a message, saying 'Roger Out'. All other persons responding to the originator must go back to him or her and say 'Roger Over'.

When ending a message the operator will use either 'Over' or 'Out', depending upon whether a reply is required or not. Contrary to popular belief, the phrase 'Over and out' is never used.

Do's and don'ts of radio procedure

Keep to the following do's and don'ts of radio procedure:

Do *not* use abusive language over the air. Apart from prejudicing voice procedure, this can result in licenses being revoked.

Do *not* play music in the background.

Do keep the radio room secure.

Do treat radios as technical equipment and handle them with care to prevent damage.

Do use radios for the transmission of official messages only. The transmission of music or other entertainment is prohibited.

Security of communications

Based on the principle that 'the enemy listens', every effort must be made to safe-guard the information transmitted over the air. Examples of information that must be safe-guarded are:

information received from delicate sources, such as the Special Branch of the police;

classified inreps and sitreps;

future intentions regarding operations; and

any movements of the VIP.

When the contents of a message must be safe-guarded, code words will be used in the message. The CPO initiating the message must use his or her discretion as to when the use of code words is necessary.

Summary

In this chapter we've discussed the basics of radio communication, a topic you must familiarise yourself with. Now test your knowledge of the chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 8

1. List all the words in the phonetic alphabet in their correct order.

2. Explain the following terms:

   Call sign;

   Over;

   Out;

Roger;

Sitrep;

Mayday;

Say again; and

Relay to.



Self-assessment answers 8

1.

PHONETIC ALPHABET					
A	Alpha	J	Juliet	S	Sierra
B	Bravo	K	Kilo	T	Tango
C	Charlie	L	Lima	U	Uniform
D	Delta	M	Mike	V	Victor
E	Echo	N	November	W	Whisky
F	Foxtrot	O	Oscar	X	X-Ray
G	Golf	P	Papa	Y	Yankee
H	Hotel	Q	Quebec	Z	Zulu
I	India	R	Romeo		

2. (a) The call sign is the sign of the station as registered and reflected on the radio licence.

(b) Over: My message is complete and I expect a reply.

(c) Out: My message is complete, do not reply.

(d) Roger: I have received your message. I understand your message. Everything is according to plan.

(e) Situation report.

(f) Mayday: Emergency call (repeat at least twice).

(g) Say again: I am repeating my previous message or a portion of it.

(h) Relay to: Pass my message on to (call sign).

Next chapter

When you are sure that you understand the contents covered in this chapter, and have achieved all the learning outcomes, move on to the next chapter – '

CHAPTER 16: ABSEILING

Learning outcomes for Chapter 16

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

Know what abseiling gear will be needed in a rescue situation.

How to set up the ropes for yourself and your principal

Be familiar with the correct procedures of using the equipment

As a CPO, you must be skilled in abseiling. You may need to use your skills at any stage in an operation where your principal and you are trapped in a hotel or office building which exceeds two stories. In this chapter, we'll discuss abseiling under the following headings:

Necessity for abseiling
What the relevant equipment consist of and their function
How to use the equipment

NECESSITY FOR ABSEILING

Why SABA (SA Bodyguard Association) stress the fact that abseiling should form part of a bodyguard`s training program is that in general CPO`S lack of this skill, myself who is operational in the industry going for two decades and attended the best part of a dozen cpo courses never once were introduced to abseiling.

Imagine yourself in a 10 story building an explosion occur (It is not a planned attack on your principal, but an defect in the electrical system) a fire break out ,there is a power failure and the lifts are out of order, the stairs are filled with smoke the fire is approaching and all levels will be reached soon.
The principal and the team are stuck on the 4th floor.

Above mentioned should be worked into your threat assessment evaluation under risk and form part of your contingency planning as standard procedure.

ABSEILING EQUIPMENT NEEDED IN A OPRATION

- Rope - 50 m will be sufficient - these ropes are designed for the purpose descending and ascending Safely with the correct training and equipment

- There are 2 types of rope - dynamic rope (stretch) shock load
  - static rope (do not stretch)

- Harnesses - it should be adjustable ,webbing harnesses - there are 3 models to choose from
  - wais-belt type (most popular) - chest harness - full body harness (good for principal)

- Carabiners - with clip gates - mostly used to clip equipment to harness etc (not safe to descent)
  - screw gates - to lock your descending / ascending device to your harness.


- Slings - mostly used for ascending or stronger slings are fastened to a solid object as a ancker point to clip the rope on the sling with carabiners.


- Hand gloves - with the friction involved with a decent the rope as well as the descending device builds up heat and will burn your hands, if you then leave the rope because it is to hot to hold, you will fall to the ground and injure or kill your self..

- Descending devices - for our purpose the following would be needed:
- Figure of eight - a cheap piece of equipment - can be used with ropes from 8mm to 13mm. Attachment to the rope is simply over and under, can be used to belay principal (will explain the belay process later in chapter)
- Stop - self-braking descender for single rope - for long descents - multi purpose device, can also be used for ascending - more appropriate for experienced user, there for the cpo would use the stop, as he can assist the principal with out holding onto the rope while both of them are hanging on the ropes, the cpo can also give body cover , if cpo needs to ascend for some reason he will be able do so.


Now that you know the function of each piece of equipment, the steps of using these equipment will be Described after explaining the figure of 8 knot.

A figure 8 knot is made at the end of the rope where your carabine can be attached to the rope on the one end and the sling which will be attached to the ancker point.





ONLY THE BASICS ARE COVERED, AS THERE ARE MANY DIFFIRENT KNOTS, THIS IS THE ONLY ONE YOU SHOULD KNOW FOR NOW.




This knot is specifically used for abseiling, PLEASE DO NOT USE ANY OTHER FANCY KNOTS, it could be DANGERES.

STEP 1

- Always`s think safety first - Plan your descent - Identify a solid ancker point (a down pipe of a building ,a burglar bar, a door handle ,taps, light fittings, furniture etc , is NOT solid ancker points, use more than one ancker point if necessary.
-

STEP 2

- Put on your harnesses



Waist-Belt




Full Body



Chest

STEP 3

- Place your sling/ rope around ancker point, put 2 carabines through slings




SLINGS



CLIP GATE CARABINES

STEP 4

- Make a figure of 8 knot at the end of the rope, hook a carabiner onto the fig 8 knot and at the same time onto the sling which is already attached to the ancker point.(use a screw gate)





ROPE

SCREW GATE CARABINE

A manual lock screw gate should always be finger tight (not to tight)

STEP 5

- Now you clear the way where the rope will be thrown out of the window, be sure that the rope is not to short and not reaching the ground or got tangled on the way down.


- Exactly the same procedure would be followed with the belay rope (repeat steps from ancker point to Throw out point) in reality it would be done simultaneously.

STEP 6

- Attach the descending devices to the rope, the petzl stop and the figure 8. Don't get confused by the figure 8 knot and the figure 8 descender. Once the descenders are attached to the rope you will clip the stop onto the carabine which hooked onto your harness, finger tight the carabine then the fig 8 descender
  Of the principal which is already attached to the rope with a over and under will now be clipped on the Harness of the principal by means of the carabine, finger tight his.



FIG 8 DESCENDER



OVER/ UNDER ATTACHMENT FROM ROPE ONTO FIG 8




PETZL STOP DESCENDER

STEP 7

- Double check all attachments, carabines and harnesses.

STEP 8

- Stand at the point where you start your descent, take up all slack on rope, the rope should be tight, not Like in the illustration




STEP 9

* Put on your gloves as well as your principals



STEP 10

- Lay back at a 45 degree angle with legs spread open to balance yourself, and with the right hand assist the principal in the belay process, although the would be a person beneath to belay the principal.



NOTE THE POSITION OF THE RIGHT HAND HOLDING THE ROPE WICH ACT AS A BREAK

STEP 11

- Slowly take down your principal to safety. Advise him to close his eyes and assure him you will get him down safe



These are the basics of abseiling but you are obligated to do the practical as there are many detail to be adhered to.

DO NOT TRY THIS WITHOUT PROPER TRAINNG AND SUPERVISION

Self ass q

Summary

In this chapter we've discussed the basics of radio communication, a topic you must familiarise yourself with. Now test your knowledge of the chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 8

1. List all the words in the phonetic alphabet in their correct order.



Self-assessment answers 8

Next chapter

CHAPTER 17: ELECTRONIC DEVICES



Learning outcomes for Chapter 17

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

Identify the electronic devices in this chapter
Know what is needed in a ops room

The setting up of relevant equipment will be taught in your practical course with SABA.

You will not be installing with all the equipment in this chapter however you need to be able to identity

The devices.

THIS PAGE WILL INTRODUCE YOU TO SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT USED FOR COUTER SURVEILLANCE

LG

The line guard is used to protect a telephone or fax line from being tapped.



TD 53

Mini bug detector has been designed with the man in the street in mind. It will detect any transmitter from 50mHz to 2 gHz. Ideal for office or home sweeps.



CPM-700

The big brother detector used by government agencies and a whole lot of guys who wear dark glasses. Frequency range 50kHz to 3gHz.



Audio jammer

Protects conversations from eaves dropping by generating an unfilterable sound which varies in frequency and amplitude.



TT

Tap trap is used to check telephone lines suspected of being tapped (series or parallel)




CMS-11


The CMS-11 is a complete counter-surveillance kit. It includes a 5mHz to 2,5gHz bug detector, an infrared detector for locating infrared transmitting devices, a Tap trap for locating series or parallel telephone taps, and a line driver for checking suspect wires.

BUG DETECTOR - CPM 700

THE CPM-700 COUNTER SURVEILLANCE PROBE/ MONITOR PROVIDES FIVE OF THE "MOST DESIRED SWEEP FUNCTIONS" IN ONE PACKAGE

1 R.F. probe "sniffs" your environment for hidden phone, room or body bugs, remote control signals, computer, Fax or Telex transmitters, video transmitters, pulsed tracking transmitters and even wide band frequency hopping or "burst" bugs.
2 V.L.F. probe tests your A.C. outlets, phone lines or suspicious wires for very low frequency "carrier current" signals.
3 Auxiliary audio input allows you to listen to telephones or lines for "hotmikes," hookswitch by-pass and "infinity" bugs, also unknown wires and cables can be tested for wired microphones.
4 After a sweep, the alarm monitor guards against new devices brought in, remote control activation or someone tampering with your equipment.
5 The 24-hour "evidence" recording output, will store suspicious sounds on a standard cassette recorder while you're away.










BUG DETECTOR





Keep your conversations private? A microphone or bug can be hidden almost anywhere. This electronically operated Bug Detector will detect bugs as well as locate them. The audible tone/alarm and/or LED bar/light display will help you find the exact position of a bug operating in the 5MHz to 2GHz range. The Bug Detector use a 9V battery.














































Typical Configuration



E-SG2000 *Micro Video & Audio DVR & Ethernet Server*

*The **E-SG2000** is the smallest digital video and audio recorder to date. The size of a pager, the unit is ideal for all covert or battery powered video applications. It records using MPEG4 compression and can accept in a standard video input signal from any of our range of covert or overt surveillance cameras.*

*Besides the four external video inputs, the **E-SG2000** has an integrated colour pinhole camera, as well as two integrated audio microphones and a speaker. DVR recording is activated by the internal software motion detection, manually or via an alarm trigger. This recorded digital data is then stored on an internal flash disk or on a removable SD memory cartridge.*

Setup and control of the unit can be done via an on-screen-display menu on the unit's tiny display or via a PC through Ethernet.




E-BNC414 *4 Way BNC Patch Cable*

4 way BNC Patch cable has been designed to be use in between a R's, Matrix's, Multiplexors, Quad Swithers and Video Distrubution plifres. It allows for space saving, simplified cabling, reduced installation time and cost savings.






CABLES *Video & Power Cables*




E-POWERAX-WP | E-POWERAX-MIL | E-COAX-RG59U | E-TWINSCR

CONNECTORS & ADAPTORS *Cable Connectors & Adaptors*



E-BNCLP | E-DC31LP | E-DC21LS | E-RCALP | E-BMRF | E-RMBF | E-BB | E-RB | E-TBM28F | E-TBF28M



These sequential switching units allow you to connect 4 or 8 cameras to one monitor. Each camera has a switch enabling you to bypass, lock on, or automatically scan all cameras. Dwell time is adjustable from 0.5 to 15 seconds, and a LED indicator displays the active camera's station number.

In addition to the video input, these units have 4/8 alarm inputs. When activated, it locks onto the camera where the alarm occurred. An alarm output can be used to activate a buzzer or alarm.

MODEL	Description
E-804AL	4 camera switching box - with timer & alarm activation
E-808AL	8 camera switching box - with timer & alarm activation




The **E-707** is designed for full duplex multiplexing, which means that all 16 cameras can record/display/ playback simultaneously. Multi-screen display formats are supported in full screen, quad, 7, 10, 13 and 16 channel modes. Playback can be done in full screen, quad or 16 channel modes with normal analog or DVR) supported.

Other features include on-screen display menu, title generator, motion detection, adjustable video gain, picture-in-picture and video loss notification.

MODEL	E-707
Camera input signal	PAL composite video
VCR input signal	Composite 1 Vp-p 75Ω BNC S-Video Y 1 Vp-p 75ohm S JACK; C 0.8 Vp-p 75ohm S JACK
Camera loop back	Composite 1Vp-p 75ohm BNC, 16 channels
Monitor output	Composite 1 Vp-p 75ohm BNC, 2 output
VCR output	Composite 1 Vp-p 75ohm BNC S-Video Y 1 Vp-p 75ohm S JACK; C 0.8 Vp-p 75ohm
Alarm input	TTL input, Hi (5V), Low (GND)
Alarm output	COM, NO, NC
Motion Detection	Digital 15 x 14 Grid
VCR trigger output	5V TTL output
Picture-in-Picture	Moveable Block
Refresh Rate	Real Time 25 fps (Single Picture) 0.133 sec/channel (All 16 Channels)
Power Consumption	DC12V, 10W
Dimensions (mm)	432 (W) x 70 (H) x 311 (D)









See-Through







QU8

A quad unit can carry up to eight camera's displaying four picture frames at a time, or selecting one pic for the whole monitor. The unit can also page one camera at a time, with the push of a button



2WS

With a two way switcher it is possible to monitor two cameras using one monitor, picture will be displayed for a certain period of time.

VMD


Video motion detector is used to activate motion de-tector VCR as soon as motion is detected in an area. De-activates 3 minutes after person has left the target area.



E-S 408 B/W MICRO CAMERA & E

For covert use








For a ops room, above mentioned would be ideal, as this is wireless audio/ video transmission.
To set up a system like this only takes a few minutes, you only need to add a 4-16 channel video switcher
Depending on how many cameras you would need to add to the system.


Areas that should be covered by the ops room during an operation in terms of cameras. (Ops room would preferably be the suite across the principals suite)

- Car parking
- Entrance and lobby –reception of hotel
- Ground floor lift & stairs
- Restaurant
- Lift, stairs, and passage on level where principals suite is with p/s/ door in sight.

THESE ARE ALL CAMERAS THE ADVANCE TEAM SHOULD IDENTIFY









If they are not identified it could place your principal and the team under surveillance.
These are diguuised cameras, but not all smoke detectors/ alarm covers are cameras, you will have to determine which are real



For covert operations




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In addition to the video input, these units have 4/8 alarm inputs. When activated, it locks onto the camera where the alarm occurred. An alarm output can be used to activate a buzzer or alarm.

MODEL	Description
E-904AL	4 camera switching box - with timer & alarm activation
E-908AL	8 camera switching box - with timer & alarm activation





*The **E-707** is designed for full duplex multiplexing, which means that all 16 cameras can record/display/playback simultaneously. Multi-screen display formats are supported in full screen, quad, 7, 10, 13 and 16 channel modes. Playback can be done in full screen, quad or 16 channel modes with normal analog or DVRs supported.*


Other features include on-screen display menu, title generator, motion detection, adjustable video gain, picture-in-picture and video loss notification.

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Alarm output	COM, NO, NC.
Motion Detection	Digital 15 x 14 Grid
VCR trigger output	5V TTL output
Picture-In-Picture	Moveable Block
Refresh Rate	Real Time 25 fps (Single Picture) 0.133 sec/channel (All 16 Channels)
Power Consumption	DC12V, 10W
Dimensions (mm)	432 (W) x 76 (H) x 311 (D)





CONNECTORS & ADAPTORS — Cable Connectors & Adaptors




E-BNCLP E-DC21LP E-DC21LS E-RCALP E-BMRF E-RMBF E-BB E-RB E-T-BM2BF E-T-BF2BM

E-BNC414 — 4 Way BNC Patch Cable

is 4 way BNC Patch cable has been designed to be use in between a R's, Matrix's, Multiplexors, Quad Swithers and Video Distrubution plifires. It allows for space saving, simplified cabling, reduced installa- n time and cost savings.




CABLES — Video & Power Cables



E-POWERAX-WP E-POWERAX-MIL E-COAX-RG59U E-TWINSCR

Always be prepared in terms of spares, batteries, chargers, tools, prestic, insulation tape etc when working with electronic devices.

A must in a toolbox



Power source to electronic devises.

Video ground loop isolator



To eliminate interference on the video signal Where there is different pieces of mains powered cctv hardware in same system are connected to ground in different places.

TX TRANSMITTERS AND RECEIVERS

TX 500 Long
Frequency: 2.4 GHz
Output: 500 mw
Range: 300 - 500m
Power: 12v

TX 100 Short
Frequency: 2.4 GHz
Output: 100 mw
Range: 100 - 300 m
Power: 12v



REPEATER

Receive: 2.4 GHz
Range: 4km
Power: 12v



AZ-10

This crystal controlled VHF telephone transmitter with dedicated receiver allows one to be able to monitor all conversations made over the target line. Recording whilst not being present is possible



CX-07

Same as CX-01 but has a "a" and "b" transmitter with a "ab" switch on the receiver so two rooms can be monitored at the same time.



LCX-101 TRANMITTERS AND RECEIVERS

Crystal controlled VHF transmitter with receiver.
Range 400 metre
Transmitter: 8cm x 7cm
Receiver: 11cm x 6cm
This unit can be used as a body transmitter as well as a room monitoring system. Recording whilst not being present is possible.



UHF3

This three channel UHF receiver is used with either the UTT (telephone TX) or any "a" "b" or "c" UTX (room TX). Recording from this unit is easy.

UTX

UHF room transmitter used with UHF3 receiver.
Range aprox. 1 km.





RECORDING KIT

For body, room or telephone.



SHOTGUN MIC

This microphone can be used in an open area to monitor conversations at a distance of up to 50 metres.



The combo is designed to monitor room and telephone conversations. When the phone is not in use, the room will be monitored.



MC-3

FM telephone transmitter.
Range 200 metre.
4cm x 2cm (very small)
Frequency: 88mHz to 108mHz.



TX-7

FM room transmitter, uses a standard FM radio as the receiver.
Small in size.
Battery life 12 days constant use.
Range 400 metres.



PEN CAMERA

Range 100-300m
Freq-2.4 GHZ
Black &white
Power 9 v



THE BASIC DOCUMENTATION AND EQUIPMENT NEEDED IN A OPS ROOM

OPS ROOM REQUIREMENTS

- Check lists (Advance and route reconnaissance, searches)
- Telephone numbers (On and off duty protection personnel, emergency services, key corporate personnel Other security services)
- Telephone directories
- Emergency plans
- Principals itinerary
- Logs (Keys, vehicles, personnel)
- Maps
- First aid equipment
- Fire extinguisher
- Spare keys
- CCTV monitors/ portable alarm monitors, dvr, extra cameras, plugs, extensions, batteries, toolbox.
- Radios, telephones, cellulars, pagers, chargers
- Search equipment and other counter surveillance equipment
- Fire arms and ammunition
- Refreshments

Summary

In this chapter we've discussed the basics of radio communication, a topic you must familiarise yourself with. Now test your knowledge of the chapter with the self-assessment questions that follow. Answer the questions in your own words. Write your answers in a file, *then* compare them with our suggested answers, below. Revise if necessary.



Self-assessment questions 8

1. List all the words in the phonetic alphabet in their correct order.

- Toilet facilities



Self-assessment answers 8

CHAPTER 18: MEDICAL (BUDDY AID)



Learning outcomes for Chapter 18

After completing this chapter, you should be able to:

Identify the electronic devices in this chapter
Know what is needed in a ops room

The setting up of relevant equipment will be taught in your practical course with SABA.

You will not be installing with all the equipment in this chapter however you need to be able to identity

The devices.

MEDICAL

THE MEDICAL COMPONENT OF A CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVE

As a close protection operative your f unction and responsibility is to protect your principal, To define the word Protection, relating to the close protection industry means the following:

- TO PROTECT YOUR PRINCIPALS LIFE
- TO PROTECT YOUR PRINCIPALS IMMAGE
- TO PROTECT YOUR PRINCIPALS PRIVACY
- TO PROTECT YOUR PRINCIPAL AGAINST UNLAWFULL ACTS (from acting unlawful as cpo)

T he medical component obviously will be categorised under the heading saving principals life.

As a cpo the chances are good that you will most likely on a contract apply your medical skills before you would draw a fire arm to protect your principal. The application of skills then would be predominantly be medical orientated.
Eg. The chance that your principal might have a cold, bad stomach, any form of injury, cuts, choking, heart attack, is a 100% but drawing a fire arm might be once in a life time, maybe never.

LEVEL OF MEDICAL QUALIFICATION FOR CPO`S

The minimum medical level for cpo`s should be - LEVEL 3 (Preferably LEVEL 5)

Level 5 is the first level where you would be registered at the HEALTH PROFFESION COUNCIL OF SA As a BLS Practitioner (BAA)
.
In this chapter you will be able to learn the theoretical side of buddy aid, you will not be certified on any of the levels 1 to 5, until you do a specific course on one of these levels by a registered trainer.

In this chapter we will deal with the following:

- HHH, A,B,C
- CHOKING ALGORITHM - CONSCIOUS VICTIM/ UNCONSCIOUS VICTIM.

.

2002

Universal Basic Life Support Algorithm

2002

If victim appears to be in need of help, adopt a **SAFE** approach:

Hazards?

S = Shout for assistance
A = Approach with care
F = Free from dangers
E = Evaluate the victim



Hello?
Check responsiveness by tapping and talking to victim



Responsive ⇨

If safe to do so:
- Keep victim in position found
- Treat illnesses or injuries as necessary
- Get help if needed
- Reassess continuously until help arrives

Unresponsive ⇩



Help!
Call for Assistance



If unresponsive:
- Shout loudly for help if alone
- Ask a bystander to wait for you to assess the victim

⇩

A



Open Airway
Head tilt – chin lift



If neck injury is suspected:
- Avoid head tilt
- Do chin lift or jaw thrust

⇩



Assess Breathing
Look, listen and feel for up to 10 seconds



Breathing present ⇨

If breathing (more than an occasional gasp):
- Place in recovery position
- Check for continued breathing
- Send or go for help
- Reassess continuously until help arrives

Send or go for Help if not Breathing* ⇩

B



Breathe
Administer 2 effective breaths



If difficulty with breathing:
- Remove obvious obstructions from mouth
- Ensure adequate head tilt-chin lift
- Make up to five attempts if necessary

⇩



Assess Circulation
Check for movement/pulse for up to 10 seconds



Circulation present ⇨

If signs of circulation present:
- Continue rescue breathing
- Assess circulation every minute
- Place in recovery position if breathing returns.
- Reassess continuously until help arrives

No circulation ⇩

Shoulders directly above sternum

C




Compress Chest
100/minute (almost 2 compressions/second)

Adult:	Children:
15 compressions followed by 2 effective breaths	5 compressions followed by 1 effective breath




* If you are on your own:
- Perform one minute of CPR before going for help if the victim is an infant or child, or if the likely cause is drowning or trauma
- Go for help before starting breathing for all non-trauma adults who have not drowned
- Continue CPR until signs of life or qualified help arrives


2002
Choking Algorithm
2002
Conscious Victim
Able to cough, talk or breathe?
Yes
Encourage to cough
No
Able to safely place head lower than chest?
Yes
Up to 5 back slaps
No
Successful?
No
Adult/Adolescent
Up to 5 Abdominal thrusts
Small Child/Infant
Up to 5 Chest thrusts
Still Conscious?
Yes
Yes
No
Unconscious Victim
Call for assistance
Open Airway
Assess Breathing?
Breathing present
• Place in recovery position
• Check for continued breathing
• Send or go for help
• Reassess continuously until help arrives
Not Breathing
Finger Sweep
(Small Child/Infant: Only if object visible)
Send for Help
Breathe
Able to give 2 effective breaths?
Yes
• Assess circulation
• Start chest compressions or continue rescue breathing if necessary
No
Adult/Adolescent
Up to 5 Abdominal thrusts
Small Child/Infant
Up to 5 Back slaps and up to 5 Chest thrusts if necessary

AIRWAY

We need to understand what the respiratory system consist of in order to know how to open, maintain and protect the airway.
We inhale approximately 21% oxygen - 78% nitrogen - and 1% of other gases.
A adult should breathe 12 to 20 breaths per minute.
After 4 to 6 minutes without oxygen the brain may be severely or permanently damaged, more than 10 minutes without oxygen might cause irreversible brain damage or even death.

The upper and lower airway contain all the structures in the body to help us to breathe. As the diagram indicates the upper airway contains the nose, mouth and throat.
The lower airway consists of the larynx, trachea, main bronchi and other air passages within the lungs.



THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF UPPER AIRWAY OBSTRUCTION ARE:

- Tongue
- Foreign objects
- Trauma
- Blood and vomitus
- Disease

PARTIAL AIRWAY OBSTRUCTION:

This occurs when the airway is partially blocked by any of the above, but air can still reach the lungs.

- Grabs at his throat - DISTRESS SIGNAL
- Abnormal breath sounds.
- Air hunger.
- Tachypnea (Rapid respirations)
- Dyspnea (Shortness of breath or difficulty breathing)
- May be cyanosed (A bluish, gray skin colour caused by reduced levels of oxygen in the blood.

COMPLETE AIRWAY OBSTRUCTION:

This is the complete closure of the airway with no breathing possible at all. This is a real life - threatening Situation, as the patient will become hypoxic (Air absent) very quickly, and may die if there is no medical intervention.

If patient is conscious

- Cannot speak
- Tries to cough
- Cyanosis (Blue)
- Decreasing LOC (Level of consciousness)

Unconscious patient

- No sign of breathing
- Cyanosed
- No air entry with ventilations
- All signs/ symptoms of shock

IF THE AIRAY IS BLOCKED, THE PATIENT CANNOT BREATH AND DEATH WILL OCCUR WITHIN MINUTES.

FOLLOW THESE STEPS TO OPEN THE AIRWAY

- Initial assessment should identify absence in breathing
-

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
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



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

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R 2,950.00

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


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Introduction To Close Protection
Terminology and Structure of a Close Protection Team
Personal Escort Section
Advance Team
Venue Assessment and Perimeter Protection
Threat Assessment

Introduction to Protective Services Weapons and Equipment
Basic Firearm techiniques
Protocol & Ettiquette
Unarmed Combat Techniques
Close Quarters Combat (CQC)
Escort formations

Profile and Code of Conduct of a CPO
Embus & debus of vehicles
Transit Protection and Motorcades
First Aid/CPR
Abseiling
Planning
Practical Exercises & Critique





EVEL COURSE R 4,950.00 (10 DAYS)

Covers all the material in the Introductory Course as well as:
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The Protective Escort Section
The Advance party
Attack Recognition for Formations
Embus and debussing (Advanced)
Defensive Tactics & CQC

Edged weapon combat
Weapon disraming techniques
Team tactics and defensive tactics
Restraint and control techniques
Basic firearm understanding and training
Target shooting skills
First Aid
Protocol & Ettiquette
Planning & Field Work

Live fire simulations
Surveillance & Counter Surveillance
Vehicle and Building Search Procedures
Protocol and Etiquette
Advance Operations
Conducting Briefings
Command Post Operations
Abseiling: rescue
Practical Exercises



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- INTRODUCTION TO CLOSE PROTECTION
- TERMINOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
- PROTOCOL & EIQUIETTE
- PLANNING
- THREAT ASSESSMENT
- HANDELING OF A FIREARM
- UNARMED COMBAT
- TRANSIT PROTECTION & MOTORCADES
- DEBUSS & ENBUSS
- FOOT FORMATIONS (SOLO & TEAMS)
- MEDICAL - EQUIVALENT TO LEVEL 1
- ABSEILING

INTERMEDIATE COURSE - LEVEL 2 R4 950 00 7 DAYS

- COVERS ALL MATERIAL IN THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE AS WELL AS:
- PROTECTIVE FORMATIONS (SOLO AND TEAM)
- MOTORCADES (TACTICAL MANOEVRES)
- EVACUATION AND DIVERSION PROCEDURES
- INTRODUCTION TO ELECRONIC DEVICES (SUVEILLANCE EQIUPMENT)
- REALISTIC TRAINING (FIREARMS)
- RESTRAINT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES
- ABSEILING (RESCUE)
- VEHICLE AND VENUE SEARCH TECHNIQUES
- SPECIALISED DISARMING TECHNIQUES
- MEDICAL - EQUIVALENT TO LEVEL 2

ADVANCE COURSE - LEVEL 3 - R 8 950 00 10 DAYS

- COVERS ALL ABOVE PLUS
- ADVANCE DRIVING TECHNIQUES
- SURVEILLANCE/COUNTER SURVEILLANCE (SPECIALISED ELECTRONIC DEVICES)
- MEDICAL - BUDDY AID
- THEAT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING IN DEPTH
- COMMAND POST OPERATIONS
- CONDUTING BRIEFINGS
- ADVANCE OPERATIONS (FIELD WORK)
- LIFE FIRE SIMULATIONS
- DISGUISING TECHNIQUES
- SIMULATION BASED TRAINING

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